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Law, Employment Contracts, and Labor Market Performance
* 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on employment and labor law. The goal of the review is to 
understand why every jurisdiction in the world has extensive employment law, particularly 
employment protection law, while most economic analysis of the law suggests that less 
employment protection would enhance welfare. The review has three parts. The first part 
discusses the structure of the common law and the evolution of employment protection law. 
The second part discusses the economic theory of contract. Finally, the empirical literature 
on employment and labor law is reviewed. I conclude that many aspects of employment law 
are consistent with the economic theory of contract – namely, that contracts are written and 
enforced to enhance ex ante match efficiency in the presence of asymmetric information and 
relationship specific investments. In contrast, empirical labor market research focuses upon 
ex post match efficiency in the face of an exogenous productivity shock. Hence, in order to 
understand the form and structure of existing employment law we need better empirical tools 
to assess the ex ante benefits of employment contracts. 
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"Take nothing on its looks; take everything on evidence. There’s no better rule."
- Charles Dickens, Great Expectations
1 Introduction
New jobs and relationships are often founded with great expectations. Yet, despite one’s best efforts, jobs
and relationships may end prematurely. These transitions might be the result of an involved search for
better opportunities elsewhere, or in the less happy cases they may stem from problems in the existing
relationship. These endings can be difﬁcult, especially when parties have made signiﬁcant relationship-
speciﬁc investments. The purpose of this chapter is to review the role that employment and labor law play
in regulating such transitions. This body of law seeks a balance between the need to enforce promises made
under great expectations and the need to modify those promises in the face of changed circumstances.
The chapter’s scope complements the earlier chapter on labor-market institutions in Volume 3 of this
handbook by Blau and Kahn (1999). That chapter focused on policies affecting wage-setting institutions.
Like much of modern empirical labor economics, Blau and Kahn (1999) use the competitive model of wage
determination as the central organizing framework. Economists begin with the competitive model because
it provides an excellent ﬁrst-order model of wage and employment determination. The competitive model
assumes that wages reﬂect the abilities of workers as observed by the market; this information, combined
with information about a worker’s training, provides sufﬁcient information for the efﬁcient allocation of
labor.
Even if a labor market achieves production efﬁciency, it may nevertheless result in an inequitable distri-
bution of income, as well as inadequate insurance for workers against unforeseen labor shocks. A number
of institutions—such as a minimum wage, unions, mandated severance pay, unemployment insurance, and
centralized bargaining—are viewed as ways to address these inequities and risks. Given that a competitive
market achieves allocative efﬁciency, then these interventions necessarily result in allocative inefﬁciency.
Hence, the appropriate policy entails a trade-off between equity and efﬁciency. For example, Lazear (1990)
views employment law as the imposition of a separation cost upon ﬁrms wishing to terminate or replace
workers. From this perspective, the policy issue is whether or not the equity gains from employment law
are worth the efﬁciency costs. Many policymakers, such as the OECD and the World Bank, have taken the
view that these employment regulations have for the most part gone too far—that they restrict the ability of
countries to effectively adjust to economic changes and make workers worse off in the long run.1
1See the inﬂuential Jobs Study by the OECD (1994) and the recent work by the World Bank economists Djankov and Ramalho
(2009).
1Notwithstanding the mainstream skepticism toward efforts to regulate the employment relationship, it
remains true that some form of employment law has operated in every complex market society for at least
the last 4000 years— for example, the ﬁrst minimum wage laws on record date back to Hammurabi’s code
in 2000 BC. This chapter therefore takes a somewhat different perspective, drawing upon the literature
in transaction-cost economics pioneered by Coase (1937), Simon (1957), and Williamson (1975), as well
as the work on law and institutions by Posner (1974) and Aoki (2001). This research on the economics
of institutions, like empirical labor economics, begins with the hypothesis that long-lived institutions are
successful precisely because they are solving some potential market failure. Accordingly, this chapter is or-
ganized around the following question: How can labor-market institutions be viewed as an efﬁcient response
to some market failure? Just as the competitive-equilibrium model supposes that wages are the market’s best
estimate of workers’ abilities, the institutional-economics program views successful institutions as solving
a resource-allocation problem.
This approach does not assume that these institutions are perfect. On the contrary, just as the competi-
tive model yields predictions regarding how wages and employment respond to shock, the hypothesis that
institutions efﬁciently solve a resource-allocation problem generates predictions regarding the rise and fall
of these institutions. Important precursors to this approach are found in labor economics. In a classic paper,
Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) suggest that we should be able to understand union behavior, including
the strike decision, as the outcome of the interaction between several interested parties. The work of Card
(1986) demonstrates that observed contracts cannot be viewed as achieving the ﬁrst best, and hence trans-
action costs are a necessary ingredient for understanding the observed structure of negotiated employment
contracts. Despite this early progress, the literature I review is still undeveloped. We do not have a good
understanding of how the law works, nor do we understand the impact of legal rules on economic perfor-
mance. In an effort to summarize what is known, this review is divided into three sections that correspond
to coherent bodies of research.
Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the structure of employment law and discusses some exemplary cases. A full
review of employment law is not provided—for an excellent review, see Jolls (2007). My more modest
goal is to provide some relevant insights into what law is and how it works. This sort of targeted inquiry
is desirable because the standard assumption in economics is that the law enforces contracts as written. In
practice, private law imposes no restrictions on behavior. It is mainly an adjudication system that can, after
a careful review of the evidence, exact monetary penalties upon parties who have breached a duty. Hence,
private law is a complex system of incentive mechanisms that affects the payoffs of individuals but does
not typically constrain their choices. The distinction is important for economics because it is convenient
to model legal rules as hard constraints on behavior—that is, as structuring the available moves in a game
rather than just altering some of the expected payoffs. This approach also implies, wrongly, that rules apply
equally to all individuals. Treating private law as an incentive system, instead, implies that the impact of the
law is heterogeneous—an individual’s response to a legal rule will vary with an individual’s characteristics,
such as wealth, attitudes toward risk, and the evidence that one can present in court.
2Heterogeneity and information also play key roles in the theory of employment contracts reviewed in
Section 3 . The past forty years have witnessed tremendous progress in the economic theory of contract,
especially in terms of teasing out how a particular set of parties should design a contract given the transaction
costs characterizing the employment relationship. The inﬂuential principal-agent model, for example, was
developed in the context of the insurance contract, which speciﬁes state-contingent payments.2 The modern
theory of contract, building on the work of Grossman and Hart (1986), recognizes that an important function
of economic institutions and contracts is the efﬁcient allocation of authority and decision rights within a
relationship.
Most economists agree that unions and employment law affect the relative bargaining power of indi-
viduals. These institutions are usually interpreted as mere re-distribution of rents, and so any allocation of
bargaining power that results in prices diverging from competitive levels is inherently inefﬁcient. The mod-
ern literature on contract views authority as an instrument for mitigating transaction costs due to asymmetric
information and holdup. This perspective also naturally admits a role for fairness in decision-making, and
hence can provide an economic rationale for why fairness concerns are important in the adjudication of a
dispute.3
Section 3 also discusses the empirical content of these models. The modern empirical literature is con-
cerned with identifying a causal link between various labor-market interventions and performance. Unfor-
tunately, much of the economic theory of contract is not amenable to this approach. These models typically
describe how matches with certain observable features (X variables) result in an employment-compensation
package (Y variables). As Holland (1986) makes clear, these are not causal relationships, but merely associ-
ations. For example, the predicted relation between the sex of a worker and the form of his/her employment
contract is not causal, since the sex of a worker is not a treatment variable.
This distinction is useful because it helps explain the gulf between much of the theory discussed in
Section 3 and the empirical evidence discussed in Section 4. It is also worthwhile to keep in mind that all
economic models are false. This does not imply that these models are not useful. As Wolfgang Pauli quipped
regarding a paper by a young colleague - “it’s not even wrong!” 4 Rather, economic models are decision aids
that guide further data collection and help in selecting between different policy interventions. The upshot
for empirical researchers is that one typically tests the associations that the theory predicts, rather than the
theory itself. Empirical determinations of the validity of these associations can help us decide whether and
to what extent we can rely on the model as a decision aid.
The theory section discusses how contract theory can be used to understand employment law, and the
conditions under which it may be desirable. We begin with a discussion of how contract design is affected
by the interplay between risk, asymmetric information and the holdup that arises from the need for parties
to make relationship speciﬁc investments. These models can be used to explain the role of the courts in
2See Pauly (1968).
3See ? for a fuller discussion of this point.
4See Peierls (1960). It is also worthwhile to point out that even though Newtonian physics is false, it is all that one needs for
most practical applications.
3enforcing the employment contract. The recent property rights theory of the ﬁrm developed by Grossman
and Hart (1986) illustrates the importance of governance and the associated allocation of decision rights in
order to achieve an efﬁcient allocation.5 A contract is an instrument that explicitly allocates certain decision
rights between the contract parties. This can also be achieved with unions. This section discusses how the
appropriate allocation of power and decision rights can enhance productive efﬁciency. Thus, these theories
provide conditions under which union power may enhance productive efﬁciency, as suggested by Freeman
and Medoff (1984).
Section 4 reviews the empirical evidence on employment and labor law. Here we are concerned with
explicitly causal statements such as the question of whether or not a reduction in dismissal barriers will
reduceunemployment. Thisisacausalinquirybecauseitcomparestheoutcomesfromtwodifferentchoices:
having more or less employment protection law. Subsection 4.2 discusses the literature on unions that
addresses two questions. First, does unionization of a workforce increases productive efﬁciency? Second,
does unionization increase or decrease ﬁrm proﬁts? Even if a union increases productive efﬁciency, if the
increase in rents extracted by the unions is greater than the increase in productive efﬁciency, then proﬁts
would fall as a consequence, which in turn may lead to a decrease in unionization. The chapter concludes
with an assessment of the evidence and a discussion of future directions for research.
2 The Law
“The law embodies the story of a nation’s development through many centuries, and it cannot
be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. In
order to know what it is, we must know what it has been, and what it tends to become.”
Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, 1881.
The purpose of this section is not to provide a comprehensive review of employment law. Rather, the goal
is to provide a sense of how the employment law has developed so that one might better understand its
impact on the employment relationship.6 In the United States, employment law is primarily the domain of
the states. Section 4 reviews several empirical studies that have exploited the natural experiments resulting
from variations in state laws to measure the impact of various laws on economic performance. Overlaying
the state laws are a number of federal statutes affecting the employment relationship, including the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 (allowing workers to organize collective bargaining units), Fair Standards
Act of 1938 (establishing minimum employment standards), Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1973 (ERISA) (ensuring that employee beneﬁts meet national standards), Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSHA) (establishing minimum health and safety standards in the workplace), and Family and
Medical Leave Act (establishing protections for leave related to personal sickness or family emergencies).
These laws are enumerated in Table 1.
5See Hart (1995) for a full discussion of this approach.
6See Jolls (2007) for a survey of employment law, and Rothstein and Liebman (2003) for a more comprehensive review of US
law. Gould IV (2004) provides an accessible discussion of American labor law, and how it differs from European labor law.
4Table 1: United States Employment Laws
Racial Discrim-
ination
Civil Rights Acts of 1866,
1964
1866 Bars racial discrimination by employers.
Social Security Social Security Act 1935 Distributes social security beneﬁts to those of retirement age.
Minimum
Wage
Fair Labor Standards Act 1938 Establishes a minimum hourly wage.
Overtime
Rights
Fair Labor Standards Act 1938 Requires that employers pay a higher wage for work exceeding 40
hours a week.
Child Labor Fair Labor Standards Act 1938 Places limits on many forms of child labor.
Gender Dis-
crimination
Civil Rights Act of 1964 1964 Prohibits gender-based discrimination.
Religious Dis-
crimination
Civil Rights Act of 1964 1964 Prohibits discrimination against employees on the basis of religion.
Age Discrimi-
nation
Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act





1970 Establishes minimum standards for workplace safety.
Good Faith Ex-
ception
Fortune v. National Cash Reg-
ister Co., 373 Mass. 96
1977 Provides for a wrongful discharge claim against employers violating
the common-law contract duty of good faith and fair dealing.
Public Policy
Exception
Tameny v. Atlantic Richﬁeld
Co., 27 Cal.3rd 167
1980 Provides for a wrongful discharge claim against employers when the
discharge would be a violation of public policy, for example, when the
employee is ﬁred for refusing to commit a crime.
Implied Con-
tract Exception
Wooley v. Hoffmann-La Roch,
99 N.J. 284
1985 Provides for a wrongful discharge claim against employers when an
employment contract is implied.
Sexual Harass-
ment
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son, 477 U.S. 57
1986 Recognizes sexual harassment as a violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.
Layoff Notice Worker Adjustment and Retr-
raining Notiﬁcation Act











1990 Prohibits discrimination based on disability.
Pregnancy Dis-
crimination
Civil Rights Act of 1991 1991 Probits discrimination against employees because they are pregnant.
Medical Leave
Protection
Family and Medical Leave
Act
1993 Requiresemployerstoallowworkers12weeksofunpaidmedicalleave
for certain medical conditions of themselves or close relatives.
5WhiletheprimaryconcernofthepresentchapteristheUnitedStates, studiesofemploymentlawinother
countries are also discussed. Blanpain (2003), for example, provides a comprehensive review of European
law. As in the United States, European law is complicated by the fact that both individual countries and
the European Parliament create rules that affect the employment relationship. More generally, all countries
in the world have some system of employment laws, created and adapted to the circumstances of each
jurisdiction.
One chapter cannot do justice to the dizzying complexity of the law across jurisdictions, even if attention
were restricted to a narrow area such as employee-dismissal law. As the quote from Holmes Jr. (1881)
illustrates, legal systems are complex systems that evolve over time to resolve the variegated disputes faced
by parties of commercial transactions. To make sense of this complexity, I follow the lead of the law-and-
economics movement as epitomized in the work of Richard Posner, who argues that the law, especially the
commonlaw, hasevolvedovertimetoaddresstheneedsofindividualstradinginamarketeconomy.7 Posner
(2003) explicitly poses the rhetorical question: “How is it possible, the reader may ask, for the common
law—an ancient body of legal doctrine, which has changed only incrementally in the last century—to make
as much economic sense as it seems to?”8
The claim is not that the entire body of rules and norms governing economic activity can be viewed as
the solution to the problem of efﬁciently organizing economic activity. Rather, the claim is that individ-
ual rules have evolved to solve particular problems that appeared repeatedly before the courts. From this
perspective ﬂow some observations that may help explain the theoretical and rhetorical gaps between legal
rule making, economic models of the labor market, and economic policy making. The advantage of the
economic approach is that it allows one to explore the empirical implications of a simpliﬁed representation
of the law. The disadvantage, particularly for purposes of economic policy analysis, is that the simplifying
assumptions may miss key characteristics of the law that are important in practice.
This gap between law and economics is particularly salient in laws protecting employees from discharge,
wrongful or otherwise. In economics, employment protections are typically modeled as a form of turnover
costs, leading to the view that such laws probably interfere with an economy’s efﬁcient response to shocks.
As a consequence, organizations such as the OECD (see OECD (1994)) have advocated reducing or aban-
doning employment protections. Recent work by Blanchard and Tirole (2008) addressing how France and
other countries should design unemployment insurance and employment protection concludes that there is
no role for the law beyond enforcing employment contracts.
Nonetheless, as a matter of law, there are no jurisdictions where courts enforce all privately agreed-upon
contracts. Labor contracts with young children, for example, are almost universally prohibited. Generally
speaking, there is a substantial gap between the law in practice and the law as represented in many economic
models of employment. One reason for this gap is that legal practitioners rarely have any reason to use an
explicitly economic approach to understand the form of a particular contract. Lawyers typically represent
clients in cases after the fact; the question of why a legal rule exists is not important to them. The real issue
7See Ehrlich and Posner (1974), and also Posner’s classic work, Economic Analysis of Law, now in its seventh edition.
8See pg. 252.
6is to predict how a judge will rule and then present the case so that their client will do as well as possible in
what is essentially a negative-sum game between the plaintiff and defendant. In this game, the details of the
law are crucial, but the reasons why they have a particular form are not usually relevant.9
In consequence, the concerns of the legal scholar are quite different from those of the economist, which
in turn creates a gap between the law as it exists and the law as modeled in economics.10 The goal of the next
two sections is to narrow that gap ever so slightly, at least in the context of employment regulation. The next
subsection discusses the generic structure of the law. Even though legal rules vary greatly from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction, the notion of law and how it works has some universal features. More speciﬁcally, Subsection
2.1 examines three well-known employment-law cases in the United States and the United Kingdom. These
cases illustrate the complex problem faced by a judge in an employment dispute. Moreover, as these cases
demonstrate, thecourtsarenotpassiveagents; theyplayanactiveroleinresourceallocation. Consistentwith
the “Posnerian” perspective, the decisions in some cases can be viewed as enhancing economic performance.
2.1 What is Law?
The notion of a legal rule dates back at least as far as 2000 BC, with the Babylonians following Hammurabi’s
code and the Mesopotamians following the code of Urukagina. While some of these ancient edicts imply
curious beliefs about causality,11 it is clear that the purpose of many of these rules is to modify or constrain
human behavior. For as long as law has existed, its purpose has been to facilitate the efﬁcient functioning of
civil society.
The aforementioned codes even had room for what we would now call labor law. Hammurabi’s code
includes, for example:
• Minimum wage rules: “If any one hire a day laborer, he shall pay him from the New Year until the
ﬁfth month (April to August, when days are long and the work hard) six gerahs in money per day;
from the sixth month to the end of the year he shall give him ﬁve gerahs per day.”
• Liability rule: “If a herdsman, to whom cattle or sheep have been entrusted for watching over, and
who has received his wages as agreed upon, and is satisﬁed, diminish the number of the cattle or
sheep, or make the increase by birth less, he shall make good the increase or proﬁt that was lost in the
terms of settlement.”
These are remarkable examples of how legal rules are created to regulate the employment relationship. That
minimum wage rules persist to this day suggests that there are robust reasons for the existence of such rules.
9Furthermore, judges are often suspicious of economics arguments and statistical evidence—so economic arguments might even
be counterproductive. See the discussion by Posner (2008) and Breyer (2009).
10See discussion in MacLeod (2007b).
11Hammurabi’s code, Paragraph 2, decrees: “If any one bring an accusation against a man, and the accused go to the river and
leap into the river, if he sink in the river his accuser shall take possession of his house. But if the river prove that the accused is not
guilty, and he escape unhurt, then he who had brought the accusation shall be put to death, while he who leaped into the river shall
take possession of the house that had belonged to his accuser.”
7Recognizing this possibility, the law-and-economics approach seeks to explain the rules as solutions to well-
deﬁned market imperfections. Ostrom (2000), for example, has shown that many societies have developed
efﬁcient systems of rules and adjudication for regulating the use of common-pool resources, thereby avoid-
ing the tragedy of the commons (Hardin (1968)). Ostrom observes that all successful commons-governance
regimes consist of a set of rules that have the following features:
1. The rules are commonly known;
2. There are penalties for breaking rules that increase in intensity with the severity and frequency of
violation;
3. There is an organization or an individual who is responsible for imposing penalties when informed;
and
4. There is a process of adjudication when there are disagreements regarding whether an offense has
occurred and what penalty should be imposed.
All organizations, including ﬁrms and families, have rule systems with these features. The economic anal-
ysis of such rule systems typically entails asking what set of rules would achieve an efﬁcient allocation.12
In the common-pool-resource problem, for example, one seeks a set of rules ensuring that each person with
access does not overuse the resource. Organizational economics tries to determine which systems of rules
and compensation in ﬁrms or public entities ensure that agents reveal useful information and choose efﬁcient
levels of effort.
What distinguishes the law’s rule system from a family’s or organization’s is not the existence of binding
rules, but the sources of enforcement and adjudication. When we speak of a legal system, we mean the set of
rules and associated penalties that are enforced by the state.13 As discussed above, however, the jurisdiction
associated with a dispute is often poorly deﬁned. Even when the jurisdiction is well-deﬁned, disputes can
often be decided by multiple judicial bodies (including private mediation and arbitration). Many countries,
such as Italy and the United Kingdom, maintain a separate system of courts for ruling on employment
disputes. In the United States, disputes regarding a collective-bargaining agreement may be brought before
the National Labor Relations Board, employment disputes before a state court, and Title VII discrimination
suits before a federal court.
To illustrate what we mean by a legal system (and employment law in particular), let us consider the
proverbial worker-ﬁrm relationship. In the standard neoclassical model of employment, the worker agrees
to supply L hours of labor for a wage w: This can be viewed as a supply contract where the hours are, say,
12Determining the optimal system for selecting a course of action given the preferences of individuals, the technology of the
environment, and the information available is the subject of mechanism design theory. See Jackson (2001).
13It is worth highlighting the fact that a set of written rules is not a requirement, nor even a deﬁning feature of a legal system.
In the Middle Ages, the subjects of a feudal lord faced a number of rules regulating their life on the manor, most of which were
not written (Bloch (1961)); nonetheless, the set of rules was widely understood. Written rules do have good social consequences,
however, byassistingwithevidentiaryissuesandfacilitatingagreementamongpartiesregardingtheapplicablerule. Inter-subjective
agreement on the law is an important issue in modern labor law, as we shall see in the case of employee handbooks.
8consulting time. In that case, the relationship would be governed by contract law. The worker must supply
L hours, and the employer must pay wL dollars.
Should the worker supply less than L hours, the worker has breached the contract. Suppose that the ﬁrm
has paid P0 in advance, a common practice if the worker is, for example, a lawyer. Some sort of binding
agreement is needed; otherwise, the worker would simply take the P0 and try to ﬁnd employment elsewhere.
The question, then, is: What incentives does the worker have not to breach the agreement?
One possibility is the use of an informal enforcement mechanism. This would include ﬁrms’ telling
each other that the individual has breached, and hence should not be dealt with.14 Another alternative is to
use physical violence against the individual, a common technique in the illegal drug trade and other black
markets.15 While both enforcement systems are still widely used, societies have evolved more legalistic
systems of adjudication for the simple reason that parties sometimes fail to perform even if they act in good
faith. Enforcement systems that trigger punishment regardless of the reason for breach, such as violence
among drug dealers, are simply not always efﬁcient.16
In contrast, if the contract is viewed as a legally binding agreement, then the breach of contract by the
worker gives the ﬁrm the right to seek damages in court. If the ﬁrm prevails, the court can order the worker
to pay damages to the ﬁrm; if the worker refuses to pay, the court can still enforce the decision by ordering
the seizure of the worker’s assets.
The fact that contract breach leads to the right to ﬁle suit—as opposed to an automatic penalty—is a
feature that distinguishes legal enforcement from other forms of rule systems, such as rewards within a ﬁrm.
In the economics literature, it is common to view any agreement between parties that links future rewards
to actions as a “contract.” Jensen and Meckling (1976), for example, famously proposed that one should
conceptualize a ﬁrm as a “nexus of contracts.” If all contracts are enforceable at negligible cost, a reward
system that promotes an employee for good performance and an agreement with an outside supplier to pay a
bonus for sufﬁcient quality are assumed to be equally enforceable. If employment contracts are enforceable
at no cost, subject only to information constraints, then explaining contract form requires only that one
carefully specify the environment and then use principal-agent theory to work out the optimal contract.
The difﬁculty, as Williamson (1991) observes, is that the law uses forbearance for transactions within
a ﬁrm. Even if a ﬁrm promises a promotion, that does not confer a right upon the worker to sue the ﬁrm
should the promotion not be offered. All dispute resolutions of this sort occur strictly within the ﬁrm, with
no appeal to an outside legal authority available. A full discussion of the role of courts in such disputes
must wait until the next subsection, but for now the relevant point is that for any contract between two legal
persons (in our example, ﬁrm and consultant), both parties always have the right to seek damages in court
should there be a breach of contract.17
That the decision to sue is discretionary implies that the same rule may have different effects depending
14Greif (1989) has some nice examples from the Maghrebi traders, who did write letters to each other in this regard.
15Naidu and Yuchtman (2009) document that criminal law, with punitive sanctions, was widely used to enforce employment
contracts in 19th century England.
16See MacLeod (2007a) for discussion and proof of this point.
17See Kornhauser and MacLeod (2011) for a discussion of the concept of a legal person.
9on the characteristics of the parties of the contract. The characteristics of the parties might even be the most
importantfactorinwhetheralawsuitisﬁled. Forexample, supposethatacompanyhasillegaldiscriminatory
hiring practices. If the market is thick, with plenty of employment alternatives, potential employees may not
ﬁnd it worthwhile to bring suit against the company. In a less friendly employment market, if an individual
believes he has been the victim of illegal discrimination and cannot ﬁnd another job, he may bring suit. This
point is illustrative of the fact that we will always ﬁnd differences between a legal rule on paper and the
same rule in practice.18
A second source of uncertainty is how the court will decide a case. In the case of the breaching consul-
tant, the court has to make two decisions, each of which is prone to statistical error: 1) deciding whether a
breach has occurred, and 2) if so, the damages to be paid. For damages, the general rule is that courts order
expectations damages—namely, the losses associated with the worker’s breach. An example of a formula
that the court might use is:
damages = P0 + w1L   wL;
= prepayment + costof replacement   promisedwagesnotpaid:
Here w1 is the wage for the replacement worker. The worker has to pay the costs associated with ﬁnding
a replacement worker rather than the value of the work done, due to contract law’s requirement that in-
jured parties make every effort to mitigate losses arising from breach. The mitigation rule is mandatory,
meaning that parties cannot contract around it. Employment law has many other mandatory rules; slavery is
prohibited, for example, as is discrimination on the basis of race, age, or sex.
Expectation is not the only way to calculate damages from contract breach. In a famous paper on
contract damages, Fuller and Perdue (1936) identiﬁed restitution and reliance as other possible measures of
damages.19 Restitution damages, for one, are intended to put the ﬁrm into the same ﬁnancial position—as if
the contract had never been signed. In our consultant example, restitution damages would only require the
worker to repay P0. Matters are less clear if P0 is paid to the worker so that he can buy passage to the job
site and secure accommodation. Suppose upon arriving, the worker is injured and cannot perform his duties;
the ﬁrm sues for breach. If the contract does not specify what happens in this contingency, a court may be
asked to ﬁll in the gaps in the agreement. Some other issues that might not be described in the contract (and
which the court must adjudicate) include whether the injured worker may be ﬁred or whether he must take
out a loan to repay P0:
Alternatively, the ﬁrm, in the expectation of being able to rely upon performance, may have paid for pas-
sage and accommodation. In that case, if the worker does not perform, then she may be asked to compensate
the ﬁrm for these reliance expenditures.
18Dunford and Devin (1998) have a nice discussion of how employee perceptions affect the decision whether to ﬁle suit. For a
review of the literature on the decision to ﬁle a suit, see Kessler and Rubinfeld (2007).
19This work has been inﬂuential in law and economics. Economists have used the three damages measures—expectations,
restitution, and reliance—as alternative legal rules that can be analyzed using the standard tools of economics. See, in particular,
Shavell (1984) and Rogerson (1984).
10Finally, the contract could have provided that a non-performing worker pay a ﬁne P0. In this case, non-
performance would not be a breach of contract, and a breach would occur only if the worker failed to pay
back P0. Notice that in this case, the damages would simply be P0, even under the expectation-damages
rule. This example illustrates that for the same exchange relationship there is no unique notion of contract
breach. Rather, the contract deﬁnes what constitutes breach, and then the courts must decide whether or not
to enforce the terms set out in the agreement.20
Deﬁning the conditions for breach is not a clear-cut exercise. For example, the contract could have
speciﬁed liquidated damages in the amount P0. In this case, breach would occur for non-performance, but
then the contract would direct the court to set damages at P0. This contract seems to be equivalent to the
previous one (indeed, most economic theories of contract would see them as equivalent), but there is an
important distinction. In the previous case, if the worker pays P0, no breach has occurred, and the ﬁrm has
no right to bring suit against the worker. In the liquidated-damages case, even if the worker offers to pay
P0, the ﬁrm still has a right to sue the worker because technically a breach has still occurred. Admittedly,
the ﬁrm would face an uphill battle in court if the worker had offered to pay—and normally would have no
reason not to accept the offer as part of a settlement agreement—but the right exists nonetheless. The ﬁrm
might believe, for example, that the worker abused the liquidated-damages clause, accepting the consulting
job only as a contingency in case another opportunity did not work out. If the ﬁrm’s belief is true, the
worker has arguably violated the requirement of good faith and fair dealing—another mandatory rule in the
common law of contracts. Arguing that the liquidated-damages clause no longer applies, the ﬁrm might ask
for expectation damages larger than P0.
Conversely, assume that the ﬁrm sets liquidated damages at three times P0. Breach occurs, and the
workerdeclaresthesedamagestobeunconscionablyhigh. Theworkermayhaveavalidclaimundercontract
law’s prohibition against penalty clauses. This doctrine—another mandatory rule—provides that liquidated
damages far exceeding the losses to the injured party will not be enforced by courts.
The prohibition on penalty clauses, along with the other examples of mandatory rules discussed above,
illustrate that the law allows for a signiﬁcant degree of judicial intervention into private contracts. Among
other things, a court can ﬁll in missing terms and refuse to enforce unreasonable terms. The decision whether
to intervene is often at the court’s discretion, but courts usually turn to the Uniform Commercial Code and
other statutes, as well as previous court decisions, to justify these interventions. Thus the legal system is
an adjudication process that modiﬁes contracts in the face of a breach as a function of past experience and
practice.
The extent to which courts should intervene into freely entered agreements has proven to be controver-
sial. Early scholars, such as MacNeil (1974), proposed that courts rely on many sources of information,
including industry custom and the history of the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, when
making a decision. If parties have a longstanding relationship, Macneil argued, contract terms should be
enforced within the context of the relationship. Macneil and many others believed that this sort of context-
20See MacLeod (2007a) for a discussion of whose reputational concerns interact with the breach decision. In particular, the
theory predicts that the party whose reputation is the most valuable should be the one who is responsible for initiating breach.
11sensitive adjudication could help repair the parties’ relationship and facilitate the continuation of mutually
beneﬁcial exchange. Most economic theories of contract, in contrast, work from the assumption that parties
have well-deﬁned interests and can draft agreements efﬁciently, implying that contracts should be enforced
as written. This presumption has led to a law-and-economics scholarship that mostly argues for the cur-
tailment of judicial discretion, and for a more systematic dependence upon basic economic reasoning when
ruling on a case (see Goetz and Scott (1980) and more recently Schwartz and Scott (2003)).
Regardless of one’s theoretical commitments, it remains the case that the law does not simply enforce
a set of well-deﬁned rules. The law does include a set of rules, but along with a system of adjudication
that results in a context-sensitive application of these rules to individual cases. This context sensitivity
includes, among other things, consideration for the idiosyncratic features of the parties. The basic principles
of contract law apply to all agreements between two parties, but more specialized bodies of law have evolved
to regulate speciﬁc classes of contracts. The insurance industry is regulated by a specialized area of contract
rules (for example, see Baker (2003)), as is employment law. It is to this latter body of law that we now turn.
2.2 Employment Law
Employment law evolved from contract law and master-servant law to deal with the unique problems char-
acterizing the modern employment relationship. The ﬁrst task is to determine the difference between 1) a
ﬁrm’s relationship with an outside contractor selling services, and 2) its relationship with an employee. The
difference not only affects the area of law that regulates the relationship, but it also affects the relevant tax
law. In the United States, the Internal Revenue Service will ﬁnd that an employment relationships exists
when “the person for whom services are performed has the right to control and direct the individual who
performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and
means by which that result is accomplished.”21
As this tax regulation exempliﬁes, the obligation of the employee is to follow his employer’s directions,
not to produce a speciﬁc service with particular characteristics. Simon (1951)’s model nicely captures this
distinction between sales and employment. In a sales contract, says Simon, the seller agrees to supply a
particular good or service x from the set of all possible goods and services X, and in exchange the buyer
agrees to pay a sum P. An employment relationship, in contrast, is characterized by a subset of all possible
goods and services, A  X; that represents the set of duties that the employer might ask the employee
to carry out. A might include the service x deﬁned in the aforementioned sales contract, but that single
task would normally be just one component in a broad complex of obligations deﬁning an employment
relationship. In exchange for a promise to carry out these duties, the employer agrees to pay a wage w.
Simon’s simple model highlights an essential feature of the employment relationship, namely, the ad-
missible scope of a person’s job as represented by the set A. The admissible set of tasks S  X—that is,
the set of acts that an employer is allowed by law to command—has been subject to a plethora of regulation
and litigation. For example, is it conscionable for a ﬁrm to require 50 hours a week? Can a manager ask her
21Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(d)-1(c)(2).
12assistant to commit crimes?
An employment relationship often begins with little formal agreement about the tasks the employee will
be asked to carry out. The longer the potential duration of the employment, the more incomplete the initial
employment agreement. Given the informal nature of such agreements, when disputes do arise the courts
will have little to rely upon when constructing the obligations of each party. With poorly deﬁned obligations,
determining whether a breach occurred presents a difﬁcult task, as does choosing an appropriate remedy.
The combination of extreme contract incompleteness and daunting litigation costs have convinced many
legal scholars that the appropriate default rule is at-will employment. The courts have converged to this
default rule partly because they now view employment law as an extension of contract law. That view
diverges signiﬁcantly from the early case law on employment disputes, which was mostly governed by
“master-servant law.”22 That old body of law consisted of a set of legal default rules developed in England
and the United States to deal with cases involving domestic servants. In the master-servant relationship, the
customary period of employment lasted one year; courts held that neither party should sever the relationship
before then.
In a widely cited work, Wood (1877) argued for replacing this law with the rule of at-will employment,
where both parties can sever the relationship whenever they wish and face no liability beyond the require-
ment that the employer pay her employee the agreed-upon wage for work already completed. Wood’s
argument was a pragmatic one, based on the bad experiences of many employers and employees with the
inﬂexibility of master-servant law. As detailed in Feinman (1978), the new rule was quickly adopted by
the New York courts and remains the default rule today. In California, the legislature adopted what is now
Section 2922 of the California Labor code, which provides that “employment, having no speciﬁed term,
may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other.”
The at-will-employment rule ﬁgures prominently in most economic models of the labor market. As
these models have it, workers and ﬁrms enter into relationships that are preferred to the alternatives in the
marketplace. Should a ﬁrm mistreat a worker, or have high standards for performance or number of hours
worked, the ﬁrm will have to pay relatively high wages or else the worker will leave. Similarly, if a worker
demands a higher wage or better working conditions, the ﬁrm is free to search for another worker who will
abide by the current arrangements. In equilibrium, all ﬁrms and workers are satisﬁed with their lot relative
to the alternatives.
The hypothesis of a perfectly competitive market can explain many broad features of wages and em-
ployment over time, but it cannot explain the emergence of the at-will-employment rule. This is an example
of model’s inability to explain the emergence of laws that seem to constitute reasonable responses to real
economic issues. That failure indicates ﬂaws in popular economic models—but not in economic reasoning
generally. Consider the case of child labor. As societies have become more wealthy, they have gradually
imposed stricter legal constraints on the minimum age and maximum hours for minors in the workplace.
By the perfectly-competitive-market hypothesis, these restrictions would be unjustiﬁed because only those
22See Feinman (1978) for a review of the development of this law.
13families for which child labor is efﬁcient would put their children to work rather than in school. On the
other hand, a more realistic economic inquiry recognizes the market imperfection imposed by liquidity
constraints: children (and parents) cannot borrow against future income arising from education, so many
families send their children to work for a short-term gain in income rather than invest in a long-term gain
from education. Investing in education results in superior overall welfare, so the choice to put children to
work is inefﬁcient. Laws that regulate child labor, like the Fair Labor Standards Act, are justiﬁed because,
by increasing the cost of child labor, they motivate families to substitute education for labor. By increasing
investments in education, these laws increase social welfare.
The analysis in the previous paragraph indicates the potential insight to be gained from an evolutionary
perspective when investigating the law and economics of employment law. Applying this perspective to
our law’s historical origins, we observe that employment law adapts to the changing macroeconomic envi-
ronment. One of the earliest labor statutes on record, the Ordinance of Labourers, addressed the problems
of unharvested crops, rising wages, and poaching of workers faced by English landowners at the height of
the Black Death. Similarly, in 1630, the Massachusetts General Court placed a wage cap of 2 shillings a
day on skilled craftsmen, who were at that time taking advantage of limited supply. More recently, the Fair
Labor Standards Act became law in the midst of the Great Depression, when workers lacked market power
to ensure good working conditions. Mandatory overtime pay, meanwhile, incentivized ﬁrms to hire more
workers at fewer hours each, thereby serving as an income- and risk-sharing function.
These legal adaptations to changes in the labor-market environment can all be conceived as forms of
insurance, whether against the waste of unharvested crops, gouging by craftsmen, or unemployment. In the
next subsection, we discuss recent work based on the hypothesis that workers are risk-averse, which might
help explain some of the features of these laws. Certainly, both minimum-wage laws and unemployment
insurance can be viewed as forms of imperfect insurance.23
Once the issue of risk is put aside, the law-and-economics movement has tended to take the view that
employment at will is the optimal default rule (see, e.g., Epstein (1984)). Within economics, a tradition
including Friedman (1962) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972) has viewed labor services from the perspective
of the buyer-seller contract—with no remedies for contract breach. Speciﬁcally, Friedman argued that a
competitive market with free entry and exit is the most efﬁcient market form, even when contracts cannot
clearly specify quality. In his vision of the world, workers and ﬁrms trade freely within the context of the
sales contract (quality x in exchange for price p); should performance be inadequate, the worker would gain
a poor reputation and thereafter be excluded from the market.
There are two difﬁculties with this argument. The ﬁrst, as MacLeod (2007a) discusses, is that the
literature on relational contracts shows that reputational concerns are neither necessary nor sufﬁcient to
ensure efﬁcient exchange. Second, the common law has developed many doctrines that limit the freedom
of contract in the context of the simple buyer-seller model. Posner (2003) suggests that these developments
tend to enhance contract performance. Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009) present evidence that this is indeed
23The reader is referred to Blau and Kahn (1999) and Rogerson et al. (2005) for excellent reviews of this literature.
14the case for a large class of contracts that are common in the construction industry.
AstheSimonmodelhighlights, theemploymentrelationshipisdifferentbecauseperformanceobligation
is created ex post. If the worker accepts a contract with scope A  X, then the performance obligation is
created when the employer asks the employee to carry out x 2 A. If the relationship were governed
by standard contract law, then if the employee chooses xb 6= x the employer-cum-buyer could sue for
damages B(x)   B(xb), where B(x) is the beneﬁt to the employer of action x. Under employment at will
the general rule would be that the employer has no right to sue, but she can freely dismiss the employee,
even if performance is satisfactory.
Correspondingly, the employee has the right to leave whenever he wishes. For example, if the employer
asks the employee to carry out an action outside the scope of his duties, then under at-will employment
the employee has the right to refuse to carry out the task and ﬁnd another job. In contrast, in the case of a
construction contract, if the buyer were to ask for a modiﬁcation to the building plan, then under U.S. law
the contractor would have an obligation to carry out the modiﬁcation, but he would also have the right to
sue for the additional cost of the change if the buyer/builder does not adequately compensate him for the
changes.
The deﬁning feature of at-will employment is that in each period parties are free to renegotiate the
contract, with the outside options deﬁned by each parties’ market opportunities. Consistent with the Coase
theorem, we should expect at-will employment to give rise to arrangements that are ex post efﬁcient. This
observation has led some legal scholars (e.g., Epstein (1984)) to suggest that exceptions to employment at
will are inefﬁcient. Yet today in the United States, as in most other jurisdictions worldwide, the law of
wrongful discharge is alive and well. Indeed, there are clear exceptions to the rule of employment at will.
In the next section, we discuss three of the most important exceptions ﬁguring in recent empirical work on
employment law.
2.3 Exceptions to Employment at Will
This section discusses three exceptions to employment at will that have found broad support in U.S. courts.
These exceptions are judge-made laws, created in response to difﬁcult cases; hence, they are good examples
of how the common law evolves in response to the disputes that arise in practice. The three exceptions
we consider are 1) the public policy exception, protecting from employer retaliation those workers that act
in a way consistent with accepted state policy, 2) the implied contract exception, protecting workers who
can show that the implicit contract with the employer entails just-cause dismissal, and 3) the good-faith
exception, requiring employers and employers to behave in ways consistent with fair dealing.
U.S. courts rarely order speciﬁc performance—that is, the losing employer typically still has the right to
discharge the employee—and hence the issue is usually one of damages: How much should she have to pay
for this right? In other jurisdictions, however, reinstatement is sometimes considered an acceptable remedy.
One of the few U.S. cases in which speciﬁc performance was granted in an employment dispute was Silva
15v. University of New Hampshire.24
The question of damage awards is not straightforward, but economics can assist in organizing our
thinking. If markets are perfectly competitive—and a worker’s compensation is equal to his best market
alternative—dismissal does not entail any harm. However, as Mincer (1962) has shown, the second assump-
tion can break down when the worker’s training costs were signiﬁcant. If the worker paid for some of the
training costs, he will be compensated for them through increased future compensation, and therefore his
income may be in excess of the best market alternatives. More often, dismissal entails a costly job search
and possibly relocation. When an employee has been wrongfully discharged, the court will award damages
that reﬂect these costs.
An additional complication is whether the wrongful-discharge action comes under tort or contract law.
The ﬁrst exception to the at-will employment rule, a claim for wrongful discharge as violation of public
policy, is considered a tort claim.25 A tort claim, put brieﬂy, is distinguished from contract disputes by there
being no requirement for a prior contractual relationship. Standard examples include trafﬁc accidents and
medical malpractice. The practical implication of this distinction is that tort law allows for the recovery of
both consequential damages and punitive damages, which may far exceed the direct economic harm suffered
by the discharged employee. In contract law, consequential damages and punitive damages are in general
not recoverable.
2.3.1 Public Policy Exception
Under the public-policy exception, an employee may sue for wrongful discharge if he is dismissed for
conduct that is protected by law. Miles (2000) summarizes the four types of terminations that ﬁt under this
class of exception.26 They are (1) "an employee’s refusal to commit an illegal act, such as perjury or price-
ﬁxing"; (2) "an employee’s missing work to perform a legal duty, such as jury duty or military service";
(3) "an employee’s exercise of a legal right, such as ﬁling a workman’s compensation claim"; and (4) "an
employee’s ‘blowing the whistle,’ or disclosing wrongdoing by the employer or fellow employees."
A well-known example of the ﬁrst type of public-policy exception is the 1980 case Tameny v. Atlantic
Richﬁeld Co.27 Plaintiff Tameny, the dismissed employee, claimed that his discharge resulted from a refusal
to participate in the company’s unlawful price-ﬁxing scheme. Defendant Atlantic Richﬁeld argued that since
there was no employment contract, Tameny’s employment was at-will and could be terminated at any time.
The California Supreme Court ruled for Tameny, holding that an employer cannot discharge an employee
for refusing to perform an illegal act. The court further held that the employee can recover under tort law,
thereby allowing for potentially higher damages. On this last point, the moral distinction between tort and
contract—speciﬁcally, that a breach is blameless, but a tort is wrongful—is relevant. Atlantic Richﬁeld
24888 F.Supp. 293 (D.N.H. 1994) (granting a preliminary injunction preventing a tenured professor’s suspension for comments
that offended some students).
25See Rothstein and Liebman (2003), chapter 10.B.
26See page 78.
2727 Cal.3rd 167 (Calif. 1980).
16did not just breach a contract, it retaliated against an employee for refusing to do its criminal dirty work.
Consistent with our moral intuitions, the court considered the company’s conduct to be morally wrongful—
not just business as usual—and therefore established a legal mechanism for increased punishment of such
conduct.
Economic models of employment mostly ignore illegal activity on the part of employees, yet Tameny
and other cases involving the public-policy exception clearly demonstrate that some employers do ask em-
ployees to commit crimes. The economic implications of this rule are difﬁcult to tease out. In Tameny,
at least, the employee was asked to engage in anti-competitive activity, so in this case the public-policy
exception probably enhanced economic efﬁciency. But economic evaluations of public-policy cases are
generally more difﬁcult. If the illegal activity entails consumer goods, such as drugs or gambling, then the
public-policy exception likely decreases output, albeit in a direction that arguably enhances social welfare.
The prohibition against discharge for military service, meanwhile, reduces economic efﬁciency because it
prevents the employer from ﬁnding a more productive replacement. As with the illegal-consumer-goods
exception, the military-service exception to at-will employment arguably serves other social-welfare goals.
2.3.2 Implied Contract Exception
When a worker can verify that a permanent employment relationship is promised by his employer, such
employment can no longer be regarded as at-will and can be terminated only under just cause.28 Under
reigning court precedent in some states, if a personnel manual given to employees speciﬁes that termination
is only with cause, a binding contract exists. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roch was the ﬁrst opinion to hold that
employee handbooks can be part of a legally binding employment contract.29
The facts of Woolley are as follows. Plaintiff Richard Woolley was hired by defendant Hoffmann-La
Roche, Inc. in 1969 as section head in one of defendant’s engineering departments. The parties did not sign
a written employment contract, but plaintiff received a personnel manual which read, in part, that “[i]t is the
policy of Hoffmann-La Roche to retain to the extent consistent with company requirements, the services of
all employees who perform their duties efﬁciently and effectively.” In 1978, after Woolley’s submission of
a report on piping problems at one of defendant’s buildings, defendant requested that he resign. Plaintiff
refused, and he was ﬁred.
The trial court judge held for the defendant on summary judgment. On Woolley’s appeal, the New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for trial, holding that an employee’s handbook could
be evidence of a binding contract. The court couched its ruling in notions of fairness:
All that this opinion requires of an employer is that it be fair. It would be unfair to allow an
employer to distribute a policy manual that makes the workforce believe that certain promises
28See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (“When a prospective employee inquires about
job security and the employer agrees that the employee shall be employed as long as he does his job, a fair construction is that the
employer has agreed to give up his right to discharge at will...and may only discharge for cause”).
29Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roch, Inc., 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985).
17have been made and then to allow the employer to renege on those promises. What is sought
here is basic honesty: if the employer, for whatever reason, does not want the manual to be
capable of being construed by the court as a binding contract, there are simple ways to attain
that goal. All that need be done is the inclusion in a very prominent position of an appropriate
statement that there is no promise of any kind by the employer contained in the manual...
In this case, as in many others, one party is not completely truthful with the other party. This possibility is
ignored by most economic models of contract. Economists typically assume that both parties do what they
say they will do, and if they do not, any malfeasance is anticipated by the other party. The Woolley opinion
can be seen as requiring employers to comply with previous agreements not to engage in malfeasance. The
judgment does not prohibit dismissal without cause; it simply requires that employers honor promises not
to dismiss without cause.
Employee handbooks are not the only example of an implied contract. For example, Pugh v. See’s
Candies held that a long employment with regular promotion can establish a long-term contract.30 In this
case, the plaintiff-worker Pugh reported to company higher-ups that his current supervisor was a convicted
embezzler, for which the supervisor subsequently ﬁred him. Pugh ﬁled suit, but the trial court dismissed the
case at summary judgment. On appeal from the dismissal, the appellate court agreed that Pugh’s reporting
his supervisor’s past conviction was not “whistle-blowing” under the public policy exception, but the long
duration of Pugh’s good service was sufﬁcient to establish an implied contract. The court therefore reversed
and remanded the case for trial.31
This example illustrates a concrete case in which an employee is dismissed not because of an objective
failing (otherwise one could provide cause for dismissal) but because, essentially, he did not get along with
his new supervisor. If the contract were at-will, then dismissal would be immediate. This rule prohibits the
dismissal of long-term employees who may not ﬁt in, or, if delinquent in their performance, the employers
are unable to provide sufﬁcient evidence of this poor performance.
2.3.3 Good Faith Exception
The requirement of good faith and fair dealing is a mandatory rule in contract law, and consequently in
employment law. The employment cases involving this exception typically turn on the use of at-will em-
ployment by the employer to deprive the employee of compensation. In Mitford v. Lasala,32 the discharged
employee, who was a party of a proﬁt-sharing agreement with the defendant, was ﬁred to ensure that he
would not share proﬁts. The court held that “good faith and fair dealing...would prohibit ﬁring [an em-
ployee] for the purpose of preventing him from sharing in future proﬁts.”
Currently, courts typically ﬁnd a rather narrow application of this rule to the timing of dismissal and
30Pugh v. See’s Candies, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
31At trial, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the company notwithstanding the appellate court’s holding on implied contracts.
Pugh v. See’s Candies, 250 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
32666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 1963).
18payment of compensation, rather than to other forms of bad behavior by employers.33 Typical examples of
wrongful terminations that ﬁt under this class are: 1) a salesman being ﬁred right before his commissions
should be paid to him, and 2) an employee being dismissed in order to avoid paying retirement beneﬁts.
As we can see from Figure 1, there are many fewer states adopting this law than in the case of the implied
contract rule. Given the more narrow applicability of the rule, this may simply reﬂect the fact that courts in
these states have adhered more closely to the common-law principle of at-will employment, and hence there
was a need for statutory intervention to deal with cases where employers avoid paying compensation by a
preemptive dismissal. If so, then we might expect this rule to have a substantial impact.
This impact is not due to the effect upon ﬁring costs, but rather because it corrects poorly drafted con-
tracts. In the case of Mitford v. Lasala, the contract was quite clear, and it implied that the ﬁrm had no
obligation to pay the bonus. Most employees would expect to be paid in such a case, but at the time of
writing the agreement they simply would not expect the deception to occur. In such cases, the courts can
enhance productive efﬁciency by essentially completing an incomplete contract.
Consider now the case of Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.34 Plaintiff Orville E. Fortune, a
former salesman of National Cash Register Company (NCR), brought a suit to recover certain commissions
allegedly due from a sale of cash registers to First National Stores. Inc. Fortune had been employed by
NCR under a written contract that provided for at-will mutual terminable with notice. The contract also
speciﬁed that Fortune would receive an annual bonus computed as a percentage of sales that he performed
or supervised. In November 1968, Fortune was involved in a supervisory capacity in a sale of 2,008 cash
registers to First National, for which the bonus credit was recorded as $92,079.99. The next month, Fortune
was given notice of termination. NCR ended up keeping Fortune on staff in a demoted capacity and paid
him three-fourths of the First National bonus during the summer of 1969. Fortune requested the other 25
percent of the bonus, but his manager told him “to forget about it.” Fortune was ﬁnally asked to retire in
June 1970, and then ﬁred upon his refusal.
At trial, the jury was asked to render two special verdicts: “1. Did the Defendant act in bad faith ... when
it decided to terminate the Plaintiff’s contract as a salesman by letter dated December 2, 1968, delivered on
January 6, 1969? 2. Did the Defendant act in bad faith ... when the Defendant let the Plaintiff go on June 5,
1970?” The jury answered both questions in the afﬁrmative, and the judge ordered damages of $45,649.92.
The state supreme court afﬁrmed the judgment.
What is interesting about this case is that NCR did not breach the written terms of the agreement, but
the court nevertheless allowed a jury to ﬁnd that they had acted in bad faith in depriving Fortune of bonuses
from the transactions he helped procure. Fortune can be seen as an efﬁcient outcome in that it reduces
employee uncertainty about whether they will be rewarded for their efforts and thereby incentivizes optimal
investment in the employment relationship.
33See section 10.2 of Rothstein and Liebman (2003).
34373 Mass. 96 (Mass. 1977).
192.4 Discussion
The economic model of contract tends to view legal rules as constraints upon individual decision-making,
either in terms of increasing transaction costs or imposing constraints upon the wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment. In practice, the law is a complex adjudication system that is difﬁcult to describe
with an elegant model. Some of the distinctive features of a legal system that are not captured in the
economic model of the employment contract include:
1. Contract terms are not self-enforcing. Enforcement is a privately motivated activity that occurs when
a plaintiff brings a case before a court. Even rules that have bureaus dedicated to their enforcement—
such as the minimum wage and overtime requirements—rely on information provided by private
parties—as well as the volition of agency ofﬁcials. This demonstrates that enforcement is heteroge-
neous and a function of employer, employee, and regulator characteristics.
2. When a case is brought to a court, parties cannot rely upon the courts to enforce the agreement as writ-
ten. Excessive penalties for non-performance are not enforced, for example. Although employment
at will is the default rule in the United States, there are several exceptions.
3. Judges do not restrict themselves to contract terms, explicit or otherwise, as relevant legal factors.
Courts may collect a large body of evidence regarding the communications and actions of both parties
before reaching a decision. Thus, information regarding events not mentioned in the employment
contract may nevertheless play a role in adjudicating the dispute.
The fact that courts may overrule contract terms is well-recognized in the legal literature. One of the central
issues of this literature is the question of whether or not there is anything we can reasonably call “the law”
that allows one to consistently anticipate how courts will rule on a given dispute. There is a related debate
regarding how best to think about judicial behavior.35
Within economics, there is a small but growing literature that explores the role of the law in ensuring
performance. Johnson et al. (2002) ﬁnd that even if enforcement is imperfect, the existence of courts can
help entrepreneurs enter into new supply contracts. Djankov et al. (2003) construct a database consisting of
how costly it is to evict a tenant and collect on a bounced check across a large sample of countries, ﬁnding
that the cost of collection in civil-law countries is signiﬁcantly higher than in common-law countries. This
resultisconsistentwithsubsequent workreportedinDjankovetal.(2008)for theproblemofdebtcollection.
See La Porta et al. (2008) for a more comprehensive discussion of this literature.
For the most part, this work focuses on the costs of the legal system and assumes that variations in these
costs across jurisdictions affect economic performance. Botero et al. (2004), and more recently Djankov
and Ramalho (2009), explore the extent to which employment law and regulation affect labor market per-
formance. This work uses cross-country variation in measures of employment-law ﬂexibility to identify
the effects of the law upon labor-market performance. These papers suggest that the historical origin of
35See Stephenson (2009) for a nice summary of this debate.
20the country’s legal regime—whether common-law or civil-law—is often the decisive factor in the evolution
of the country’s employment rules. However, these papers do not explain this observation. One possible
interpretation, perhaps in need of further research, is that laws, like organisms, are adapted not just to the
environment but to other laws. The various laws in a legal system—of which employment law is a small
part— persist at a steady-state equilibrium unless an overwhelming shock—whether political or economic—
sufﬁces to move enough laws to another equilibrium to pull the rest of the legal regime along with them. The
rarity of such events—Russia’s transition to capitalism is a plausible example—might explain the durable
inﬂuence of common-law and civil-law institutions on employment laws.
Regardless of this latter conjecture, what is clear from the analysis above is that the law is adaptive, yet
existing work does not adequately explain why there is variation in the law. The plausible view taken here is
that the law evolves in response to cases brought before the courts. New types of disputes breed new types
of law. To understand why these cases arise, we need to understand what exactly is the role of the law in
an employment contract. In the next section, we review the literature on the economics of the employment
relationship, placing legal rules in the context of the full relationship.
3 The Economics of the Employment Relationship
Economic theories of employment begin with a model of human behavior and choice. The standard as-
sumption in economics models of employment is that the worker is a risk-averse individual who wishes to
maximize expected utility adjusted for the utility from doing speciﬁc tasks and the work environment.36 One
of the lessons of contract theory is that the optimal contract is often a complex function of the technology of
production, the characteristics of the prospective employer and employee, and the information available. In
order to highlight the empirical implications of the theory, we begin with a discussion of causality. We then
discuss economic models of the employment relationship, highlighting their empirical implications.
3.1 Why do we need models?
The purpose of this section is to review the role that economic theory plays in understanding the signiﬁcance
of the law. As discussed in Section 2, even though economic concerns shape the development of the law,
economic analysis as developed by the economics profession has played a relatively minor role in explicitly
guiding court decisions.37 While there may be no explicit accounting of economic effects, it is safe to say
that employment rules established by courts have measurable effects on the economy. Accordingly, the goal
of the theory discussed here is to structure empirical tests of the impact of employment policy on economic
performance.
The recent empirical work in labor economics has been greatly inﬂuenced by the potential-outcomes
framework, as beautifully exposited by Holland (1986).38 I shall brieﬂy review this approach when using
36See Rebitzer and Taylor (2010) for a discussion of recent research in behavioral economics as applied to labor economics.
37Forexample, seeJusticeBreyer(2009)’sobservationthateconomicsplaysasmallroleinU.S.SupremeCourtdecision-making.
38See also Angrist et al. (1996) and particularly Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for an up-to-date discussion.
21Table 3: Employment Law for a Selected Set of Countries
Country Min. Work Age Holidays OT Prem. Sev. Pay Ret. Ben. Yrs. Unemp. Wait Matern. Leave
Switzerland 15 9 1.25 0.0 1 5 4.5
United States 16 0 1.5 0.0 20 3 1.35
Singapore 12 11 1.5 12.9 5 n.a. 3.0
Finland 16 11 2.0 0.0 0 7 4.2
Italy 15 11 1.1 0.0 19 7 1.35
New Zealand 16 11 1.0 0.0 0 70 1.5
Portugal 16 12 1.5 12.9 15 0 2.0
Uruguay 15 5 2.0 12.9 35 0 4.1
Malaysia 14 10 1.5 2.14 20 n.a. 4.05
Mexico 14 7 2.0 18.04 10 n.a. 3.0
Lebanon 13 13 1.5 12.9 20 n.a. 3.5
Russia 16 9 2.0 8.6 25 0 12.0
Lithuania 14 11 1.0 8.6 30 8 2.0
Jordan 16 12 1.25 12.9 10 7 2.0
Morocco 12 11 1.25 0.0 9 n.a. 3.0
Indonesia 12 12 1.5 25.8 20 n.a. 2.25
Zimbabwe 17 11 1.0 0.0 10 n.a. 3.0
Armenia 16 13 1.5 6.45 25 0 6.0
India 14 5 2.0 6.43 10 n.a. 4.0
Vietnam 18 5 1.5 12.9 20 n.a. 3.0
Madagascar 14 2 1.3 4.2 15 n.a. 3.0
Mozambique 18 9 1.5 25.8 10 n.a. 0.0
Employment Rules in Sample of OECD Countries. The 85 countries studied in Botero et al. (2004) were ranked
by per capita income, and every fourth country was selected. The table presents measurements for the following
employment rules. Min. Work Age. The minimum legal age for attaining full-time employment. Holidays. Number
of legally mandated paid holidays per year. OT Prem. The premium for working overtime, as a multiple of normal-
time wages. Sev. Pay. Legally mandated severance payment for terminated workers, in week’s pay. Ret. Ben.
Yrs. Years of work required before a worker is eligible for retirement beneﬁts through the country’s social security
program. Obtained by multiplying the relevant index by 45 (the maximum observation in years) and subtracting that
number from 45. Unemp. Wait. Waiting period in days before a worker becomes eligible for unemployment beneﬁts.
Obtained by multiplying the relevant index by 70 (the maximum observation in days), and subtracting that number
from 70. “n.a.” indicates that the country does not offer unemployment beneﬁts. Matern. Leave. Number of months
of legally mandated maternity leave.
22economic theory to understand the effects of the law on labor-market performance. First, the framework
provides guidance on how to best organize and represent data. Second, it provides guidance on how to
estimate a causal effect. Holland emphasizes that it is impossible to establish a causal relationship without
some additional hypotheses that themselves can rarely be tested; they must rely on a model of how the world
works.
Formally, the model proceeds by supposing that we have a universe of units to be treated, denoted by
u 2 U. For the purposes of our discussion, let U denote all potential workers in the economy. In addition,
we might also be interested in outcomes at a state or country level. In that case we let us  U be the subset
of individuals living in state s 2 S, where s could denote a U.S. state among all states or one country among
all countries.
This chapter’s main concern is labor-market performance, so we restrict our attention to the question of
how policy might affect wages and employment. For individual u, let yE 2 Y E = f0;1g be employment
status (with 1 meaning employed), and let her wage per period be given by yw 2 Y W = [0;1). Suppose
that these outcomes will be observed in the next period (t). Employment and wages are likely to be affected
by employment policies in the next period, denoted by lt.
Rubin’s model was developed in the context of a medical treatment where one asks if a particular drug
has an effect. This question is typically answered by randomly dividing a group of individuals into a treat-
ment and a control group. The causal effect of the drug is measured by comparing the outcomes in the
two groups. The problem is that this procedure does not identify the effect of the treatment on a particular
individual. In some illnesses, individuals become well in the absence of treatment. For others, the illness
may be fatal regardless of the treatment. By chance, it is possible that all the former individuals (the false
positives) would be assigned to the treatment group, while the latter individuals (the false negatives) would
be assigned to the control group. In that case, the experiment would show that the drug had an effect, even
though it did not.
The ﬁrst issue is how to deﬁne a causal effect. In the context of our simple model, let y(u;l0;t) be the
outcome under the status-quo law in the next period, and let y(u;l1;t) be the outcome under the new rule,
say an increase in the minimum wage. Let  = l1 l0 denote the policy change. Following Holland (1986),
we say that the policy change  at date t causes the effect:
D(u;;t) = y(u;l1;t)   y(u;l0;t):
This deﬁnition is concrete: It is the difference in potential outcomes. In order to measure this “effect,”
we would have to observe the same outcome for two different policies at the same time, something that is
clearly impossible without time travel. Holland (1986) calls the impossibility of observing a causal effect
the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference. His analysis emphasizes the fact that measuring the causal
impact of a treatment entails additional hypotheses.
Most solutions to the problem of causal inference rely upon versions of unit homogeneity or time homo-
geneity. By unit homogeneity we mean that there is a set of units U0  U with the feature that the effect of
23the change  is the same for all u 2 U0, in which case the effect can be estimated by policy change to unit
u1 2 U0 but not to unit u0 2 U0, in which case for u 2 U0 we have:
D(u;;t) = y(u1;l1;t)   y(u0;l0;t):
By time homogeneity, we mean that the effect of the treatment in different periods is the same. Hence, if we
can estimate the effect of a treatment on a unit u by comparing the effect over time:
D(u;;t) = y(u;l1;t + 1)   y(u;l0;t):
The challenge then becomes ﬁnding the homogeneous group. Regression discontinuity is an example
of a recent popular technique that provides a way to create homogeneous groups that allow for the estimate
of the effect of a treatment.39 For example, DiNardo and Lee (2004) argue that ﬁrms in closely contested
unionization drives are almost identical in most respects. Because the outcomes of union certiﬁcation votes
are very close, one can assume that for these ﬁrms union status is randomly assigned. Consequently, we can
compare the change in ﬁrm value for those ﬁrms that were unionized to the change for those that were not,
and thereby procure a robust measure of the effects of unionization on a ﬁrm’s productivity.
Lee and McCrary (2005) provide an example of time homogeneity. Speciﬁcally, they look at the effect on
behavior of sanctions against crime. Their study exploits the fact that when a person turns 18, they suddenly
become eligible to be tried in adult courts,where they will face more severe sanctions than a juvenile court
would impose. On the supposition that a person’s characteristics just before and after they turn 18 are the
same, observed changes in crime-related behavior can be ascribed to changes in criminal sanctions.
Notice that all the work is being done by the assumption of continuity over time with the same union, or
across units with very similar characteristics. The great beneﬁt of this approach is that, beyond the continuity
assumption (which is a strong assumption), this approach is relatively model-free. The problem is that while
it may provide a credible measure of the effect of a policy change, the approach says little if one moves
away from the point at which the policy change or treatment is applied.
A formal model in this framework has two distinct goals. The ﬁrst is that it may provide a concise
representation of a set of facts about the world. It describes the set of measured characteristics that one
needs to know in order to capture the effect of a treatment. For unit u 2 U, let X(u;t) 2  be a set of
characteristics. In practice, one may not be able to measure all dimensions of , but let us suppose for the
moment that we can. Suppose u is a worker and we are interested in explaining worker wages. Then, we
would say that a model that speciﬁes a wage f(X;l;t) for a worker with characteristics X is an unbiased
representation of the data at date t if for all u 2 U,
ut = y(u;lu;t)   f(X(u;t);lu;t)
39See Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2009) for a discussion of the technique.
24is an i.i.d set of random variables with zero mean.
If our model is linear, we can let (t;l) = @f=@X, in which case we can write our model in the familiar
regression form:
yut = (t;lut)>Xut + ut:
If our model is unbiased, then this is a well-speciﬁed model that can be estimated by ordinary least squares.
However, even if the model is well-speciﬁed, as Holland (1986) emphasizes, the coefﬁcients of the model
cannot be assumed to represent a causal relationship. For example, one of the parameters might be the
gender of a worker, say 0 is male and 1 is female. If yut is the wage, and the coefﬁcient on gender is
negative, we cannot say that gender causes a wage drop. This is because gender is not a treatment or
something that one normally assumes can be varied within a person.
We can use the coefﬁcient on gender to test various theories. For example, human capital theory predicts
that a person’s wage is a function only of their productive characteristics, such as schooling, ability, and
experience. One reason women might be paid less is that they spend more time out of the labor force in child
rearing. This reasoning implies that once the full set of characteristics reﬂecting productivity is included in
X, then the coefﬁcient on gender should be zero. If it is not, then we can say there is discrimination in the
labor force.
A good theory speciﬁes the set of parameters X that provide all the information necessary to describe
wages while preserving time independence:
yut = (lut)>Xut + ut:
Any variation in wages that occurs over time is explained via either changes in the parameters Xut or by
changes in the environment lut. In practice, the econometrician may not have access to all the relevant
information Xut, which leads to the well-known omitted variable bias problem in econometrics. For the
present discussion, let us suppose that the relevant data are available and ask how the model can help in
measuring the causal impact of a change in law l.
In general, economic theories do not provide precise point predictions; more typically, they make pre-
dictions about the sign of an effect. In the context of measuring the effect of the law on outcomes, the
variation in treatment typically occurs either across jurisdictions—namely, the experiment assumes that all
individuals in a particular jurisdiction u 2 Us face the same legal environment lst;, and it is the legal envi-
ronment that varies across jurisdictions. For example, many countries can be characterized as civil-law or
common-law legal systems. We can let U1 be individuals in common-law countries and U0 be individuals
in civil-law countries, and set ls = s.
In the example of civil- and common-law countries, one could estimate s = (ls) for each jurisdiction.
In this case, the causal impact of the legal system depends on the distribution of characteristics of individuals
in the economy. We would estimate the causal effect of changing from a civil-law system to a common-law








In order to estimate the causal effect of a change in the legal system, one needs to use the characteristics
of the jurisdiction where the change is to occur. This adjustment is a version of the well-known Oaxaca
decomposition, which is widely used in studies of income inequality (see Altonji and Blank (1999)) and
unionwagedifferentials. AswediscussinmoredetailinSection4, thisisnottheliterature’susualtechnique.
The more common assumption is that the effect of a policy is linearly separable, where for u 2 Us we have:
yut = >Xut + >
l ls + ut: (1)
Using data for a single period t, then, we can estimate the average effect of the legal system on the wages


















The goal of the theory discussed in this section can be summarized as follows. The theory makes predic-
tions regarding the characteristics X that are needed to represent individual outsources. In particular, it will
provide predictions regarding how variations in individual characteristics relate to variations in outcomes.
Theory has predictive power if we can safely assume that the relationship between the Xs and the ys is
stable over time.
A theory has more predictive power if one can represent outcomes using a smaller set of Xs. Given the
difﬁculty of obtaining good measures of individual characteristics, theories with fewer Xs are inherently
easier to test. On a related note, there is a line of inquiry in statistics that attempts to be model free. This
is achieved by supposing that one has a rich set of X variables and that the environment is inherently
continuous; as a result, good representations of the data can be used to make predictions on how changes in
an individual’s Xs will affect outcomes. Breiman (2001) suggests that such an approach is sometimes more
feasible given present computing resources and the large data sets we have in some domains.
However, representation is not causation. Many individual characteristics are not amenable to experi-
mental treatment. Making causal statements requires that we assume we have a valid representation of the
data that allows one to compare outcomes either: 1) across units with similar characteristics but in different
treatments, or 2) the same units faced with different treatments over time. In these cases, the theory—in ad-
dition to specifying the relevant X variables—also speciﬁes an explicit mechanism by which the law affects
the actions of individuals, and hence how one can obtain a valid measure of the causal impact of a change.
263.2 Economics of the Employment Contract
This section discusses the literature that seeks to explain the form and function of employment contracts.
Fundamentally, parties who enter into a contract have agreed to have their behavior constrained in the future.
The most basic reason for a contract is to support inter-temporal exchange, something that cannot be avoided
in the context of labor services. For example, a day laborer agrees to work eight hours in exchange for a
wage at the end of the day. When it comes to paying, the employer may have an incentive to renege or
attempt to reduce the agreed-upon wage. One role of the law is to enforce such agreements.
In economics, such simple exchanges are typically assumed to be enforceable. The literature has focused
on explaining the form of observed contracts that address one of three more subtle issues:
1. Risk. Demand for a worker’s services, and hence wages, is likely to change from period to period.
Risk-averse workers would like to enter into long-term contracts that would shield them from such
shocks.
2. Authority and Asymmetric Information. Decision-making and bargaining are costly under asymmetric
information. In this case, contract form can affect performance.
3. Reliance. Once a worker-ﬁrm match has been formed, a contract is needed to ensure that each party
makes the appropriate investments into the relationship.
What makes the study of employment contracts difﬁcult is that every relationship has elements of these
three ingredients. In particular, teasing out the empirical implications of these models has proven difﬁcult.
Nonetheless, much of the structure of the legal rules governing employment can be understood as an attempt
to address risk, information asymmetries, or hold-up.
3.2.1 Insurance
We shall illustrate these ideas using a simple three-period employment model. Suppose that in period 0 the
ﬁrm offers the worker a long-term employment contract C, which the worker can either accept or reject. If
the worker does not accept the contract, then in period 1 she will earn w0
1 and in period 2 she will earn !0
2,
which is a random variable with mean m0
2 and variance 2. We will let the realized value of !0
2 be w0
2. The








Given that the worker is risk-averse, a risk-neutral ﬁrm who wished to hire this worker for two pe-
riods could do so by paying a ﬁxed wage w per period at an expect cost of W0    r
22; where r =
27 u00(m)=u0(m) is the coefﬁcient of absolute risk aversion for the worker.40 Let us consider the case in
which the owner of the ﬁrm is assumed to be able to fully diversify market risk, and hence is able to offer
the worker a perfect risk-sharing contract. The ﬁrm would be willing to do this because she can offer a wage
contract to a risk-averse worker that has a lower expected cost than the worker’s market alternative.
Azariadis (1975) introduced the term implicit contract to describe the idea that ﬁrms voluntarily smooth
workers’ income over time in order to lower expected labor costs. Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974) both
observe that the enforceability of these contracts depends upon the existence of turnover costs, otherwise
under at-will employment wages would necessarily equal the market alternative. Recently, Blanchard and
Tirole (2008) have revisited this issue and suggested that mandated severance pay may enhance the risk-
sharing properties of labor contracts. They explore the question of how to optimally design minimum wages
and severance pay to insure risk-averse workers. There is little role for the law in their model beyond
enforcing the agreed-upon severance payments.
We consider a two-period extension of their model that will allow for a substantive role for the courts.
Rather than supposing that the employment contract is implicit, I follow Blanchard and Tirole (2008) and
consider the problem of implementing the optimal allocation. Suppose that in period 0 it is efﬁcient for the
worker to contract with a ﬁrm with the following proﬁt function:
 = y1   w1 + E f 2   !2g;
where y1 and  2 is ﬁrm output in periods 1 and 2, while w1 and !2 is the wage paid to the worker in each
period. Again, Greek letters refer to random variables.
We begin with a case that entails no enforcement problems, and characterize the empirical implications
of the optimal allocation. In this case, we do not have any explicit treatments—rather, we wish to describe
the wage and employment proﬁle of the worker (the y’s of the model) in relation to the worker’s outside op-
tions, the worker’s risk preferences, and the ﬁrm’s productivity in each period (the explanatory X variables
of the model).
The optimal allocation is the solution to:
max w1;!2;e2 y1   w1 + E fe2 2   !2g; (2)
subject to:
u(w0




In addition to wage payment each period, the optimal allocation must also determine the worker’s employ-
ment status in period 2, where e2 = 1 if employed at the ﬁrm and 0 otherwise. If the worker is not employed,
the she earns !0
2 in the market, which is assumed to be paid to the worker. The next proposition characterizes
the ﬁrst best:










28Proposition 1. The optimal risk sharing allocation has the following properties:
1. Employment is ex-post efﬁcient: e
2 = 1 if and only if  1  !0
2 (and zero otherwise).
2. The worker is fully insured: w
1 = !
2 = w.
3. Expected labor cost is equal to the worker’s expected future income less a risk premium that increases
with worker’s aversion to risk (r): (1 + )w ' W0    r
22:
Observe that this result provides an institution-free description of the optimal allocation that links the
characteristics of the optimal contract with potentially observable features of the worker, ﬁrm, and labor-
market alternatives. In practice, there are a large number of institutions that have been created to insure
workers, including workman’s compensations, unemployment insurance, transfers within the household,
and so on. Rather than delve into the details of these institutions, one may ask the question whether or not
institutions are sufﬁciently rich that something approaching efﬁcient risk-sharing occurs in practice.
Cochrane(1991)worksouttheimplicationsofthecompleterisk-sharingmodelforconsumptiongrowth.
In our simple model, notice that the wage of a worker (here consumption is assumed equal to wage for
simplicity) is independent of whether she works for the current ﬁrm or takes up a market alternative (which
might mean unemployment). More generally, Cochrane (1991) observes that consumption growth should be
independent of idiosyncratic shocks. He ﬁnds that full insurance is not rejected for spells of unemployment,
loss of work due to strikes, and involuntary moves. However, insurance appears to be incomplete for long
illnesses and involuntary job loss. In recent work, von Wachter (2007) ﬁnds with German data that the
effect of job loss is temporary, with workers returning to their previous earnings in 5 years. Taking a similar
approach with data from India, Townsend (1994) rejects the perfect insurance model but does ﬁnd evidence
of signiﬁcant, albeit imperfect, risk sharing.
This work illustrates the usefulness of the insurance model in organizing consumption data. The work
does not test a causal relationship, nor does it describe a mechanism that would generate a relationship
between wages and risk attitudes. That mechanism could involve, for example, ﬁrms setting wage contracts
in advance and workers selecting into contracts that are most appropriate for their risk preferences. Alterna-
tively, ﬁrms might negotiate contracts directly with the workers and use worker-speciﬁc information, such
as marital status, to set the wage contract. In addition, the implicit contract model does not explain wage
rigidity per se—and certainly not nominal wage rigidity (see Card and Hyslop (1997))—-only consumption
smoothing. If a worker has access to other insurance opportunities, say via their family, then their actions
might appear less risk-averse, implying that there may not be a stable relationship between an individual’s
risk preference and the wage contract.
Consider the question that Blanchard and Tirole (2008) ask, namely: How can one implement the efﬁ-
cient allocation using available legal instruments? The answer to this question can generate some predictions
about the effects of changes in the law or in the parameters of social programs such as unemployment insur-
ance. These predictions are causal statements because the choice of law is a treatment; we can ask explicitly
what the causal impact of a policy change will be.
Insurance contracts require some form of enforcement when employment with the ﬁrm in period 2 is
29efﬁcient. Whenever  2 < w the ﬁrm would like to dismiss the worker, while the worker would like to
quit whenever !0
2 > w. Given that it is always efﬁcient to perform, the parties would never voluntarily
renegotiate the contract price. If the contract were between commercial parties for services, termination of
the relationship by either party could be followed by a suit for damages. Under the rule of common law the
standard remedy is expectation damages—harm caused by the contract breach. Let us suppose that there is
a cost k in pursuing a court case. If the employment contract is adjudicated under standard common-law
rules, we would have the following outcomes for contract termination41:
State of the World Breach Decision Remedy
 2 < w   k Firm lays off worker Worker paid D = w   !0
2
!0
2   k > w Worker quits Firm paid D =  2   w
Observe that under this rule, if it is efﬁcient for parties to stay together (it is always the case that  2  
!0
2 > 0), then there would never be breach. For example, suppose that the worker’s outside option is so
great that it is worthwhile to quit even while paying legal fees, namely !2
2   k > w. Once she pays the
damages to the ﬁrm, her income would be:
w   k   ( 2   !0
2) < w:
Hence, under the standard legal rule of expectation damages, an employment contract that fully insures
workers would be enforceable and would implement the efﬁcient contract when turnover is not efﬁcient. In
practice, however, these rules are rarely used in employment cases. The common-law rule is employment at
will, not expectation damages.
Parties might try to achieve a binding contract by stipulating that each party would pay a large ﬁne F if
there is breach. In practice, requiring workers to pay large penalties to leave employment are not enforceable
in most legal jurisdictions—this would be akin to a slavery contract. One exception is requiring a worker to
pay for training she has received. In the case of professional sports, this goal is achieved by requiring teams
to pay a fee to acquire a player. This rule has become controversial, though, and was recently overturned by
the European Court of Justice.42
The case of sports teams is the exception. For most employment contracts, employees can leave at will.
There is literature, beginning with Harris and Holmström (1982), that explores the optimal wage contract
under the assumption that the ﬁrm cannot ﬁre the worker, but the worker can leave at will. Under such a rule,
the optimal contract is downward rigid. It is ﬁxed in real terms and readjusted upwards each time a worker
gets an outside offer. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) suggest that this model can explain why individuals who
are hired during recessions are worse off in the long run than workers hired in boom periods. Chiappori
41I assume that the terms of the wage payment are enforceable, so it is only the decision to quit or layoff that is liable to legal
recourse. There is a well-known U.K. case, Rigby v. Ferodo [1988] ICR 29, House of Lords, that establishes the enforceability of
the wage payment.
42This is the so-called Boseman case. See Feess and Muehlheusser (2002) for a discussion.
30et al. (1999) point out, that there may be other reasons for this result, including holdup (which we discuss
below).
3.2.2 Asymmetric Information and The Employment Relationship
Consider the following extension of Simon (1951) employment model, allowing for task allocation ex post
in the presence of asymmetric information. Suppose that in period 2 the worker can be assigned to one of
two tasks, x 2 fa;bg, and that the productivity of task x is  x
2, which is assumed to be observed only by the
ﬁrm. In addition, there is a private cost of carrying out task x to the worker given by cx
2 > 0, and which is
observed only by the worker. If we let x = 0 denote the outside option, with  0
2 = 0 and c0
2 =  !, then the
respective payoffs to the ﬁrm and worker under task x are:
x = y1   w1 + Ix f x
2   !x
2g;
Ux = u(w1) + u(!x
2   cx
2);
where Ix = 1 if x 2 fa;bg and 0 otherwise.
Note that regardless of the contract, the optimal task allocation is given by:






Let us ﬁrst suppose that it is efﬁcient for the worker and the ﬁrm to stay together both periods. Also
suppose that there is no variation in task productivity, but that the worker’s cost, cx
2; can vary. In this case,
the efﬁcient solution is to allocate the choice of task to the worker, who will always choose the efﬁcient
allocation. More generally, as Milgrom (1988) argues, this effect leads to an organizational structure that
limits the authority of the ﬁrm, so that within certain task groups individuals are given autonomy.
Given that the worker is risk-averse, the optimal solution entails a ﬁxed wage and an allocation of





2 , it is efﬁcient for the worker to stay matched
with the ﬁrm, but the ﬁrm would prefer to lay the worker off rather than pay wage w. Enforcing the
efﬁcient contract requires a stipulated severance pay that is sufﬁciently large but conditional upon worker’s
performance. Similarly, the efﬁcient contract should ensure that the worker does not threaten to renegotiate
the wage contract in period 2. These points are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. If the ﬁrm is indifferent over task assignment ( a
2 =  b
2), then the optimal contract has the
following conditions:
1. The worker has the right to choose her preferred task.
2. The contract wage each period is decreasing with the worker’s risk aversion, increasing with mini-









3. If the worker leaves in period 2, then she pays a penalty P > !0
2   w
2 + c. If the ﬁrm dismisses the




This contract is very much like the contract for a tenured academic. The contract asks the professor to
carry out teaching duties but typically allows a great deal of discretion over how she teaches and the material
she will use. Second, the demand for the services of an academic is stable, and hence there is little beneﬁt
from turnover. As a consequence, the academic cannot be ﬁred. The optimal contract also precludes the
worker from leaving without paying a penalty, but this sort of provision is not typically observed (aside from
the sports contracts mentioned earlier). For academics, the resignation penalty is implicit, consisting in large
moving costs, lowering the incentives to leave. Note that a consequence of removing the penalty clause for
leaving is that the period 2 wage would be more responsive to the outside market, and as a consequence
the ﬁrst-period wage would fall. Conversely, sometimes it is suggested that tenure be abolished. The
consequence of abolition would be to lower expected income in period 2, which in turn would raise period
1 wages.
In terms of empirical predictions, this result merely links X variables—the risk aversion of the worker
and job characteristics—to predicted contract choice. Hence, this proposition does not make any causal
claims, but predicts that there should be an association between measured risk aversion of the worker, job
characteristics, and turnover. It predicts that certain jobs, such as academic jobs, combine substantial job
protection with the freedom to control activities on the job.
In order to introduce a notion of just cause for dismissal, there needs to be a substantive role for the
ﬁrm in task allocation. The next case supposes that effort costs do not vary with the task, c2 = ca
2 = cb
2,
but the productivity of the tasks vary,  a
2 6=  b
2. Let us continue to suppose that it is always efﬁcient to be
employed at the same ﬁrm for two periods. In this case, it is efﬁcient to provide the worker with a ﬁxed
wage contract, w
1 = w
2   c2. It is crucial that the worker and ﬁrm not negotiate the task allocation. If the
wage paid for each task is the same, and the ﬁrm has the right to make the task allocation x 2 fa;bg, then it
will choose the most productive task. Hence, this contract is incentive-compatible in the sense that the ﬁrm
will make the most efﬁcient choice even though she holds private information. In order to provide the ﬁrm
with authority over the worker, there must be a penalty associated with not following the ﬁrm’s instructions.
More formally, we have:
Proposition 3. Suppose that employment with the ﬁrm is always efﬁcient. Then the optimal contract consists
of a ﬁxed wage each period along with the following conditions:
1. The contract wage each period is decreasing with her risk aversion and increasing with cost of effort
(w
1 = w
2   c2 ' (W0    r
22   c2)=(1 + )).




3. If the worker is indifferent over task assignment (c2 = ca
2 = cb
2), then she agrees to carry out the task
assigned by the ﬁrm; otherwise she is dismissed and pays a penalty .
This proposition describes the features of an optimal contract when the worker is risk-averse and sepa-
ration is not efﬁcient. It is useful because it captures some features of observed default rules in employment
32law. Notice that the ﬁrm has authority because it has the information regarding the best task to carry out.
Moregenerally, AghionandTirole(1997)haveshownthatauthorityshouldbeallocatedtothebest-informed
individual.43 Dessein (2002) extends this point to look at the trade-off between communication and delega-
tion, ﬁnding that delegation can be more efﬁcient than communication when there is little conﬂict between
the preferences of the worker and ﬁrm.
The provision of insurance via wages does create potential conﬂict. The ﬁrm must have the right to
penalize workers who do not carry out their assigned tasks. But this power cannot be unchecked. For
example, the ﬁrm might try to renege upon the wage contract by assigning a worker very unpleasant tasks—
formally, those with a high cost of effort c2—that would effectively cause the worker to quit. Such a case
might lead to litigation where the worker would claim constructive dismissal.44 Hence, in practice, such a
contract may still face signiﬁcant litigation.
The results above suggest that if labor contracts are incomplete, with parties relying upon the courts
to set the default terms, then both propositions predict that a change from at-will to just-cause dismissal
will lead to lower wages and higher employment. Higher employment occurs because just-cause dismissal
is more efﬁcient in these cases, and hence should increase employment.45 Wages are lower because the
worker faces less risk.
Note that the employment result does not fundamentally depend on worker’s risk aversion. The employ-
ment law we have discussed builds upon contract law, where the key issue is ensuring that parties deliver the
promised quality. Disputes arise when ﬁrms feel that workers have not performed as promised, or workers
believe they have performed as promised but the ﬁrm has not compensated or continued employment as
promised. This set of issues is legally distinct from the body of law that has developed to enforce insur-
ance contracts, and accordingly the doctrines regarding damages in employment law rarely entail an explicit
discussion of risk.
Finally, there is literature, beginning with Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), that views the right of dismissal
as a necessary ingredient for effort provision. In their model, the ﬁrm offers a high wage and threatens to
dismiss the worker should she shirk. In this model, this results in an inefﬁcient allocation due to the high
wages offered by the ﬁrm. However, as MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) show, the threat of ﬁring is not
necessary for effort provision. The ﬁrm can use bonus pay, in which cost enforcement depends upon the ﬁrm
facing a cost should it renege upon a promised payment. MacLeod (2003) extends this result to the case
of a risk-averse worker employed with an imperfect performance measure.46 He shows that a necessary
condition for the implementation of an efﬁcient contract is the ability to impose a cost upon ﬁrms that
renege on bonus pay. The good-faith exception to employment at will is one mechanism that may achieve
this condition.
43See also Chakravarty and MacLeod (2009), who discuss the allocation of authority in the context of contract law. They show
that construction contracts carefully allocate authority between the buyer and seller to ensure efﬁcient production.
44This is a legal term of art in English law deﬁned by the U.K. Employment Rights Act of 1996, § 95(1)(c). Even if an employee
resigned from her post, she can claim that she was forced to quit due to the employer’s action.
45See MacLeod (2005) and MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007) for more details on how employment law may enhance efﬁciency.
46See Levin (2003) and ? for a more detailed analysis of the risk-neutral case in a repeated-game setting.
333.2.3 The Reliance Interest
In a famous paper, Fuller and Perdue (1936) introduced a conceptual framework that has formed the basis
of the modern law-and-economics treatment of contract law. The goal of their paper was to provide a
framework for the setting of damages for contract breach. They introduced three ways to measure damages.
The ﬁrst of these, as discussed earlier, is expectation damages. This is the rule that one would use if one
wished to enforce an insurance contract because it ensures that each party obtains the desired outcome while
ensuring that matching is efﬁcient.
The notion of expectations is not always well deﬁned, particularly in the case where the value of the
worker’s performance is private information. Another way of measuring damages is the notion of restitu-
tion. This damages rule strives to restore the harmed party to the state she was in before the contract was
agreed upon. For example, suppose a worker sells her house and moves to a new city in order to take up
employment. If the potential employer reneges on the contract, restitution damages would entail paying the
harmed worker the costs of relocation so that she may return to her previous state.
A third measure of damages is the reliance interest. Take, for example, an employer that spends a
signiﬁcant amount of money training a worker, as in the military providing pilot training. In that case, if
the worker were to leave employment early, the employer may ask the worker to repay part of the training
expenses.
The early literature on the economics of contract law, notably Rogerson (1984) and Shavell (1984),
consider the case in which parties make a sunk investment into a relationship, and then ask, which of
this damage rules leads to the most efﬁcient level of investment. This work illustrates an important third
motivation for an employment contract: namely, to provide incentives for efﬁcient relationship-speciﬁc
investments. The early literature assumed that the investment was observable by the courts, and hence
could be used to set damages. In an inﬂuential paper, Grout (1984) showed that if parties could not write a
binding contract, then there would be inefﬁcient investment into the relationship. This model has become
the paradigm for the holdup problem, a term coined by Victor Goldberg (1976) to describe situations in
which the buyer or seller attempts to change the terms of an agreement after have there been signiﬁcant sunk
investments. Williamson et al. (1975) similarly make the point that relationship-speciﬁc investments imply
that the employment relationship must be carefully governed to avoid opportunistic behavior by the worker.
These points can be formally illustrated in our model by supposing that the employer makes an invest-
ment into capital k in period 1, while the risk-neutral worker makes a similar investment i. In this case, the
worker’s investment can be any activity that lowers the cost of supplying labor, which might include making
friends, investing in a new home, or acquiring skills on the job. Formally, the payoffs of the ﬁrm and the
worker would be:
 = y1   w1   k + E fe2( 2 + y(k))   !2g;
U = w1   i + Ef!2 + e2v(i) + (1   e2)!0
2)g;
34where the notation is as above, except now worker productivity depends on investment k via y(k), and
worker utility depends upon her investment i via the v(i). It is assumed that y(0) = v(0) = 0, y0;v0 > 0,
and y00;v00 < 0, and that the efﬁcient levels of investment are characterized by:
v0(i) = y0(k) = 1=
2
where 
2 is the probability that the worker and ﬁrm trade in period 2 under efﬁcient matching (namely

2 = Pr[ 2  !0
2]).
Observe that the level of investment into a relationship depends upon both the discount rate and the
expectation that the relationship will continue. This implies that if a worker, for example, overestimates the
likelihood that an employment relationship will continue in period 2, this can lead to over-investment, and
an increased incentive to litigate discharge should she believe it to be unjustiﬁed.
Theholdupproblemariseswhentheworkerandﬁrmhavenobindinglaborcontractbutinsteadnegotiate
the wage in period 2 after the value of their outside options have been realized. Grout (1984) supposes that
period 2 wage is given by the Nash bargaining solution, which entails parties dividing evenly the gains from
trade to yield a wage:
w2( 2;!2;k;i) = ( 2 + y(k)   v(i)   !0
2)=2:
When this wage is negative, parties will choose the outside option rather than trade. This rule ensures
efﬁcient matching in period 2, but the returns from the speciﬁc investments are divided equally between the
worker and the ﬁrm. In consequence, we have underinvestment:
Proposition 4. In the absence of a binding employment contract, the worker and the ﬁrm choose investments
to satisfy:
y0(knc) = v0(inc) = 1=nc
2 ;
where the probability of employment in period 2, nc
2 < 
2, is less than the efﬁcient level, and hence
investments are less than the ﬁrst best (knc < k and inc < i).
The motivation for Grout’s model is the legal rule in the United Kingdom that makes it impossible for
unions to enter into binding contracts with employers. The substance of the Trade Disputes Act of 1906
made it impossible for employers to sue unions, and hence to recover damages should a union strike.
To predict the causal impact of such a policy, one needs to work out what would happen if contracts
were enforceable. The holdup model supposes that investments are observable by the two parties but cannot
be used to set contract terms. Under this assumption, Hart and Moore (1988) show that parties would agree
to a contract with a stipulated wage w2 and severance payment s2 that would improve upon no contract. In
general, however, the contract will not implement the ﬁrst best. This can only occur in this model if it is
always efﬁcient to trade, and there is a contract that, with probability 1:
 2 + y(k)   w2   s2;
35w2 + v(i)  !0
2 + s2:
For this contract to work, one does need legal enforcement. If either the worker or the ﬁrm attempts to
modify the contract terms, the other party should be able to seek relief in court. This is not to say that parties
cannot, if they wish, renegotiate the contract by mutual consent. Given that both parties are better off under
the contract than on the outside market, however, the threat not to trade is not credible. Hence, the wage
would not be renegotiated in period 2, and both parties receive the full return from any speciﬁc investment.
Hart and Moore (1988)’s result that contracts can always improve matters holds only for the case of
speciﬁc self-investments: the investments that affect one’s own payoff but not the other party’s payoff. Che
and Hausch (1999) show that in the case of cooperative investments—that is, when one party’s investments
affect the payoffs of both parties—and when contract renegotiation cannot be precluded, then there is no
beneﬁt from writing any contract. This result depends on the hypothesis that the courts cannot observe the
investments. Given the level of litigation in employment, one must conclude that parties do indeed ﬁnd it
useful to write contracts. The issue is how the courts should enforce these contracts.
An interesting feature of the holdup model is that the efﬁciency of the relationship can be enhanced
in some cases with the appropriate allocation of bargaining power. This idea begins with the so-called
property-rights approach of Grossman and Hart (1986). They observe that even though contract may not be
explicitly conditioned upon certain events, the law can allocate residual decision rights. The example they
explore in detail is property, which in effect is a contract that gives the owner of property the right to carry
out any action that is not constrained by other contracts.
We have a similar issue in employment law. That is, under what conditions does the worker or the ﬁrm
have the right to leave a relationship based on information that may not be observable by the courts? Aghion
et al. (1994) show that if one can design contracts to allocate the bargaining power of parties, then one can
achieve an efﬁcient allocation in the models of Gout (1984) and Hart and Moore (1988).47
These are useful abstract results that delineate conditions under which efﬁcient allocations can be
achieved, but they do not specify the legal institutions that would achieve these allocations. MacLeod and
Malcomson (1993) explicitly explore the implications of the holdup model on wages over time when the
market alternatives are viewed as an outside option in the sense of Shaked and Sutton (1984). The outside
option principle has two parts.
First, if at the current, enforceable wage both parties are better off than at their next best alternative, then
threats to leave/layoff are not credible and hence the wage is insensitive to current market conditions. As
Howitt (2002) observes, this observation has the potential to provide a theory of rigid wages. Second, when
the current wage is worse than, say, the worker’s best alternative, then either the wage will be renegotiated
to be equal to this alternative, or the worker will leave.
Given these rules, MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) show the following:
1. When investments are general and there is a ﬁxed cost to changing jobs or employees, then a ﬁxed
47These results build upon the implementation results of Moore and Repullo (1988).
36wage contract that is renegotiated to match outside offers implements the ﬁrst best.
2. In the case of two-sided self-investments, if it is possible to index wages so that the outside options
are binding only when separation is efﬁcient, then such an indexed wage contract implements the ﬁrst
best.
3. In the case of cooperative relationship-speciﬁc investments by the ﬁrm, an efﬁcient allocation is im-
plemented with a contract that leaves the worker indifferent between employment and taking up the
outside option. Conversely, if the worker is making the investment, then the efﬁcient rule leaves the
ﬁrm indifferent between hiring the worker and taking up the outside option.
These three cases are not comprehensive, however. For example, Rogerson (1992) shows in a more general,
asymmetric-information setup that there is a wide variety of situations where there exist efﬁcient contracts
when both parties are risk-neutral. The holdup model is attractive because it provides some predictions on
contract form when parties approximately satisfy these contracts.
What is particularly interesting about these results is that they are broadly consistent with the doctrine of
employment at will. The ﬁrst case merely requires that the worker and the ﬁrm agree to some wage contract
that can be periodically renegotiated. In particular, the wage can be in real or nominal terms, and hence, as
Howitt (2002) points out, can explain nominal wage rigidity. Though the model also predicts that nominal
wages may be renegotiated up or down by arbitrary amounts, depending upon the outside market, a behavior
that is consistent with the evidence of Blinder and Choi (1990), McLaughlin (1994), and Card and Hyslop
(1997), but not consistent either with menu-cost models or the model with risk-averse agents.
These models do rely upon the legal enforcement of a contract wage that cannot be unilaterally changed
by one party, a principle that was afﬁrmed in the United Kingdom by Rigby v. Ferodo (1987).48 We also
observe the use of indexed contracts, particularly union contracts: Cousineau et al. (1983) document the use
of indexed contracts by Canadian unions. Notice that the risk-sharing model would predict ﬁxed real wages,
with corresponding penalty clauses to enforce the risk-sharing agreement. The fact that penalty clauses
are typically not enforceable, especially in the case of employment contracts, leads to the prediction that if
parties are going to index, then the indexed contract should approximately follow the market wage, which is
what we observe in Canada (and also in the case of long-term supply contracts, as documented by Joskow
(1988)).
Crawford (1988) shows that the holdup problem can also be solved when parties sign a series of short-
term contracts. Essentially, parties anticipate their future holdup and mitigate its effect by agreeing in the
current period to lower wages combined with higher investment. Card et al. (2010) ﬁnd some evidence in
support of this prediction using Italian data. Given that these are unionized ﬁrms, this suggests that the ﬁrms
are able to reach efﬁcient bargains.
The ﬁnal case is implemented in the absence of any contract, and can help explain the puzzling fact
that contracts do not consistently have index terms. As Cousineau et al. (1983) have shown, about 50% of
48[1988] ICR 29, [1987] IRLR 516.
37unionized ﬁrms in Canada did not index their employment contracts during a period of high inﬂation. This
would imply that unions would have to constantly renegotiate their contracts to match market conditions.
Result 3 implies that this contract form provides ﬁrst-best incentives for the ﬁrm to invest in capital and into
relationship-speciﬁc worker training. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) also show that if there are signiﬁcant
turnover costs, then ﬁrms may also invest into general human capital.
3.3 Implementing the Efﬁcient Employment Contract in a Market
The literature on the employment contract has identiﬁed three broad economic motivations for an employ-
ment contract: insuring risk-averse employees, ensuring the revelation of relevant information for decision-
making, and encouraging relationship-speciﬁc investments. Given these transaction costs, the next issue is:
What sort of labor-market institutions ensure efﬁcient matching and trade?
In principle, one could construct a model that includes all the ingredients that have been identiﬁed as rel-
evant for understanding employment. At a purely abstract level, Rogerson (1992) and Aghion et al. (1994)
have shown that under the appropriate conditions, one can construct an abstract mechanism that implements
the efﬁcient allocation in a variety of cases, some of which combine risk aversion and asymmetric infor-
mation. However, as Tirole (1999) discusses, we still do not know how to relate these abstract results to
observed institutions and contract forms. The literature on employment typically explores the implications
of regulation for a simple model that has one or at most two transaction costs. The literature on employment
protection has for the most part followed the lead of Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Lazear (1990) in
supposing that an increase in labor protection is parsimoniously modeled as an increase in turnover costs.
Lazear(1990)observesthatifcompletecontractsarepossible, mandatedseverancepaymentscanalways
be undone via the labor contract. In that case, a law mandating severance payments would have no effect on
employment but would lower starting wages. Lazear carries out a study of 22 countries over a 29-year period
and concludes that increasing severance pay to 3 months’ salary for workers with 10 years’ experience leads
to a 1-percent reduction of the employment-to-population ratio. This is a reduced-form analysis that does
not take into account the complex inter-temporal optimization problem faced by ﬁrms. This is the goal
of Bentolila and Bertola (1990). They ﬁnd that ﬁring costs create complex inter-temporal incentives that
depend upon the state of the business cycle. Speciﬁcally, ﬁring costs reduce labor demand in good times but
increase demand in bad times. Lower starting wages translate into lower ﬁring costs, and hence ﬁrms have
greater incentives to hire workers during downturns.
The literature has mostly followed the lead of this work and modeled employment protection as a
turnover cost. The theoretical contributions have begun with one of the transaction costs (risk, asymmetric
information, or holdup) and then explored the implications of employment protection modeled as a turnover
cost. This allows one to explore the implications of treating a relationship with a particular policy choice.
If we suppose that in different relationships one of the three transaction costs is more important, then this
approach generates testable predictions of the effect of a law change for different relationships, which hope-
fully can be measured and hence form right-hand-side X variables.
38I complete the section with a brief discussion of unions. From the perspective of transaction costs,
one can view unions as an alternative to employment law. This provides a system for the implementation,
enforcement, and arbitration of employment disputes between the ﬁrm and unionized employees.
Risk
Since the work of Azariadis (1975) and Baily (1974), the assumption of risk-averse workers has played an
important role in the development of labor policy. I showed above that if the main role of the labor contract
is to insure workers, then such a contract can be enforced with the use of expectation damages. Moreover,
the contract will have the feature that if a relationship is no longer efﬁcient, then the ﬁrm has the obligation
to “sell” the worker’s contract to another ﬁrm. In the absence of bankruptcy constraints and asymmetric
information, such an institution would implement the ﬁrst best.49
In practice, we observe contracts with features similar to this in the area of sports, but rarely elsewhere.
In the case of athletes, the quality of the player and hence the value of a trade is information that is easily
available to the teams in a league. Such conditions are not likely to be satisﬁed in general, however. There
is an active literature in macro-economics that explores the role of turnover taxes and mandated severance
pay when complete contracts are not possible. A seminal contribution in this literature is Hopenhayn and
Rogerson (1993). They assume that workers have access to complete ﬁnancial markets and hence can
diversify ﬁrm risk. Under these assumptions they show that a turnover tax (or severance pay) is equal to one
year of wages leads to a 2.5% reduction in employment.
Their model assumes away market incompleteness. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) consider the case
in which the ﬁrm provides the insurance services for the worker, but the worker is responsible for ﬁnding a
new job. The point is that the matching process is both costly, and is an important element in labor market
performance. They show that there should be a mandated unemployment insurance that is ﬁnanced out of a
re-employment tax. Moreover, the level of insurance (or replacement rate, that is, the fraction of one’s wages
that are paid when unemployed) should fall with time. They show that this rule can result in a signiﬁcant
increase in market performance. The result also illustrates one role for government intervention that arises
when there is a combination of risk aversion and moral hazard (worker’s search effort is not observed).
Notice that in the presence of ﬁxed unemployment insurance payments, mandated severance pay pro-
vides an approximation to such a rule because it provides a high income to the worker early in her unem-
ployment that is lost once the severance pay is spent. In the event of an employment dispute, even if the
worker wins the case, in most jurisdictions there is a mandatory rule that parties should mitigate their losses
from contract breach. In the case of an employee, this means that the employee should make a reasonable
effort to ﬁnd alternative employment. Any damages due to the worker would be based upon lost income
given the new job.
Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) introduce a careful model of the matching process that generalizes many
of the previous matching process, and then derive the optimal unemployment insurance. If the agent is
49See Dye (1985), who uses this point to build a theory of contract length.
39risk-neutral, then there should be no unemployment insurance. This is equivalent to saying that employment
at will is efﬁcient when workers are risk-neutral. However, when workers are risk-averse, the provision
of unemployment insurance increases wages, employment, and the capital-labor ratio. Pissarides (2001)
explicitly discusses the role of employment protection. He also shows that with search frictions it is optimal
to have unemployment insurance, and observes that employment legislation is an (imperfect) substitute for
employment protection.
Finally, the recent paper Blanchard and Tirole (2008) builds upon these themes to explore the imple-
mentation of an efﬁcient severance pay—unemployment insurance system in the face of a variety of market
imperfections. There are cases in which there are limits on insurance and layoff taxes, ex post wage bargain-
ing, and ex ante heterogeneity of ﬁrms or workers. The key insight is that not only do these various cases
affect the design of insurance system, but that a third party such as the government is needed in order to
implement the second-best optimum. In particular, if the state merely provided a set of courts that enforce
private agreements, this would not achieve the ﬁrst best.
This body of work is carried out using relatively conventional assumptions regarding the operation of
the labor market. Together they suggest that arguments by legal scholars—such as Epstein (1984) or Morriss
(1995-1996)—that the efﬁciency of free markets implies that there is no role for government intervention
into labor markets are not correct as rhetorical statements. However, there are many issues that this literature
does not address.
First, these results depend upon workers having stable risk-averse preferences. There is a large body of
work that ﬁnds that the ﬁne-grained predictions from a model with risk-averse preferences are not consistent
with the data. See Rosen (1985) and Hart and Holmström (1987) for important early evaluations of the
literature. More recently, Gibbons (1997) has argued that the standard agency model does not adequately
explain many features of observed contracts.
Some recent exciting research on the preferences of individuals may provide a way forward. Andreoni
and Sprenger (2010a) show that previous research measuring risk and time preferences do not adequately
control for the risk inherent in future rewards. In a follow-up paper, Andreoni and Sprenger (2010b) explic-
itly measure risk and time preferences. They ﬁnd that individuals cognitively view choices as risky or not,
but among risky choices they have relatively ﬂat attitudes toward risk. This is consistent with the fact that
individuals want to avoid risk but that there is no stable empirical relationship between attitudes toward risk
and the form of the optimal contract. This research is very new, and this latter point is yet a conjecture. If
these results hold, they may allow for much better models of contract and optimal unemployment insurance.
Asymmetric Information
Asymmetric information is ubiquitous in the employment relationship, which leads naturally to the question
of how employment law and other labor market-institutions should be designed to handle this problem.
Section 3.2.2 provided some examples of situations where asymmetric information can help explain both
contract form and the allocation of authority within a relationship. The difﬁculty is how best to mediate the
40information problems that arise both within the relationship and between different potential matches.
Theearlyliteraturefocusesonthequestionofhowcontractsshouldbedesignedtoensureoptimalmatch-
ing when the ﬁrm has private information on worker productivity and the worker has private information
on alternative opportunities. In a classic paper, Diamond and Maskin (1979) compare expectation damages
(they call them compensatory damages) to privately negotiated liquidated damages in a buyer-search model.
When parties match, they obtain a gain from trade that is split evenly. The issue is how much they should
pay should they ﬁnd a better match—this will affect the incentives to search and whether or not separations
are efﬁcient. They ﬁnd whether or not one damage rule is better than another depends upon the technology
of search; hence, in general, it illustrates that in a world with costly search it is difﬁcult to obtain a clear
general prediction on the optimal default rule.
In the employment context, workers are rarely asked to pay for damages should they ﬁnd a better match.
Hall and Lazear (1984) begins with this observation and compares three contract forms:
1. Fixed wage w is set in advance. Trade occurs only if both parties prefer trade to no trade at this price.
This contract leads to inefﬁcient quits and layoffs.
2. Firm sets wage knowing worker’s productivity. This is essentially the monopsony solution: The ﬁrm
has an incentive to set wages above the marginal product of labor, so there are inefﬁcient separations
whenever the worker’s outside option is between the wage and the worker’s marginal product.
3. Workers set wages (monopoly union model). In this case, the worker sets his wage above his outside
option, resulting in the ﬁrm inefﬁciently not employing worker when marginal product of worker is
greater than his outside option, but below wage demanded.
If information is symmetric, then in case 1 we should observe renegotiation and efﬁcient trade. However,
as Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) have shown in a general mechanism-design framework, when there is
two-sided asymmetric information, efﬁcient trade is impossible. Hence, as Hall and Lazear (1984) observe,
there is no simple contract that implements efﬁcient trade ex post. Even in the absence of risk aversion or
relation-speciﬁc investments, there are limits to efﬁcient trade that no legal rule or contract can overcome.
There are, however, situations under which efﬁcient trade is possible. If a worker’s outside option is
known, then giving the ﬁrm all the bargaining power results in efﬁcient separations, just as it resulted in
efﬁcient task assignment in section 3.2. This is a reasonable assumption when the labor market is thick,
as would be the case for, say, casual day labor. In that case, at-will employment is an efﬁcient rule. If
variations in outside options are due to variations in worker’s ability, then efﬁciency can still be achieved
with the use of piece-rate contracts, as Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992) show. Such a result is consistent
with the good-faith exception to employment at will that requires ﬁrms to follow through upon promised
performance pay.
If it is possible to measure ﬁrm productivity, then the efﬁcient rule is to give the worker all the bargaining
power. In that case, the worker would offer a wage contract that would make the ﬁrm indifferent between
acceptance and rejection, with the result that trade would occur if and only if it is efﬁcient. Gibbons (1987),
41in a paper that complements Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992), shows that if the ﬁrm has bargaining power
and the workers have information regarding the difﬁculty of the job, then the resulting contract is inefﬁcient.
If the workers were given all the bargaining power in this case, then the ﬁrst best would be restored.
Though this point follows naturally from the question of how to implement efﬁcient exchange under
asymmetric information, it is oddly missing from the literature on unions. Freeman and Medoff (1984)
made the point that unions can enhance efﬁciency via the “voice” mechanism, which can be interpreted as
solving the problem of asymmetric information. Beginning with McDonald and Solow (1981), there is a
literature that wonders why unions cannot bargain over both wages and employment to achieve an efﬁcient
outcome.
One reason is that, in practice, we are typically in a situation with two-sided asymmetric information.
In that case, one cannot in general achieve the ﬁrst best. However, if there are choices whose marginal
costs vary with the hidden information, then optimal contracts should incorporate this information. This
observation has lead several contributions that explain observed contracts as a solution to this problem. The
early work of Grossman and Hart (1981) shows that employment-wage policies of a ﬁrm are designed to
reveal underlying productivity, which can result in observed wages that are different from the true marginal
product of labor. Moore (1985) has reﬁned this analysis, to show that when there is two-sided asymmetric
information with risk-averse workers, the extent to which the optimal employment contract exhibits over- or
under-employment depends upon the preferences of the workers, as well as the nature of uncertainty.
Aghion and Hermalin (1990) introduce a contracting model with asymmetric information and signaling.
They show that laws mandating employer-provided beneﬁts can enhance efﬁciency. There are also papers
illustrating that several features of union contracts can be viewed as solving an information problem. Kuhn
and Robert (1989) show that seniority rules are a form of efﬁcient price discrimination against the ﬁrm.
Laing (1994) provides a more general analysis of employment contracts with asymmetrically informed
agents, ﬁnding that a seniority layoff rule may improve efﬁciency. Levine (1991) suggests that requiring just
cause for dismissal risks attracting low-quality workers. Hence, it is argued that mandated just cause rules
may enhance efﬁciency. Kuhn (1992) observes that requiring mandatory notice of plant closings enhances
labor-market performance by ensuring that the ﬁrms inform workers in a timely fashion and allow them to
make more efﬁcient separation decisions.
There is a recent literature that takes a reduced-form approach to employment protection based on the
idea that employment protection acts as a turnover tax that interacts with asymmetric information. Kugler
(2004b) observes that in the presence of turnover costs, ﬁrms favor more skilled employees, and hence try to
ﬁll vacancies from currently employed workers. Hence, she ﬁnds that increases in employment protection
reduces the ﬂow from unemployment. Pries and Rogerson (2005) introduce more structure to the process
regarding worker quality. They suppose that the formation of a match is both an inspection and experience
good. The former requires ﬁrms and workers to engage in explicit search to form matches, while the latter
implies that the signal of match quality becomes more precise with tenure. They explore several labor-
market policies, including unemployment insurance, a minimum wage, and dismissal costs. They ﬁnd that
42dismissal costs lead to higher unemployment, lower turnover, and higher-quality matches. In contrast, Bur-
guet and Caminal (2008) show that if there is contract renegotiation and uncertainty regarding match, then
turnover costs can enhance market performance. Guerrieri (2008) introduces a dynamic general equilibrium
model with asymmetric information regarding match quality. She shows that in a dynamic economy the ﬁrst
best cannot be achieved with out government intervention in the form of a lump sum tax upon all workers.
Finally, Matouschek et al. (2009) formally consider the implications of contract renegotiation when there is
asymmetric information regarding outside options.
The extent to which asymmetric information might “explain” observed contracts, and justify the exis-
tence of unions or additional taxation depends upon the magnitude of the asymmetric information. Using
evidence from layoffs, Gibbons and Katz (1991) ﬁnd that workers who lose jobs from a plant closing have
higher subsequent wages than those who are laid off. This is consistent with later work by Gibbons et al.
(2005), where high-skilled workers earn greater returns to their skill. This evidence supports the hypothesis
that labor market wages are a ﬁrst-best approximation for worker ability. If it is true, then this would suggest
that ex post efﬁciency is best achieved with as little market intervention as possible.
This policy choice is no longer ideal if the labor contract must also ensure ex ante efﬁcient investment.
We turn to this issue next.
Holdup
When worker’s productivity is common knowledge, but the cost of labor supply is private to the worker, then
it is optimal to allocate all ex post bargaining power to the worker. However, this is not in general ex ante
efﬁcient. When unions and ﬁrms are in a long-term relationship, the ﬁrm will make investment decisions
a function of their expected return from these investments. Grout (1984) has shown that if the union (or
worker) has ex post bargaining power during contract renegotiation, then there is underinvestment.
Becker (1962), Mincer (1962), and Williamson et al. (1975) have emphasized that the employment
relationship typically entails relationship-speciﬁc investments. This raises two issues. First, can the em-
ployment relationship be governed in such a way that one has efﬁcient investment combined with efﬁcient
matching? Second, what are the implications for wages over time? Hashimoto (1981) introduces a model of
incomplete wage contracting with relationship-speciﬁc investment into worker skill. He shows that if parties
cannot condition the wage contract upon the worker’s or the ﬁrm’s alternative opportunities, then there will
be inefﬁcient quits (as in Hall and Lazear (1984) discussed above). The result is a wage contract at which
the worker and the ﬁrm share the rents from ﬁrm-speciﬁc investments, as hypothesized by Becker (1962)
and Mincer (1962).
This result assumes that the worker and the ﬁrm can commit to a ﬁxed wage contract. If that is not
possible, then the current wage is always set by ex post renegotiation, which can be expected to lead to an
ex post efﬁcient allocation when information is symmetric. Grout (1984) has shown that this leads to the
worker’s capturing a positive fraction of the rent created by the ﬁrm’s investments, which in turn leads to
lower investment by the ﬁrm and slower employment growth. Grout’s goal is to model the implications
43of a U.K. law making it impossible to enforce wage agreements between a union and a ﬁrm. Even when
such commitment is possible, Hart and Moore (1988) show that the fact that the worker and the ﬁrm can
voluntarily renegotiate a contract in the face of new information implies that in general the ﬁrst best cannot
be achieved with a binding agreement.
However, Carmichael and MacLeod (2003) show that if parties can agree upon a fair division rule that
divides the gains to trade in proportion to the investments made by each party, then the ﬁrst best can be
achieved even in the absence of a binding complete contract. Such a rule requires one party to penalize the
other should the agreement be perceived as unfair. In the context of union-ﬁrm bargaining, there is some
recent evidence that unions do retaliate when it is perceived that the wage bargain is unfair. Krueger and
Mas (2004) show that a dispute between Firestone and their union led to lower-quality tires. Mas (2006)
ﬁnds that the resale value of Caterpillar products fell for equipment built during a labor dispute, suggesting
again that labor unrest resulted in lower product quality. Finally, Mas (2008) ﬁnds that when police unions
in New Jersey got adverse rulings in arbitration that led to lower wages, the police reduced their effort as
measured by arrest rates.
These results ﬁt in with an extensive literature, beginning with Akerlof (1982), that the extent to which
a worker believes that treatment is fair affects productivity (see in particular the work by Bewley (1999)
and Fehr and Schmidt (1999)). The holdup model provides an elegant explanation of why fairness is so
important. The economic model predicts that investment into a relationship is a function of the return from
such an investment. Note that after an investment has been made, however, it is a sunk cost, and hence
rational choice theory would predict that any agreement made after investments have been made should be
independent of these investments. Consequently, the only way compensation can be linked to investments
ex post is for parties to follow a social norm that links them—in other words, parties should believe and
enforce a norm of fairness that results in parties who invest more receiving more compensation. Carmichael
and MacLeod (2003) provide a general proof of the existence of such norms. See also the work of Hart and
Moore (2004), who argue that contracts can act as efﬁciency-enhancing focal points.
Such models have a potential to provide an efﬁciency-based explanation of why unions with bargaining
power can enhance ﬁrm productivity. The next section discusses some of the empirical evidence in this
regard. This perspective may also provide some insights into the decline in unionization that has occurred
in the private sector in the United States (see Farber and Western (2001)). The issue is whether or not there
exist alternatives to unions that enhance the productivity of the employment relationship. First, there is
the possibility that employment law is a substitute for union protection. At the moment, we simply do not
have any studies that explore this idea. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) show that ﬁrm-sponsored investment
into training can be enhanced by the fact that ﬁrms have superior knowledge regarding worker productivity.
In Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), they also argue that increased employment protection enhances ﬁrm-
sponsored training. They suggest that ﬁrm-sponsored training is higher in Europe than in the United States
due to higher employment protection in Europe. We do know if the increase in employment protection in
the US has lead to more training. MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007) introduce a model with investment and
44asymmetric information, and show that increased employment regulation in the US would lead to a more
productive relationship for highly skilled workers.
For lower-skilled workers, Autor (2003) has documented the fact that there has been an increase in
temporary help agencies in the United States. He ﬁnds that this is in part explained by the increase in
employment protection. However, Autor (2001) also documents that as an organizational form, temporary
help agencies play a signiﬁcant role in screening and training of workers.
3.4 Summary
In this section, we have reviewed the literature on the theory of the employment relationship from the per-
spective of transaction-costs economics and contract theory. From this research, we learn that an optimal
employment contract is shaped by many factors in addition to the demand and supply of factors of produc-
tion. The need to provide insurance to workers underlies many of the contributions, in part because this
model is quite elegant and can in many situations deliver clear predictions. One prediction that it does not
deliver is a theory of why employment relations can entail conﬂict, and why the allocation of bargaining
power has important efﬁciency consequences.
Models of asymmetric information naturally deliver a theory of conﬂict, and can explain why parties
for whom trade is efﬁcient may fail to reach an agreement (see Crawford (1982)). The vast majority of
work on employment focuses on the case in which the asymmetric information concerns the outside options
for the worker and ﬁrm. Many of the employment disputes discussed in the previous section deal with
disagreements concerning what happened within the relationship. The model in Simon (1951) is a useful
starting point for thinking about these issues, but currently there is little work on the role of the courts in
ﬁnding facts in employment cases.50 The main message here, consistent with the work of Milgrom (1988),
is that the efﬁcient contract for task assignments is to give the informed party decision rights. Chakravarty
and MacLeod (2009) discuss how the law can achieve this goal in the context of construction contracts.
The way the law achieves the formal allocation of authority within an employment relationship has not been
explored in detail, however. Williamson (1991) makes the point that for the most part courts do not intervene
in the day-to-day management of employees. The question of how various employment law doctrines affect
this authority relationship is still an open question.
The provision of incentives to make relationship-speciﬁc investments gives the third motivation for
entering into a binding contract. What is interesting is that the contractual instruments here—speciﬁcally,
the allocation of authority and bargaining power—also play a central role in achieving efﬁcient investment.
There is a need for work that helps us understand which, if any, of these theories provide the most useful
way to think about the employment contract. The theories by themselves are not typically framed in terms of
making causal inferences. Rather, they make predictions regarding how variations in match characteristics
(X variables) are related to observed features of the relationship (wages, employment, bonus or severance
pay).
50See MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007) and Stahler (2008) for a start.
45There is some recent work by Cahuc et al. (2006) and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) that uses the
holdup model of wage determination developed in MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) to empirically estimate
models of wage and employment determination. Cahuc et al. (2006) ﬁnd that only highly skilled workers
have signiﬁcant bargaining power, while low-skilled workers have none. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)
ﬁnd in a panel with French data that personal characteristics tend to be more important for highly skilled
workers. These are not causal exercises, but they do suggest that employment law is more likely to be
important for highly skilled workers.
4 The Evidence
The theory of transaction costs provides an economic rationale for intervention into labor markets. Each of
the models we have discussed capture some features of the employment relationship that seem empirically
plausible. The next step is to see whether changes in employment law do improve matters. We discuss
two sets of empirical results that illustrate a range of approaches. First, we review the literature on the
employment contract suggesting that there are likely to be mechanisms by which employment law and
unions affect the efﬁciency of labor markets. Second, we review the literature that asks to what extent
unions enhance productivity.
4.1 Employment Law
In terms of Rubin’s model, the unit of analysis for employment laws are typically governments. The most
commonoutcome variablesare employmentperunit ofpopulation, wages, the unemploymentrate, andGDP
growth. The issue then is, how does a change in employment law change these outcome variables? This
is a very difﬁcult question because many events occur along with changes in the law that make it difﬁcult
to identify a causal effect. Surprisingly, the results tend to be relatively consistent. The majority of studies
ﬁnd either no effect or a negative effect of increasing employment protection. The results of this work are
summarized in Table 2. We do not discuss all of these papers, but note that they can be divided into three
broad classes: cross-sectional country studies, cross-sectional country studies with time, and the studies
from the United States and India that use within-country state variation.
A good starting point are the cross-country studies. Botero et al. (2004) gather data from a several
sources to construct measures of various types of employment regulation, including hours restrictions and
dismissal procedures. They ﬁnd that stricter employment protection is associated with countries whose law
originated in the civil law tradition. For these countries, it is found that labor force participation is lower
and unemployment is higher. Of course, these statements are not causal, but rather say that there is a co-
variation between legal origins and employment performance. Djankov et al. (2003) show that civil codes
make it more costly to use the courts for contract enforcement, but even this evidence is not necessarily
causal. For example, if judges in civil law countries are more corrupt, then the more bureaucratic rules may
be a response to this corruption. These basic results have recently be replicated by Djankov and Ramalho
46(2009), and hence there appears to be a relationship. The question is, why?
A natural way to control for cross-country variations is to use variation over time in laws. Early studies
along these lines include the inﬂuential work of OECD (1993). They found that employment protection
increased jobless duration. In subsequent work, the OECD (2003) ﬁnds that employment protection is
often insigniﬁcant, but is associated with increased unemployment for prime-age males. These, like the
cross-section studies, must construct measures of employment protection that are meaningful in different
countries. The difﬁculty, as we see in Table 3, is that there are a large number of possible laws, each of
which get implemented in an idiosyncratic fashion. One way to deal with this complexity is to have a more
narrow study of a law change. A series of studies by Kugler (1999), Kugler (2004a), and Kugler (2005) uses
the 1990 market-based reforms in Columbia. Kugler ﬁnds that these reforms generally lead to more ﬂexible
labor markets and lower unemployment.
Given that these changes occurred at a single point in time, this implies a true causal effect under
the hypothesis that other secular changes would not have produced this effect. One way to satisfy this
assumption is to narrow the analysis to a set of units that are more similar, but face changes at different
times. Besley and Burgess (2004) pioneered this approach using variations in employment law across states
in India. Given that all the units (states) are in the same country, this controls for legal origin. Using data
from 1958-1992 on employment law legislation, Besley and Burgess (2004) ﬁnd that pro-worker legislation
lowers economic growth. Similar results have been replicated by Aghion (2008) and Ahsan and Pages
(2009). However, given the large cultural diversity in India, one might question the extent to which the law
is exogenous to other events in society.
Possibly, the most convincing studies on the effect of the law exploit the fact that in the United States
employment law is under state jurisdiction. One can then estimate the effect that state level changes in
exceptions to employment at will have on the labor market. These law changes for the 1983-95 period are
illustrated in Figure 1. As we can see, a large number of states adopted the implied-contract and public-
policy exceptions during this time period. In this case, the identifying assumption is that U.S. states are
sufﬁciently similar that one can assume that the impact of the law in each state is similar. One then uses a
generalization of model 1:
yut = >Xut + >
l lst + ut;
where u denotes state. In most papers, the Current Population Survey (CPS) is used to measure employment
and wages by state. Bertrand et al. (2004) show that one cannot assume that the error term ut is i.i.d, and
one must allow for correlation over time. In practice this is achieved by adding state-speciﬁc time trends
and computing standards errors with clustering of the errors at the state level (in effect allowing arbitrary
covariance over time within states, but assuming independent errors across states).













48Miles (2000) is an early study by a legal scholar who carefully ensured that employment law is correctly
coded. This can be difﬁcult in the United States because law is created by both the courts and the states.
He ﬁnds very little effect on employment from any of the law variables, but ﬁnds that the implied contract
exception leads to an increase in temporary employment, consistent with the later work of Autor (2003).
Autor et al. (2004) and Autor et al. (2006) further reﬁne the law variables used by Miles (2000), ﬁnding that
the implied-contract exception leads to a robust reduction in state employment, but that the public-policy
and good-faith exceptions have no effect.
The theory discussed above predicts that the effect of the law depends upon the characteristics of the
employment relationship. In particular, if hold-up is the transaction cost most responsible for the creation
of employment law, then we would expect the law to have more effect on matches with higher levels of
relationship-speciﬁc investment. This idea motivates the work of MacLeod and Nakavachara (2007). They
match the CPS job training supplement that measures the amount of skill in a job with occupation code to
divide occupations in the low, middle, and high skill. They then use the data created by Autor et al. (2004)
to explore the effect of relating skill requirement with the law. They ﬁnd that the negative effects of the
implied contract and good faith exceptions tend to be concentrated in low-skill (high-turnover) jobs. In fact,
the good faith exception has a positive effect on employment for high-skill workers.
Though this appears to be at odds with the previous literature, it should be noted that the earlier literature
focuses on the average effects, which obscures the effect on different subgroups. One of the messages from
the recent research on contract theory is that optimal contract form should be sensitive to characteristics of
the job, particularly for high-performance jobs. Consequently, we cannot obtain a complete understanding
of how the law works without taking into account its impact on different types of relationships. Both the
theory and the early work of Freeman and Medoff (1984) predict that if transaction costs are a signiﬁcant
source of inefﬁciency in employment relationships, then there is a role for unions to enhance performance.
4.2 The Effect of Unions
Table 4 provides a list of studies that explore the effect of unions upon ﬁrm productivity. The early studies
by Brown and Medoff (1978) and Clark (1980b) explicitly recognize that unions may enhance performance
by increasing investments in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital, improving worker morale and other organizational
parameters. Clark (1980b) also observes that union contracts have many terms that address issues in the
workplace other than compensation. Brown and Medoff (1978) estimate a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion using data from the May CPS merged with the 1972 Census of Manufacturers (COM). They ﬁnd that
labor productivity is consistently higher at unionized ﬁrms. They are careful to point out that this result can
be explained by several factors, and while consistent with the hypothesis that unions enhance productivity,
they do not establish a causal link.
Clark (1980b) reﬁnes this approach by using a time series on U.S. cement plants, which allows one to
explore the effect of unions upon plants in the same industry, with precise control on capital equipment. Like
Brown and Medoff (1978), Clark ﬁnds that unions enhance productivity. One of the interesting ﬁndings is
49that if one compares only new plants, then unionized ﬁrms have 3.6% higher productivity, but a lower
capital/labor ratio. This is consistent with the holdup model of Grout (1984), which predicts that ﬁrms will
invest less in physical capital in response to union bargaining power. Abowd (1989) uses stock market data
to conclude that unions and ﬁrms maximize total wealth.
Recently, developments have begun to focus on workplace organization.51 Black and Lynch (2001) ﬁnd
that there is an interaction between workplace practice and unionization. When ﬁrms have more consen-
sual decision-making in the workplace, then unionization is associated with higher productivity. Conversely,
unions are associated with lower productivity in ﬁrms that use “traditional” management practices. Doucou-
liagos and Laroche (2003) carry out a meta-analysis of a large number of studies on the productivity impact
of unions. They ﬁnd that the evidence is broadly consistent with a positive-productivity effect in the United
States and a negative effect in the United Kingdom. This is an interesting observation given that the law is
quite different in the two jurisdictions. In the United Kingdom, unions cannot commit to a binding agree-
ment, whereas this is possible in the United States. This difference in productivities is consistent with the
evidence, though we are far from having convincing causal evidence.
Even if unions enhance ﬁrm productivity, this does not necessarily translate into an increase in proﬁts.
This depends on the bargaining power of unions, and the extent to which ﬁrms earn rents52 A common
strategy is to merge National Labor Relations Data on union certiﬁcation with ﬁrm stock-market data to look
at the impact of certiﬁcation on proﬁts. Ruback and Zimmerman (1984) ﬁnd that unionization causes a 3.8%
fall in equity value. Abowd (1989) ﬁnds that unionization can also reduce proﬁts, but that this is an efﬁcient
redistribution from ﬁrms to workers. These and similar studies must deal with the fact that unionization
is endogenous, and hence it is very difﬁcult to estimate the causal impact of a union, independent from
other factors. DiNardo and Lee (2004) use a regression discontinuity design in which they compare the
outcomes in ﬁrms where the unions barely won certiﬁcation, to ones where there was a close lost. Under
the hypothesis that the groups have similar characteristics, then differences can be attributed to union status.
Their ﬁnding is that the effect is essentially zero.
Lee and Mas (2009) use a similar approach, but obtain a better measure of abnormal stock-market re-
turns. They ﬁnd that unionization causes a 10% decline in abnormal returns. What is particularly interesting
(especially in the light of the efﬁcient-markets hypothesis) is that the negative effect is largest a year after the
vote for unionization. This result is consistent with the body of research that looks at the impact of unions
on ﬁrm productivity (see Doucouliagos and Laroche (2009)). Even if unions truly enhance productivity, if
they lower proﬁtability then we should expect ﬁrms to reallocate resources to jurisdictions with less union
penetration. Kuhn (1998) suggests that there seems to be little evidence of this in Canada, while Machin
(2000) ﬁnds that new ﬁrms in the United Kingdom tend not be unionized.
As Farber and Western (2001) documents for the United States, and Machin (2000) for the United
Kingdom, there has a been a large decline in unionization that is consistent with the hypothesis of excessive
rent extract by unions in the face of alternative, non-union, investment opportunities for ﬁrms. Yet, there
51See Ichinowski and Shaw (2003), and the Handbook chapters by Bloom and Van Reenan (2010) and Oyer and Schaefer (2010).
52See Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969) for a classic discussion of union-ﬁrm bargaining and associated empirical implications.
50are still some areas with signiﬁcant union presence. For example, workers in the entertainment industry
are unionized. This is an industry where highly skilled actors, writers, and musicians must move from job
to job, and where for each job there is a large number of potential candidates. In the absence of a union
contract, the wage would be set at the talent’s opportunity cost, which is likely to be far below the return
necessary to make it proﬁtable to invest in his or her particular skill. In this case, a union has the potential
to increase the talent pool, though this is a hypothesis that has not been carefully tested.
The other area with signiﬁcant union presence is the public sector. Ehrenberg et al. (1983) ﬁnd that
unions do not signiﬁcantly affect productivity for municipal librarians. Byrne et al. (1996) ﬁnd that union-
ized police are less effective in dealing with crime. Eberts and Stone (1987) explore the effect of unions upon
teacher productivity, ﬁnding that on average unionized teachers increase test scores by about 3%. However,
their impact is more homogeneous, and they do not do as well with students with above- or below-average
ability. In a recent study, Lovenheim (2009) ﬁnds that teacher unions raise costs by about 15% while having
no impact on school performance.53
In summary, the evidence on unions is consistent with the hypothesis that they do have some bargaining
power with respect to the ﬁrm. As we discussed in the previous section, bargaining power may allow parties
to implement more efﬁcient arrangements. The extent to which this is possible in practice is controversial.
It is clear that over the past century we have witnessed a large rise and fall in unionization rates in the
United States. The transaction-cost perspective suggests that unions can be viewed as substitutes for legal
enforcement of contracts and other forms of labor-market regulation. The fact that employment law in
the United States has become stronger in the last 30 years—in the sense of providing more protection for
disadvantaged groups54 and stronger employment protection—suggests that private law may be providing a
substitute for unionization.
In the case of the public sector, the skills acquired by workers are likely to be job-speciﬁc, and moreover
the demand for these skills are stable. This suggests that the optimal contract is of a long duration, which
may explain why public-sector unions are so prevalent. However, it is extremely difﬁcult to measure public-
sector productivity, and hence to evaluate properly the available labor institutions for these relationships.
Moreover, it is difﬁcult to argue that public-sector unions are purely rent-seeking organizations. As Blank
(1994) documents, the public/private sector wage ratio has been falling in the United States, even while
private-sector unionization has been falling. If unions were the main source of wage growth for workers,
then we should observe the opposite. We do not have deﬁnite answers to any of these questions, and hence
there is much room for further research.
53See Eberts (2007) for a general discussion of the role of teacher unions in education.
54See Chay (1998), Oyer and Schaefer (2002), and Jolls and Prescott (2004) for studies of the labor-market impact of legislation
to protect civil rights and disabled individuals.
515 Discussion
There is a remarkable consensus that increased employment protection law tends to reduce employment
for individuals with less attachment to the labor market. Increases in employment protection law tend to
adversely affect matches at the margin. That being said, the economics research uses a relatively crude
representation of the law. We know virtually nothing about how speciﬁc legal rules interact with different
types of worker-ﬁrm matches.
At a policy level, employment protection entails changes to speciﬁc rules, such as the number of days’
notice for a dismissal, mandatory dismissal payments, and speciﬁcation of the conditions under which a
protected employee may be dismissed. At the moment, policymakers have little guidance on how to set
these parameters, aside from the blanket recommendation to reduce them all.
Our discussion of the law illustrates that rules evolve in response to speciﬁc issues that need to be
addressed in the labor market. In the case of common law rules, as in the United States or United Kingdom,
a judge may create law in response to a speciﬁc set of facts, yet this new law affects all matches. This
process is not well understood. The beneﬁt of common-law rule making is that it usually restricts itself
to the bounds of particular cases, and therefore is not speculative. However, though judges are aware and
are certainly concerned with the broad impact that a decision may have, there is no systematic feedback
mechanism for evaluating the consequences of these rule changes.55
In a global context, we see a great deal of competition between different legal systems. Firms may
opt out of the courts completely by relying upon mandatory arbitration. However, arbitration courts are
increasingly looking like public courts, where there is a long process of deposing witnesses and presentation
of volumes of evidence before a decision is reached. More generally, all adjudication systems consist of
evidence-collection and decision-making that complement the employment practices used by a ﬁrm. We
need to better understand the substantive role that these courts play in the complex problem of managing
human resources.56 The literature on employment law has focused on turnover costs. Yet, the discussions of
both the law and the literature on transaction costs suggest that information costs are key to understanding
the role that the courts play in handling disputes.
In addition, the focus on turnover costs fails to deal with the selective nature of court decisions. The
courts are a venue of last resort for a party who feels that another party has breached a duty. This implies
that the law is not applied equally to all individuals. All contracts in the United States are subject to the
rule of good faith and fair dealing, which is meant to protect individuals from others, such as managers who
blatantly breach their obligations. An issue that is rarely addressed in the economics literature is the extent
to which we need courts to protect individuals who face poor treatment from bad managers.57 The law, and
employment law in particular, exists to deal with speciﬁc extreme cases, and not the average employment
relationship. In contrast, empirical research on employment law is focused on the average effect.
55See Krueger (1991), who suggests that the most important feature of the law for private parties is predictability.
56See the chapters by Rebitzer and Taylor (2010) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2010) on human resource management.
57For example, Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) show that job loss leads to measurable declines in health; hence, there are real
costs for workers who invest in a long-term match with a poor employer.
52In this chapter, unions and labor law are discussed as alternative governance structures that may en-
hance the management of the employment relationship. In theory, allocating more power to workers can
be efﬁciency-enhancing when they have private information that can impact match quality. The difﬁculty is
that such power also results in more rent extraction by workers. The existing evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that union power leads to lower proﬁts for ﬁrms. There is also mixed evidence regarding whether
or not unions enhance match quality. Unions, like managers, are likely to vary in their ability to strike ef-
ﬁcient agreements. Hence, we should not be surprised that there is mixed evidence regarding their effects
on match quality. The theory suggests that the rise and fall of unions in the private sector can be explained
by the extent to which unions enhance the productive efﬁciency of ﬁrms. At the moment we simply do not
have any evidence that explains the observed pattern.58
Finally, I have characterized elsewhere the literature on employment law as consisting of three solitudes
(see MacLeod (2007b)), namely, that the law, the economic theory of contract, and empirical labor eco-
nomics each has its own aesthetic and group of scholars that have developed for the most part independently
of each other. One reason for this is that the law evolved to deal with the pragmatic issue of how to govern
the exchange relationship before the analytic tools were in place to study these phenomena. We can view
the existing structure of the law as evidence that the central ingredients of contract theory - the insurance
motive, asymmetric information and incomplete contracts - are empirically relevant concepts, though we do
not know to what extent they provide the best unifying framework.
Ensuring that the economic theory of contract is empirically relevant is not helped by the fact that the
theory evolved out of the need to extend the reach of general equilibrium theory, which itself developed from
the mathematically sophisticated models of Arrow (1951) and Debreu (1959). The important work of Hart
(1975) illustrates a fundamental shortcoming of this approach and shows that when markets are incomplete
we cannot expect competitive equilibria to achieve an efﬁcient outcome. This work illustrates that simply
extending the model of general equilibrium to deal with incomplete markets is not likely to be a fruitful
path.
As discussed in section 3, the subsequent literature on game theory and mechanism design developed a
theory that is much more speciﬁc to the nature of individual transactions, and allows one to link transactions
costs to the observed structure of employment contracts.59 The fact that the law has a long and rich history
with its own mode of thought and language has made it difﬁcult to link these abstract models of contract
theory to legal practice. The work of Oliver Williamson (1975) appeared before much of modern contract
theory was developed, and hence his analysis has roots in the legal tradition. As a consequence, his work
develops a language that has been inﬂuential in introducing the notion of a transaction cost to law and
economics, though at the cost of making it very difﬁcult for the scholar schooled in modern theory to tease
out the empirical implications of the theory.
In contrast, the third solitude of empirical labor economics uses the model of a competitive market as
developed by Marshall (1948) and Samuelson (1947) to successfully organize vast quantities of data on
58See Farber and Western (2001) for an explanation for the decline.
59See in particular the recent books by Laffont and Maritmort (2002) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
53employment and wages, as we can see in the ﬁrst three volumes of the Handbook of Labor Economics. The
goal of the empirical literature reviewed in section 4 is to establish a causal link between changes in law and
the union status of workers and the change in employment and wages. Such identiﬁcation is more credible
the closer it is to approximating the treatment-control paradigm that is widely used in science. Hence, there
is a bias in this literature towards studying changes that occur over fairly short time periods.60 Yet the
economic theory of contract highlights the fact that individuals enter into agreements because they expect
that these relationships will be rewarding in the future, sometimes the distant future. The temporal distance
between cause and effect makes it very difﬁcult to explore the implications of these models.
The essence of a contract is that we voluntarily give up freedom of action in the expectation that this
reduction will make us better off. It is a fact of life that these great expectations are often dashed, requiring
changes to our plans. The history of employment and labor law can be viewed as a sequence of changes that
were brought about in the expectation of improving the lives of workers in the long run. We certainly need
better ways to measure and evaluate these expectations, so that we may ﬁnd the optimal trade-off between
opportunities of the moment and those that require durable investment and commitment. There is a growing
literature that is beginning to explore these issues and the interplay between law and long term outcomes.
Harrison and Scorse (2010) explore the effect of anti-sweatshop campaigns and ﬁnd that they lead to higher
wages, with little employment lost. Fiess et al. (2010) explore the impact of informal labor markets upon
growth.
Finally, Sullivan and von Wachter (2009) show that job lost leads to higher worker mortality. This
research is very important because it illustrates why the pecuniary costs and beneﬁts of job lost cannot fully
capture the effect of job lost upon individual well being. This can help explain why employment and labor
law have for centuries played such an important role in civil society, and why we need more research on the
interplay between law, employment contracts, and labor market performance.
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g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
.
B
e
s
l
e
y
a
n
d
B
u
r
g
e
s
s
(
2
0
0
4
)
C
a
n
L
a
b
o
r
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
H
i
n
d
e
r
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
P
e
r
-
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
?
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
I
n
d
i
a
I
n
d
i
a
n
s
t
a
t
e
s
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
o
f
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
a
m
e
n
d
m
e
n
t
i
s
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
,
p
r
o
-
w
o
r
k
e
r
,
o
r
p
r
o
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
.
S
t
a
t
e
s
t
h
a
t
a
m
e
n
d
e
d
i
n
a
p
r
o
-
w
o
r
k
e
r
d
i
r
e
c
t
i
o
n
e
x
p
e
-
r
i
e
n
c
e
d
l
o
w
e
r
e
d
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
7
.
2
%
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
r
e
g
-
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
;
2
8
.
5
%
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
d
a
i
l
y
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
n
r
e
g
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
.
B
i
r
d
a
n
d
K
n
o
p
f
(
2
0
0
9
)
D
o
W
r
o
n
g
f
u
l
-
D
i
s
c
h
a
r
g
e
L
a
w
s
I
m
p
a
i
r
F
i
r
m
P
e
r
f
o
r
-
m
a
n
c
e
?
U
S
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
a
p
-
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
e
l
y
1
8
,
0
0
0
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
b
a
n
k
s
W
r
o
n
g
f
u
l
-
d
i
s
c
h
a
r
g
e
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
T
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
w
r
o
n
g
f
u
l
-
d
i
s
c
h
a
r
g
e
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
d
o
p
t
e
d
b
y
U
.
S
.
s
t
a
t
e
c
o
u
r
t
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
1
9
7
7
-
9
9
.
A
f
t
e
r
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
i
n
g
f
o
r
l
o
c
a
l
s
t
a
t
e
e
c
o
-
n
o
m
i
c
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
,
t
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
ﬁ
n
d
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
a
r
e
-
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
a
d
o
p
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
c
o
n
-
t
r
a
c
t
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
t
h
e
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
l
a
b
o
r
e
x
p
e
n
s
e
s
.
I
n
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
,
a
d
o
p
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
i
s
f
o
u
n
d
t
o
h
a
v
e
a
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
a
n
d
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
T
h
e
s
t
u
d
y
c
o
r
r
o
b
o
r
a
t
e
s
p
r
e
v
i
-
o
u
s
ﬁ
n
d
i
n
g
s
t
h
a
t
w
r
o
n
g
f
u
l
-
d
i
s
c
h
a
r
g
e
l
a
w
s
p
l
a
c
e
i
n
-
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
c
o
s
t
s
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
s
.
B
l
a
n
c
h
a
r
d
a
n
d
W
o
l
f
e
r
s
(
2
0
0
0
)
T
h
e
R
o
l
e
o
f
S
h
o
c
k
s
a
n
d
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
t
h
e
R
i
s
e
o
f
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
U
n
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
:
T
h
e
A
g
-
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
2
0
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
-
t
r
i
e
s
;
1
9
6
0
-
1
9
9
9
;
8
ﬁ
v
e
-
y
e
a
r
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
s
o
f
d
a
t
a
S
t
a
t
i
c
a
n
d
t
i
m
e
-
v
a
r
y
i
n
g
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
t
a
k
e
n
f
r
o
m
N
i
c
k
e
l
l
(
1
9
9
7
)
;
t
i
m
e
-
v
a
r
y
i
n
g
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
t
a
k
e
n
f
r
o
m
L
a
z
e
a
r
(
1
9
9
0
)
a
n
d
u
p
d
a
t
e
d
.
L
o
o
k
i
n
g
a
t
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
t
h
e
y
ﬁ
n
d
t
h
a
t
s
h
o
c
k
-
E
P
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
t
e
r
m
s
p
o
i
n
t
t
o
a
m
p
l
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
a
d
v
e
r
s
e
s
h
o
c
k
s
.
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l
l
y
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
i
s
t
r
u
e
f
o
r
t
h
e
r
e
m
a
i
n
i
n
g
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
w
i
t
h
t
w
o
e
x
c
e
p
-
t
i
o
n
s
.
T
h
e
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
a
n
d
a
c
t
i
v
e
l
a
b
o
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
,
w
h
i
c
h
a
m
e
l
i
o
r
a
t
e
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
a
d
v
e
r
s
e
s
h
o
c
k
s
.
I
n
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
,
m
u
c
h
w
e
a
k
e
r
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
a
n
d
p
o
o
r
e
r
ﬁ
t
w
h
e
n
s
t
a
t
i
c
E
P
(
a
n
d
U
I
)
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
i
r
t
i
m
e
-
v
a
r
y
i
n
g
c
o
u
n
t
e
r
p
a
r
t
s
.
72A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
E
P
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
B
o
t
e
r
o
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
4
)
T
h
e
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
L
a
-
b
o
r
8
5
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
l
a
w
s
i
n
d
e
x
c
o
m
p
o
s
e
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
i
n
g
a
l
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
v
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
,
c
o
s
t
o
f
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
h
o
u
r
s
w
o
r
k
e
d
,
c
o
s
t
o
f
ﬁ
r
i
n
g
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
,
a
n
d
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
.
N
o
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
n
t
h
e
u
n
o
f
ﬁ
-
c
i
a
l
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
,
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
m
a
l
e
L
F
P
,
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
U
E
r
a
t
e
.
C
a
b
a
l
l
e
r
o
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
4
)
E
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
a
b
o
r
r
e
g
u
-
l
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
m
i
c
r
o
e
c
o
-
n
o
m
i
c
ﬂ
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
N
e
w
s
e
c
t
o
r
a
l
p
a
n
e
l
f
o
r
6
0
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
J
o
b
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
j
o
b
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
c
l
e
a
r
l
y
h
a
m
p
e
r
s
t
h
e
c
r
e
a
t
i
v
e
-
d
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
,
e
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
l
y
i
n
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
w
h
e
r
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
l
i
k
e
l
y
t
o
b
e
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
d
.
M
o
v
i
n
g
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
2
0
t
h
t
o
t
h
e
8
0
t
h
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
l
e
i
n
j
o
b
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
,
i
n
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
w
i
t
h
s
t
r
o
n
g
r
u
l
e
o
f
l
a
w
,
c
u
t
s
t
h
e
a
n
n
u
a
l
s
p
e
e
d
o
f
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
t
o
s
h
o
c
k
s
b
y
a
t
h
i
r
d
w
h
i
l
e
s
h
a
v
-
i
n
g
o
f
f
a
b
o
u
t
o
n
e
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
f
r
o
m
a
n
n
u
a
l
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
g
r
o
w
t
h
.
T
h
e
s
a
m
e
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
h
a
s
n
e
g
l
i
g
i
b
l
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
i
n
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
w
i
t
h
w
e
a
k
r
u
l
e
o
f
l
a
w
.
D
i
T
e
l
l
a
a
n
d
M
a
c
C
u
l
l
o
c
h
(
2
0
0
5
)
T
h
e
C
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
s
o
f
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
F
l
e
x
i
b
i
l
-
i
t
y
:
P
a
n
e
l
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
B
a
s
e
d
o
n
S
u
r
v
e
y
D
a
t
a
2
1
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
-
t
r
i
e
s
:
1
9
8
4
-
1
9
9
0
W
o
r
l
d
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
R
e
p
o
r
t
d
a
t
a
;
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
o
f
ﬂ
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
(
s
e
e
t
e
x
t
)
;
T
i
m
e
-
v
a
r
y
i
n
g
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
w
i
t
h
ﬁ
v
e
d
a
t
a
p
o
i
n
t
s
.
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
ﬂ
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
a
n
d
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
o
p
u
l
a
-
t
i
o
n
r
a
t
i
o
a
c
r
o
s
s
a
l
l
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
B
y
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
g
r
o
u
p
t
h
i
s
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
s
m
u
c
h
s
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
f
o
r
f
e
m
a
l
e
s
t
h
a
n
f
o
r
m
a
l
e
s
.
P
a
r
a
l
l
e
l
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
a
r
e
o
b
t
a
i
n
e
d
f
o
r
t
h
e
p
a
r
-
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
r
a
t
e
.
S
o
m
e
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
t
h
a
t
ﬂ
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
i
n
-
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
h
o
u
r
s
w
o
r
k
e
d
.
T
h
e
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
-
t
w
e
e
n
ﬂ
e
x
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
t
h
e
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
i
s
n
e
g
-
a
t
i
v
e
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
o
u
t
b
u
t
n
o
t
a
l
w
a
y
s
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
f
-
i
c
a
n
t
.
T
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
f
o
r
l
o
n
g
-
t
e
r
m
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
r
e
l
e
s
s
p
r
e
c
i
s
e
l
y
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
.
73A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
E
P
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
D
j
a
n
k
o
v
a
n
d
R
a
m
a
l
h
o
(
2
0
0
9
)
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
l
a
w
s
i
n
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
T
h
e
D
o
i
n
g
B
u
s
i
-
n
e
s
s
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
,
t
h
e
W
o
r
l
d
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
-
m
e
n
t
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
l
i
t
y
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
G
l
o
b
a
l
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
R
e
p
o
r
t
R
i
g
i
d
i
t
y
o
f
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
n
d
e
x
p
u
b
-
l
i
s
h
e
d
b
y
D
o
i
n
g
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
w
i
t
h
r
i
g
i
d
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
l
a
w
s
t
e
n
d
t
o
h
a
v
e
l
a
r
g
e
r
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
l
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
a
n
d
h
i
g
h
e
r
u
n
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
e
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
l
y
a
m
o
n
g
y
o
u
n
g
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
A
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
e
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
l
y
i
n
E
a
s
t
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
d
W
e
s
t
A
f
r
i
c
a
,
h
a
v
e
r
e
c
e
n
t
l
y
u
n
d
e
r
g
o
n
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
-
c
a
n
t
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
t
o
m
a
k
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
l
a
w
s
m
o
r
e
ﬂ
e
x
-
i
b
l
e
.
C
o
n
v
e
r
s
e
l
y
,
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
i
n
L
a
t
i
n
A
m
e
r
-
i
c
a
h
a
v
e
m
a
d
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
l
a
w
s
m
o
r
e
r
i
g
i
d
.
T
h
e
s
e
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
a
r
e
l
a
r
g
e
r
i
n
m
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
t
h
a
n
a
n
y
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
i
n
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
i
r
s
t
u
d
y
c
a
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
n
e
w
i
n
s
i
g
h
t
s
o
n
t
h
e
b
e
n
e
ﬁ
t
s
o
f
l
a
b
o
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
D
o
w
n
e
s
(
2
0
0
4
)
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
R
e
g
u
l
a
-
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
n
t
h
e
C
a
r
i
b
b
e
a
n
B
a
r
b
a
d
o
s
,
T
r
i
n
i
d
a
d
,
a
n
d
J
a
m
a
i
c
a
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
d
a
t
a
C
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
c
a
l
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
s
e
v
e
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
-
m
e
n
t
r
e
g
i
m
e
.
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
e
f
f
e
c
t
.
E
l
m
e
s
k
o
v
(
1
9
9
8
)
K
e
y
L
e
s
s
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
L
a
-
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
R
e
f
o
r
m
s
:
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
O
E
C
D
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
’
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
1
9
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
-
t
r
i
e
s
;
1
9
8
3
-
1
9
9
5
O
E
C
D
(
1
9
9
4
,
T
a
b
l
e
6
.
7
,
p
a
n
e
l
B
,
c
o
l
.
2
)
r
a
n
k
i
n
g
,
b
u
t
m
o
d
i
ﬁ
e
d
t
o
t
a
k
e
a
c
-
c
o
u
n
t
o
f
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
s
i
n
c
e
l
a
t
e
1
9
8
0
s
;
t
w
o
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
t
i
m
e
-
v
a
r
y
i
n
g
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
.
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
r
a
i
s
e
s
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
-
m
e
n
t
b
u
t
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
a
r
e
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
.
E
m
p
l
o
y
-
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
n
o
t
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
i
n
e
i
t
h
e
r
h
i
g
h
l
y
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
e
d
/
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
e
d
o
r
d
e
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
e
d
b
a
r
-
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
r
e
g
i
m
e
s
.
E
s
l
a
v
a
(
2
0
0
4
)
T
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
s
t
r
u
c
-
t
u
r
a
l
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
a
n
d
p
r
o
f
-
i
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
e
n
h
a
n
c
i
n
g
r
e
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
:
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
P
l
a
n
t
-
l
e
v
e
l
l
o
n
g
i
-
t
u
d
i
n
a
l
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
f
o
r
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
f
o
r
t
h
e
p
e
r
i
o
d
1
9
8
2
-
1
9
9
8
M
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
i
n
1
9
9
0
s
M
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
a
r
e
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
r
i
s
i
n
g
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
t
h
a
t
i
s
l
a
r
g
e
l
y
d
r
i
v
e
n
b
y
r
e
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
w
a
y
f
r
o
m
l
o
w
-
a
n
d
t
o
w
a
r
d
s
h
i
g
h
-
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
b
u
s
i
-
n
e
s
s
e
s
.
I
n
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
,
t
h
e
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
a
c
r
o
s
s
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
s
i
s
l
e
s
s
d
r
i
v
e
n
b
y
d
e
m
a
n
d
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
a
f
t
e
r
r
e
-
f
o
r
m
s
.
T
h
e
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
p
o
s
t
-
r
e
f
o
r
m
i
s
e
n
t
i
r
e
l
y
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
e
d
f
o
r
b
y
t
h
e
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
a
l
-
l
o
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
.
F
e
l
d
m
a
n
n
(
2
0
0
8
)
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
A
r
o
u
n
d
t
h
e
W
o
r
l
d
7
4
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
;
2
0
0
0
-
2
0
0
3
L
a
b
o
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
r
a
t
i
n
g
s
f
r
o
m
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
o
f
t
h
e
W
o
r
l
d
i
n
d
e
x
.
L
a
b
o
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
r
e
d
u
c
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
74A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
E
P
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
F
e
l
d
m
a
n
n
(
2
0
0
9
)
T
h
e
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
L
a
b
o
r
R
e
g
-
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
A
r
o
u
n
d
t
h
e
W
o
r
l
d
7
3
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
;
2
0
0
0
-
2
0
0
3
L
a
b
o
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
E
F
W
i
n
d
e
x
a
s
w
e
l
l
a
s
t
h
e
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
.
S
t
r
i
c
t
e
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
a
p
p
e
a
r
s
t
o
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
u
n
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
F
r
e
e
m
a
n
(
2
0
0
2
)
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
D
i
f
f
e
r
-
e
n
c
e
s
a
n
d
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
A
m
o
n
g
O
E
C
D
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
2
3
+
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
;
1
9
7
0
-
1
9
9
0
F
r
a
s
e
r
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
i
n
d
e
x
o
f
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
f
r
e
e
-
d
o
m
(
s
e
e
t
e
x
t
)
;
t
i
m
e
-
v
a
r
y
i
n
g
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
w
i
t
h
6
d
a
t
a
p
o
i
n
t
s
.
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
w
i
t
h
a
h
i
g
h
d
e
g
r
e
e
o
f
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
f
r
e
e
-
d
o
m
h
a
v
e
h
i
g
h
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
-
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
r
a
t
e
s
a
n
d
l
o
w
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
–
a
t
l
e
a
s
t
i
n
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
l
e
v
e
l
s
.
O
n
l
y
f
o
r
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
d
o
t
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
s
u
r
v
i
v
e
t
h
e
i
n
c
l
u
-
s
i
o
n
o
f
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
ﬁ
x
e
d
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.
G
a
r
i
b
a
l
d
i
(
1
9
9
9
)
D
e
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
n
g
J
o
b
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
2
1
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
-
t
r
i
e
s
;
1
9
8
0
-
1
9
9
8
O
E
C
D
(
1
9
9
4
,
t
a
b
l
e
6
.
5
p
a
n
e
l
B
,
c
o
l
.
5
)
r
a
n
k
i
n
g
;
M
o
m
e
n
t
-
i
n
-
t
i
m
e
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
.
T
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
s
t
r
o
n
g
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
E
P
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
a
n
d
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
g
r
o
w
t
h
i
n
c
r
o
s
s
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
(
f
o
r
2
4
o
u
t
o
f
2
7
c
a
s
e
s
)
,
b
u
t
i
n
p
a
n
e
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
t
h
e
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
l
e
s
s
p
r
e
c
i
s
e
l
y
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
a
n
d
i
s
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
-
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
i
n
o
n
e
o
f
ﬁ
v
e
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
l
y
.
G
r
u
b
b
a
n
d
W
e
l
l
s
(
1
9
9
3
)
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
R
e
g
u
l
a
-
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
P
a
t
t
e
r
n
s
o
f
W
o
r
k
i
n
E
C
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
1
1
E
U
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
;
1
9
8
9
A
u
t
h
o
r
s
’
o
w
n
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
o
f
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
w
o
r
k
(
O
R
D
W
)
,
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
o
f
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
(
R
D
S
M
)
,
ﬁ
x
e
d
-
t
e
r
m
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
(
R
F
T
C
)
,
a
n
d
t
e
m
-
p
o
r
a
r
y
w
o
r
k
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
(
R
T
W
A
)
.
O
R
D
W
r
e
d
u
c
e
s
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
s
e
l
f
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
a
n
d
r
e
d
u
c
e
s
p
a
r
t
-
t
i
m
e
w
o
r
k
.
R
D
S
M
(
R
F
T
C
)
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
(
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
)
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
w
o
r
k
.
R
T
W
A
b
u
t
n
o
t
R
D
S
M
r
e
d
u
c
e
s
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
a
g
e
n
c
y
w
o
r
k
.
75A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
E
P
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
H
e
c
k
m
a
n
a
n
d
P
a
g
é
s
(
2
0
0
0
)
T
h
e
C
o
s
t
o
f
J
o
b
S
e
-
c
u
r
i
t
y
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
:
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
L
a
t
i
n
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
4
1
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
f
r
o
m
L
A
C
a
n
d
O
E
C
D
;
1
9
8
0
-
1
9
9
7
(
m
a
x
)
A
u
t
h
o
r
s
’
o
w
n
c
a
r
d
i
n
a
l
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
s
e
v
e
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
,
n
o
t
i
c
e
i
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
,
a
n
d
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
i
o
n
f
o
r
u
n
f
a
i
r
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
(
s
e
e
t
e
x
t
)
.
T
w
o
p
e
r
i
o
d
t
i
m
e
-
v
a
r
y
i
n
g
m
e
a
-
s
u
r
e
.
E
P
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
s
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
f
o
r
t
o
t
a
l
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
f
o
r
e
a
c
h
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
n
g
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
.
S
i
m
i
l
a
r
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
b
t
a
i
n
e
d
f
o
r
m
a
l
e
s
a
n
d
y
o
u
t
h
,
b
u
t
n
o
t
f
e
m
a
l
e
s
,
t
h
e
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
E
P
o
n
m
a
l
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
b
e
-
i
n
g
h
a
l
f
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
e
f
f
e
c
t
a
n
d
t
h
e
y
o
u
t
h
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
s
a
l
m
o
s
t
d
o
u
b
l
e
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
.
E
P
e
f
-
f
e
c
t
s
f
o
r
f
e
m
a
l
e
s
a
n
d
s
e
l
f
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
v
a
r
y
w
i
d
e
l
y
a
c
r
o
s
s
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
n
g
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
.
T
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
f
o
r
u
n
e
m
-
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
d
e
p
e
n
d
o
n
m
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
a
n
d
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
n
o
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
E
P
o
n
l
o
n
g
e
r
-
t
e
r
m
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
D
i
s
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
i
o
n
b
y
b
r
o
a
d
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
g
r
o
u
p
i
n
g
r
e
v
e
a
l
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
E
P
b
y
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
g
r
o
u
p
a
r
e
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
m
o
s
t
l
y
s
t
a
-
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
.
T
h
e
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
i
s
f
e
m
a
l
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
L
a
t
i
n
-
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
g
r
o
u
p
i
n
g
.
T
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
E
P
o
n
u
n
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
r
e
n
e
a
r
l
y
a
l
w
a
y
s
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
s
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
f
o
r
t
h
e
O
E
C
D
g
r
o
u
p
i
n
g
.
K
a
h
n
(
2
0
1
0
)
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
-
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
,
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
t
h
e
i
n
c
i
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
t
e
m
p
o
-
r
a
r
y
j
o
b
s
i
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
:
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
1
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
,
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
,
F
r
a
n
c
e
,
G
e
r
m
a
n
,
I
t
a
l
y
,
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
,
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
,
S
p
a
i
n
,
U
n
i
t
e
d
K
i
n
g
d
o
m
,
1
9
9
6
-
2
0
0
1
.
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
C
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
P
a
n
e
l
(
E
C
H
P
)
A
r
o
b
u
s
t
ﬁ
n
d
i
n
g
i
s
t
h
a
t
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
m
a
k
i
n
g
i
t
e
a
s
i
e
r
t
o
c
r
e
a
t
e
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
j
o
b
s
o
n
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
r
a
i
s
e
t
h
e
l
i
k
e
l
i
-
h
o
o
d
t
h
a
t
w
a
g
e
a
n
d
s
a
l
a
r
y
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
w
i
l
l
b
e
i
n
t
e
m
-
p
o
r
a
r
y
j
o
b
s
.
T
h
i
s
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
s
f
e
l
t
p
r
i
m
a
r
i
l
y
w
h
e
n
t
h
e
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
i
s
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
h
i
g
h
.
H
o
w
-
e
v
e
r
,
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
n
o
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
t
h
a
t
s
u
c
h
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
r
a
i
s
e
e
m
-
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
T
h
u
s
,
t
h
e
s
e
r
e
f
o
r
m
s
,
w
h
i
l
e
t
o
u
t
e
d
a
s
a
w
a
y
o
f
j
u
m
p
-
s
t
a
r
t
i
n
g
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
’
c
a
r
e
e
r
s
i
n
t
h
e
j
o
b
m
a
r
k
e
t
,
a
p
p
e
a
r
r
a
t
h
e
r
t
o
e
n
c
o
u
r
a
g
e
a
s
u
b
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
f
o
r
p
e
r
m
a
n
e
n
t
w
o
r
k
.
K
a
p
l
a
n
(
2
0
0
9
)
J
o
b
C
r
e
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
L
a
-
b
o
r
R
e
f
o
r
m
i
n
L
a
t
i
n
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
F
i
r
m
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
1
4
L
a
t
i
n
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
c
o
u
n
-
t
r
i
e
s
I
n
d
e
x
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
o
f
t
h
e
W
o
r
l
d
r
e
p
o
r
t
a
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
o
f
l
a
b
o
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
i
g
i
d
i
t
y
.
M
o
r
e
ﬂ
e
x
i
b
l
e
l
a
b
o
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
w
o
u
l
d
l
e
a
d
t
o
a
n
a
v
-
e
r
a
g
e
n
e
t
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
o
f
2
.
0
8
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
n
t
o
t
a
l
e
m
p
l
o
y
-
m
e
n
t
.
F
i
r
m
s
w
i
t
h
f
e
w
e
r
t
h
a
n
2
0
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
w
o
u
l
d
b
e
n
e
ﬁ
t
t
h
e
m
o
s
t
,
w
i
t
h
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
g
a
i
n
s
i
n
n
e
t
e
m
p
l
o
y
-
m
e
n
t
o
f
4
.
2
7
%
.
76A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
E
P
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
K
u
g
l
e
r
(
1
9
9
9
)
T
h
e
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
ﬁ
r
i
n
g
c
o
s
t
s
o
n
t
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
a
n
d
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
:
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
n
l
a
b
o
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
f
o
r
m
R
e
p
e
a
t
e
d
c
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
n
N
a
-
t
i
o
n
a
l
H
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
S
u
r
v
e
y
(
N
H
S
)
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
n
L
a
b
o
u
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
R
e
f
o
r
m
o
f
1
9
9
0
,
w
h
i
c
h
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
t
i
a
l
l
y
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
d
i
s
-
m
i
s
s
a
l
c
o
s
t
s
.
T
h
e
e
x
i
t
h
a
z
a
r
d
r
a
t
e
s
i
n
t
o
a
n
d
o
u
t
o
f
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
d
a
f
t
e
r
t
h
e
r
e
f
o
r
m
b
y
o
v
e
r
1
%
f
o
r
f
o
r
m
a
l
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
(
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
l
e
g
i
s
l
a
t
i
o
n
)
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
i
n
f
o
r
-
m
a
l
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
(
u
n
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
)
.
T
h
e
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
o
f
t
h
e
h
a
z
-
a
r
d
s
i
m
p
l
i
e
s
a
n
e
t
d
e
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
o
f
a
t
h
i
r
d
o
f
a
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
p
o
i
n
t
,
w
h
i
c
h
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
f
o
r
a
b
o
u
t
o
n
e
q
u
a
r
t
e
r
o
f
t
h
e
f
a
l
l
i
n
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
p
e
r
i
o
d
o
f
s
t
u
d
y
.
K
u
g
l
e
r
(
2
0
0
4
a
)
T
h
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
J
o
b
S
e
-
c
u
r
i
t
y
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
F
l
e
x
i
-
b
i
l
i
t
y
:
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
n
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
R
e
f
o
r
m
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
n
h
o
u
s
e
-
h
o
l
d
d
a
t
a
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
;
1
9
8
8
,
1
9
9
2
,
1
9
9
6
C
o
l
o
m
b
i
a
l
a
b
o
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
f
o
r
m
o
f
1
9
9
0
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
s
e
v
e
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
,
w
i
d
e
n
e
d
t
h
e
d
e
ﬁ
n
i
t
i
o
n
o
f
“
j
u
s
t
”
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
s
,
e
x
-
t
e
n
d
e
d
t
h
e
u
s
e
o
f
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
,
a
n
d
s
p
e
d
u
p
t
h
e
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
o
f
m
a
s
s
d
i
s
-
m
i
s
s
a
l
s
.
R
e
f
o
r
m
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
d
t
o
a
b
o
u
t
1
0
%
o
f
t
h
e
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
h
e
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
p
r
e
a
n
d
p
o
s
t
r
e
f
o
r
m
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
.
K
u
g
l
e
r
(
2
0
0
4
b
)
H
o
w
d
o
ﬁ
r
i
n
g
c
o
s
t
s
a
f
-
f
e
c
t
w
o
r
k
e
r
ﬂ
o
w
s
i
n
a
w
o
r
l
d
w
i
t
h
a
d
v
e
r
s
e
s
e
-
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
?
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
L
o
n
g
i
-
t
u
d
i
n
a
l
S
u
r
v
e
y
o
f
Y
o
u
t
h
U
n
j
u
s
t
-
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
U
.
S
.
s
t
a
t
e
s
.
A
s
ﬁ
r
i
n
g
c
o
s
t
s
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
,
ﬁ
r
m
s
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
l
y
p
r
e
f
e
r
h
i
r
i
n
g
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
,
w
h
o
a
r
e
l
e
s
s
l
i
k
e
l
y
t
o
b
e
l
e
m
o
n
s
.
U
n
j
u
s
t
-
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
i
n
U
.
S
.
s
t
a
t
e
s
r
e
d
u
c
e
t
h
e
r
e
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
i
e
s
o
f
u
n
e
m
-
p
l
o
y
e
d
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
T
h
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
u
n
j
u
s
t
-
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
o
n
t
h
e
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
d
a
r
e
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
f
o
r
u
n
i
o
n
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
a
n
d
t
h
o
s
e
w
h
o
l
o
s
t
t
h
e
i
r
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
j
o
b
s
d
u
e
t
o
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
f
a
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
.
L
a
z
e
a
r
(
1
9
9
0
)
J
o
b
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
P
r
o
v
i
-
s
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
2
0
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
;
1
9
5
6
-
1
9
8
4
S
e
v
e
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
d
u
e
b
l
u
e
-
c
o
l
l
a
r
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
w
i
t
h
1
0
y
e
a
r
s
o
f
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
;
t
i
m
e
-
v
a
r
y
i
n
g
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
.
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
r
a
i
s
e
s
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
r
e
d
u
c
e
s
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
h
o
u
r
s
.
77A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
E
P
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
M
a
c
L
e
o
d
a
n
d
N
a
k
a
v
a
c
h
a
r
a
(
2
0
0
7
)
C
a
n
W
r
o
n
g
f
u
l
D
i
s
-
c
h
a
r
g
e
L
a
w
E
n
h
a
n
c
e
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
?
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
I
m
p
l
i
e
d
-
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
.
I
m
p
l
i
e
d
-
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
:
3
.
6
%
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
o
f
m
e
d
i
u
m
-
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
g
r
o
u
p
u
n
d
e
r
s
c
h
o
o
l
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
c
r
i
-
t
e
r
i
a
;
3
.
0
%
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
o
f
m
e
d
i
u
m
-
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
g
r
o
u
p
u
n
d
e
r
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
l
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
;
o
t
h
e
r
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
a
r
e
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
,
b
u
t
c
a
n
r
e
j
e
c
t
n
u
l
l
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
t
h
a
t
a
l
l
a
d
o
p
t
i
o
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
a
r
e
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
f
-
i
c
a
n
t
f
o
r
a
n
y
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
(
1
1
.
7
%
l
e
v
e
l
)
a
n
d
s
c
h
o
o
l
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
(
0
.
0
%
l
e
v
e
l
)
.
P
u
b
i
c
-
p
o
l
i
c
y
:
N
o
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
o
f
l
o
w
a
n
d
h
i
g
h
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
g
r
o
u
p
s
a
c
r
o
s
s
a
l
l
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
o
f
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
.
G
o
o
d
-
f
a
i
t
h
:
7
.
1
-
9
.
6
%
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
o
f
l
o
w
-
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
g
r
o
u
p
,
0
-
3
.
4
%
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
o
f
m
e
d
i
u
m
-
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
g
r
o
u
p
,
a
n
d
6
.
5
-
1
4
.
5
%
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
i
n
e
m
-
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
o
f
h
i
g
h
-
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
g
r
o
u
p
u
n
d
e
r
a
n
y
t
r
a
i
n
-
i
n
g
,
s
c
h
o
o
l
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
,
a
n
d
f
o
r
m
a
l
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
.
N
o
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
u
n
d
e
r
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
l
-
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
o
n
.
M
i
l
e
s
(
2
0
0
0
)
C
o
m
m
o
n
l
a
w
e
x
c
e
p
-
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
t
w
i
l
l
a
n
d
U
S
l
a
b
o
r
m
a
r
-
k
e
t
s
U
S
p
a
n
e
l
o
f
s
t
a
t
e
l
a
b
o
r
m
a
r
k
e
t
a
g
g
r
e
-
g
a
t
e
s
f
r
o
m
1
9
6
5
t
o
1
9
9
4
T
h
e
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
t
w
i
l
l
t
h
a
t
l
i
m
i
t
t
h
e
c
i
r
c
u
m
s
t
a
n
c
e
s
o
f
w
o
r
k
e
r
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
.
T
h
e
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
t
o
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
r
e
s
e
e
n
t
o
h
a
v
e
n
o
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
n
o
r
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
H
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
s
o
b
s
e
r
v
e
d
t
o
i
n
-
c
r
e
a
s
e
b
y
a
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
1
5
%
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
t
h
e
a
d
o
p
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
n
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
i
m
p
l
i
e
d
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
e
x
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
,
i
n
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
,
a
p
p
e
a
r
s
t
o
b
e
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
i
b
l
e
f
o
r
t
h
i
s
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
.
M
o
n
d
i
n
o
a
n
d
M
o
n
t
o
y
a
(
2
0
0
4
)
T
h
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
D
e
-
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
b
y
F
i
r
m
s
:
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
f
o
r
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
i
a
n
p
a
n
e
l
o
f
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
s
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
c
o
m
p
o
s
e
d
o
f
t
a
x
e
s
a
n
d
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
s
e
v
e
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
.
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
r
i
g
i
d
l
a
b
o
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
-
m
e
n
t
.
78A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
E
P
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
a
n
d
P
a
g
é
s
(
2
0
0
4
)
W
h
o
B
e
n
e
ﬁ
t
s
f
r
o
m
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
R
e
g
-
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
?
C
h
i
l
e
,
1
9
6
0
-
1
9
9
8
C
h
i
l
e
a
n
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
u
r
v
e
y
d
a
t
a
;
1
9
6
0
-
1
9
9
8
J
o
b
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
e
r
i
v
e
d
i
n
P
a
g
e
s
a
n
d
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
(
1
9
9
9
)
w
h
i
c
h
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
s
t
h
e
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
c
o
s
t
,
a
t
t
h
e
t
i
m
e
a
w
o
r
k
e
r
i
s
h
i
r
e
d
,
o
f
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
t
h
e
w
o
r
k
e
r
i
n
t
h
e
f
u
t
u
r
e
.
J
o
b
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
i
s
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
l
o
w
e
r
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
s
f
o
r
y
o
u
n
g
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
,
f
e
m
a
l
e
a
n
d
u
n
s
k
i
l
l
e
d
w
o
r
k
-
e
r
s
,
a
n
d
h
i
g
h
e
r
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
f
o
r
o
l
d
e
r
a
n
d
s
k
i
l
l
e
d
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
N
i
c
k
e
l
l
(
1
9
9
7
)
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
R
i
g
i
d
i
-
t
i
e
s
:
E
u
r
o
p
e
v
e
r
s
u
s
N
o
r
t
h
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
2
0
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
-
t
r
i
e
s
;
1
9
8
3
-
1
9
8
8
a
n
d
1
9
8
9
-
1
9
9
4
O
E
C
D
(
1
9
9
6
)
(
t
a
b
l
e
6
.
7
,
p
a
n
e
l
B
,
c
o
l
.
5
)
r
a
n
k
i
n
g
;
a
l
s
o
u
s
e
o
f
l
a
b
o
r
s
t
a
n
-
d
a
r
d
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
c
o
v
e
r
i
n
g
i
n
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
t
o
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
t
i
m
e
,
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
w
a
g
e
s
,
a
n
d
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
r
e
p
-
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
r
i
g
h
t
s
(
O
E
C
D
,
1
9
9
4
,
t
a
b
l
e
4
.
8
,
c
o
l
.
6
)
.
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
r
e
d
u
c
e
s
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
b
u
t
n
o
t
t
h
a
t
o
f
p
r
i
m
e
-
a
g
e
m
a
l
e
s
.
F
o
r
u
n
e
m
-
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
s
n
e
g
a
-
t
i
v
e
b
u
t
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
.
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
-
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
r
e
d
u
c
e
s
s
h
o
r
t
-
t
e
r
m
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
i
n
-
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
l
o
n
g
-
t
e
r
m
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
C
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
e
s
t
i
-
m
a
t
e
f
o
r
w
o
r
k
e
r
l
a
b
o
r
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
-
c
a
l
l
y
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
i
n
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
.
79A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
E
P
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
N
i
c
o
l
e
t
t
i
e
t
a
l
.
(
2
0
0
3
)
I
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
a
n
d
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
:
D
o
T
h
e
y
A
f
f
e
c
t
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
?
2
0
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
-
t
r
i
e
s
;
1
9
8
2
-
1
9
9
8
T
w
o
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
o
f
t
h
e
s
t
r
i
n
g
e
n
c
y
o
f
t
h
e
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
a
p
p
a
r
a
t
u
s
.
T
h
e
ﬁ
r
s
t
i
s
E
P
p
e
r
s
e
,
a
n
d
i
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
t
h
e
t
i
m
e
v
a
r
y
-
i
n
g
O
E
C
D
(
1
9
9
9
,
T
a
b
l
e
2
.
5
)
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
.
T
h
e
s
e
c
o
n
d
i
s
a
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
t
h
e
d
e
-
g
r
e
e
o
f
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
m
o
d
e
l
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
i
s
b
o
t
h
s
t
a
t
i
c
(
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
N
i
c
o
l
e
t
t
i
e
t
a
l
.
,
1
9
9
9
)
a
n
d
t
i
m
e
v
a
r
y
i
n
g
(
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
t
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
’
e
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
m
a
r
k
e
t
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
7
e
n
e
r
g
y
a
n
d
s
e
r
-
v
i
c
e
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
,
1
9
7
0
-
1
9
9
8
)
.
I
n
i
n
i
t
i
a
l
ﬁ
x
e
d
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
E
P
i
s
a
s
s
o
c
i
-
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
a
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
e
m
-
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
W
h
e
n
E
P
e
n
t
e
r
s
i
n
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
d
u
m
m
i
e
s
,
i
t
s
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
a
r
e
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
f
o
r
b
o
t
h
i
n
t
e
r
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
a
n
d
h
i
g
h
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
s
a
m
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
o
b
t
a
i
n
f
o
r
t
h
e
r
a
n
d
o
m
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
a
n
d
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
t
a
g
e
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
.
I
n
e
a
c
h
c
a
s
e
,
t
h
e
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
s
s
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
i
n
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
w
i
t
h
a
n
i
n
-
t
e
r
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
d
e
g
r
e
e
o
f
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
t
h
e
s
t
a
t
i
c
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
-
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
a
n
d
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
.
F
i
n
a
l
l
y
,
f
o
r
t
h
e
ﬁ
x
e
d
e
f
f
e
c
t
p
a
n
e
l
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
s
,
E
P
i
s
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
-
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
i
n
t
h
e
b
a
s
i
c
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
.
I
n
i
n
t
e
r
-
a
c
t
i
v
e
f
o
r
m
,
h
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
t
h
e
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
c
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
e
s
t
i
-
m
a
t
e
f
o
r
E
P
i
s
o
n
l
y
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
f
o
r
t
h
e
i
n
t
e
r
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
.
I
n
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
c
o
o
r
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
,
t
h
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
m
a
r
k
e
t
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
o
u
t
,
b
u
t
i
s
s
t
a
-
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
f
o
r
l
o
w
a
n
d
i
n
t
e
r
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
c
o
o
r
-
d
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
.
O
E
C
D
(
1
9
9
3
)
1
9
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
-
t
r
i
e
s
;
1
9
7
9
-
1
9
9
1
S
e
v
e
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
a
n
d
n
o
t
i
c
e
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
c
o
m
-
b
i
n
e
d
a
c
r
o
s
s
b
l
u
e
-
a
n
d
w
h
i
t
e
-
c
o
l
l
a
r
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
;
m
o
m
e
n
t
-
i
n
-
t
i
m
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
.
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
h
a
s
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
n
j
o
b
-
l
e
s
s
d
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
,
e
s
p
e
c
i
a
l
l
y
i
n
s
o
u
t
h
e
r
n
E
u
r
o
p
e
.
80A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
E
P
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
O
E
C
D
(
1
9
9
9
)
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
P
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
L
a
b
o
u
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
1
9
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
-
t
r
i
e
s
;
1
9
8
5
-
1
9
9
0
,
1
9
9
2
-
1
9
9
7
O
E
C
D
(
1
9
9
9
,
t
a
b
l
e
2
.
5
)
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
f
o
r
l
a
t
e
1
9
8
0
s
a
n
d
l
a
t
e
1
9
9
0
s
;
s
i
n
g
l
e
o
v
e
r
-
a
l
l
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
a
n
d
a
l
s
o
s
e
p
a
r
a
t
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
-
t
o
r
s
f
o
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
t
e
m
p
o
-
r
a
r
y
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
d
i
s
-
m
i
s
s
a
l
s
;
i
n
s
o
m
e
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
u
r
t
h
e
r
d
i
s
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
a
n
d
t
e
m
p
o
-
r
a
r
y
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
I
r
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
o
f
t
h
e
f
o
r
m
o
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
,
E
P
c
o
e
f
ﬁ
-
c
i
e
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
i
s
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
f
o
r
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
I
t
i
s
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
-
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
f
o
r
p
r
i
m
e
-
a
g
e
m
a
l
e
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
o
n
l
y
)
.
F
o
r
a
l
l
o
t
h
e
r
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
g
r
o
u
p
s
E
P
i
s
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
.
F
u
r
t
h
e
r
,
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
E
P
d
o
n
o
t
a
f
f
e
c
t
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
f
o
r
o
t
h
e
r
t
h
a
n
p
r
i
m
e
-
a
g
e
f
e
m
a
l
e
s
,
w
h
e
r
e
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
s
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
(
s
t
r
i
c
t
n
e
s
s
o
f
E
P
w
i
t
h
r
e
-
s
p
e
c
t
t
o
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
)
.
F
o
r
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
t
h
e
c
o
e
f
ﬁ
c
i
e
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
f
o
r
E
P
a
r
e
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
b
u
t
s
t
a
t
i
s
-
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
f
o
r
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
,
p
r
i
m
e
-
a
g
e
f
e
m
a
l
e
,
y
o
u
t
h
,
a
n
d
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
O
t
h
e
r
w
i
s
e
t
h
e
y
a
r
e
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
a
n
d
i
n
t
h
e
c
a
s
e
o
f
s
e
l
f
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
s
t
a
-
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
(
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
E
P
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
a
n
d
i
t
s
r
e
g
-
u
l
a
r
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
v
a
r
i
a
n
t
)
.
F
u
r
t
h
e
r
,
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
E
P
h
a
v
e
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
f
o
r
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
e
m
-
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
f
o
r
a
l
l
d
e
m
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
g
r
o
u
p
s
.
F
o
r
s
e
l
f
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
t
h
e
s
h
a
r
e
o
f
t
e
m
p
o
r
a
r
y
e
m
p
l
o
y
-
m
e
n
t
,
s
o
m
e
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
a
r
e
o
b
s
e
r
v
e
d
.
P
a
g
é
s
a
n
d
M
o
n
t
e
n
e
g
r
o
(
2
0
0
7
)
J
o
b
S
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
a
n
d
t
h
e
A
g
e
-
C
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
o
f
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
:
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
C
h
i
l
e
C
h
i
l
e
a
n
a
n
n
u
a
l
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
u
r
v
e
y
s
;
1
9
6
0
-
1
9
9
8
I
n
d
e
x
c
o
m
b
i
n
i
n
g
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
n
o
t
i
c
e
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
,
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
i
o
n
f
o
r
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
,
t
h
e
l
i
k
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
t
h
a
t
a
ﬁ
r
m
s
’
d
i
f
ﬁ
c
u
l
t
i
e
s
b
e
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
e
d
a
s
j
u
s
t
i
ﬁ
e
d
c
a
u
s
e
o
f
d
i
s
-
m
i
s
s
a
l
,
a
n
d
s
e
v
e
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
d
u
e
t
o
t
h
a
t
e
v
e
n
t
.
T
h
i
s
i
n
d
e
x
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
t
h
e
e
x
-
p
e
c
t
e
d
c
o
s
t
,
a
t
t
h
e
t
i
m
e
t
h
e
w
o
r
k
e
r
i
s
h
i
r
e
d
,
o
f
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
i
n
g
a
w
o
r
k
e
r
i
n
t
h
e
f
u
-
t
u
r
e
.
J
o
b
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
i
s
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
a
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
t
i
a
l
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
i
n
t
h
e
w
a
g
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
-
t
o
-
p
o
p
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
r
a
t
e
o
f
y
o
u
n
g
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
N
o
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
i
n
y
o
u
n
g
s
e
l
f
-
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
s
o
r
i
n
t
h
e
w
a
g
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
s
o
f
o
l
d
e
r
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
.
A
d
v
e
r
s
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
j
o
b
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
o
n
y
o
u
t
h
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
i
s
d
r
i
v
e
n
b
y
t
h
e
l
i
n
k
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
s
e
v
e
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
a
n
d
t
e
n
u
r
e
.
J
o
b
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
d
o
e
s
n
o
t
h
a
v
e
a
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
-
t
i
o
n
o
r
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
s
.
81A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
E
P
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
S
a
a
v
e
d
r
a
a
n
d
T
o
r
e
r
o
(
2
0
0
4
)
L
a
b
o
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
R
e
-
f
o
r
m
s
a
n
d
T
h
e
i
r
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
v
e
r
F
o
r
m
a
l
L
a
b
o
r
D
e
m
a
n
d
a
n
d
J
o
b
M
a
r
k
e
t
T
u
r
n
o
v
e
r
:
T
h
e
C
a
s
e
o
f
P
e
r
u
P
e
r
u
v
i
a
n
ﬁ
r
m
a
n
d
s
e
c
t
o
r
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
;
1
9
8
6
-
1
9
9
7
.
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
s
e
v
e
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
R
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
ﬁ
r
i
n
g
c
o
s
t
s
(
a
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
b
y
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
s
e
v
e
r
a
n
c
e
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
)
h
a
s
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
-
m
e
n
t
l
e
v
e
l
.
S
c
a
r
p
e
t
t
a
(
1
9
9
6
)
A
s
s
e
s
s
i
n
g
t
h
e
R
o
l
e
o
f
L
a
b
o
u
r
M
a
r
k
e
t
P
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
a
n
d
I
n
s
t
i
-
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
S
e
t
t
i
n
g
s
o
n
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
:
A
C
r
o
s
s
-
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
S
t
u
d
y
1
7
O
E
C
D
c
o
u
n
-
t
r
i
e
s
;
1
9
8
3
-
1
9
9
3
O
E
C
D
s
t
r
i
c
t
n
e
s
s
r
a
n
k
i
n
g
f
o
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
-
t
i
o
n
o
f
d
i
s
m
i
s
s
a
l
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
d
o
v
e
r
r
e
g
-
u
l
a
r
a
n
d
ﬁ
x
e
d
-
t
e
r
m
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
(
O
E
C
D
(
1
9
9
4
)
,
T
a
b
l
e
6
.
7
,
p
a
n
e
l
B
,
c
o
l
.
2
)
.
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
r
a
i
s
e
s
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
-
m
e
n
t
,
w
i
t
h
s
t
r
o
n
g
e
r
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
f
o
r
y
o
u
t
h
a
n
d
l
o
n
g
-
t
e
r
m
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
.
E
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
s
n
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
.
82T
a
b
l
e
4
:
U
n
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
A
b
o
w
d
(
1
9
8
9
)
T
h
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
W
a
g
e
B
a
r
g
a
i
n
s
o
n
t
h
e
S
t
o
c
k
M
a
r
k
e
t
V
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
e
F
i
r
m
C
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
s
e
t
t
l
e
-
m
e
n
t
s
,
1
9
7
6
-
1
9
8
2
C
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
c
o
m
m
o
n
s
t
o
c
k
U
n
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
b
a
r
-
g
a
i
n
e
d
l
a
b
o
r
c
o
s
t
s
T
h
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
t
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
c
o
m
m
o
n
s
t
o
c
k
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
f
r
o
m
a
n
u
n
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
c
h
a
n
g
e
i
n
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
e
d
l
a
b
o
r
c
o
s
t
s
i
s
e
s
-
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
.
U
s
i
n
g
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
u
n
i
t
w
a
g
e
d
a
t
a
a
n
d
N
Y
S
E
s
t
o
c
k
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
,
i
t
i
s
s
h
o
w
n
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
d
o
l
l
a
r
-
f
o
r
-
d
o
l
l
a
r
t
r
a
d
e
o
f
f
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
s
e
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
.
T
h
i
s
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
s
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
w
i
t
h
s
t
o
c
k
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
s
b
a
s
e
d
o
n
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
v
a
l
u
e
m
a
x
i
m
i
z
i
n
g
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
i
a
l
d
e
-
c
i
s
i
o
n
s
(
H
o
t
e
l
l
i
n
g
’
s
l
e
m
m
a
)
.
T
h
e
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
f
o
r
t
h
e
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
t
h
a
t
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
s
m
a
x
i
m
i
z
e
t
h
e
s
u
m
o
f
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
’
a
n
d
u
n
i
o
n
m
e
m
b
e
r
s
’
w
e
a
l
t
h
.
A
l
l
e
n
(
1
9
8
4
)
U
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
C
o
n
-
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
W
o
r
k
e
r
s
A
r
e
M
o
r
e
P
r
o
d
u
c
-
t
i
v
e
U
.
S
.
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
,
1
9
7
2
V
a
l
u
e
a
d
d
e
d
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
T
h
i
s
p
a
p
e
r
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
o
n
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
i
s
m
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
i
n
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
l
i
n
k
a
g
e
s
a
r
e
d
i
s
t
i
n
c
t
f
r
o
m
t
h
o
s
e
s
t
u
d
i
e
d
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
l
y
i
n
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
s
e
t
t
i
n
g
s
.
A
p
p
r
e
n
t
i
c
e
-
s
h
i
p
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
a
n
d
h
i
r
i
n
g
h
a
l
l
s
p
r
o
b
a
b
l
y
r
a
i
s
e
u
n
i
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
-
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
w
h
i
l
e
j
u
r
i
s
d
i
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
d
i
s
p
u
t
e
s
a
n
d
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
v
e
w
o
r
k
r
u
l
e
s
l
o
w
e
r
i
t
.
U
s
i
n
g
B
r
o
w
n
a
n
d
M
e
d
o
f
f
s
m
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
,
u
n
i
o
n
p
r
o
-
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
b
y
v
a
l
u
e
a
d
d
e
d
p
e
r
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
,
i
s
4
5
t
o
5
2
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
h
i
g
h
e
r
t
h
a
n
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
s
t
o
1
7
t
o
2
2
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
w
h
e
n
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
a
r
e
a
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
p
r
i
c
e
d
i
f
-
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
a
r
e
u
s
e
d
t
o
d
e
ﬂ
a
t
e
v
a
l
u
e
a
d
d
e
d
.
O
c
c
u
p
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
m
i
x
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
a
n
d
,
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
y
,
a
p
p
r
e
n
t
i
c
e
s
h
i
p
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
f
o
r
1
5
t
o
2
7
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
i
s
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
.
A
l
l
e
n
(
1
9
8
6
)
T
h
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
U
n
i
o
n
i
s
m
O
n
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
I
n
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
l
y
a
n
d
P
u
b
l
i
c
l
y
O
w
n
e
d
H
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
a
n
d
N
u
r
s
i
n
g
-
h
o
m
e
s
P
u
b
l
i
c
l
y
a
n
d
p
r
i
-
v
a
t
e
l
y
o
w
n
e
d
h
o
s
-
p
i
t
a
l
s
a
n
d
n
u
r
s
i
n
g
h
o
m
e
s
,
1
9
7
6
V
a
l
u
e
a
d
d
e
d
,
s
q
u
a
r
e
f
e
e
t
U
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
,
u
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
*
p
u
b
l
i
c
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
T
h
i
s
p
a
p
e
r
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
s
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
w
i
t
h
i
n
a
s
a
m
p
l
e
o
f
p
u
b
l
i
c
l
y
a
n
d
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
l
y
o
w
n
e
d
h
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
s
a
n
d
n
u
r
s
i
n
g
h
o
m
e
s
t
o
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
p
u
b
l
i
c
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
i
n
ﬂ
u
-
e
n
c
e
s
u
n
i
o
n
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
.
T
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
s
h
o
w
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
o
r
s
i
s
m
u
c
h
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
i
n
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
t
h
a
n
i
n
p
u
b
l
i
c
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
.
W
i
t
h
i
n
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
o
f
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
,
t
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
-
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
a
r
e
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
b
u
t
v
e
r
y
i
m
p
r
e
c
i
s
e
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
A
l
l
e
n
(
1
9
8
6
)
U
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
i
n
O
f
ﬁ
c
e
B
u
i
l
d
-
i
n
g
a
n
d
S
c
h
o
o
l
C
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
o
f
ﬁ
c
e
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
c
o
m
-
p
l
e
t
e
d
i
n
1
9
7
3
-
7
4
,
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
i
n
1
9
7
2
V
a
l
u
e
a
d
d
e
d
,
s
q
u
a
r
e
f
e
e
t
U
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
T
h
i
s
s
t
u
d
y
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
t
h
e
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
i
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
u
n
i
o
n
a
n
d
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
o
r
s
i
n
t
h
e
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
w
o
s
a
m
p
l
e
s
,
o
n
e
o
f
8
3
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
o
f
ﬁ
c
e
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
s
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
i
n
1
9
7
3
-
7
4
a
n
d
t
h
e
o
t
h
e
r
o
f
6
8
e
l
e
m
e
n
t
a
r
y
a
n
d
s
e
c
-
o
n
d
a
r
y
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
i
n
1
9
7
2
.
A
n
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
t
h
a
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
f
o
r
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
i
n
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
-
l
a
b
o
r
r
a
t
i
o
s
,
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
b
l
e
l
a
-
b
o
r
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
,
r
e
g
i
o
n
,
a
n
d
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
i
n
t
h
e
o
f
ﬁ
c
e
b
u
i
l
d
i
n
g
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
w
a
s
a
t
l
e
a
s
t
3
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
h
i
g
h
e
r
t
h
a
n
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
d
i
n
t
e
r
m
s
o
f
s
q
u
a
r
e
f
e
e
t
o
f
ﬂ
o
o
r
s
p
a
c
e
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
p
e
r
h
o
u
r
w
o
r
k
e
d
;
a
n
d
f
r
o
m
z
e
r
o
t
o
2
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
h
i
g
h
e
r
i
n
s
c
h
o
o
l
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
,
m
e
a
-
s
u
r
e
d
i
n
p
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
u
n
i
t
s
a
n
d
v
a
l
u
e
a
d
d
e
d
,
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
l
y
.
B
e
c
k
e
r
a
n
d
O
l
s
o
n
(
1
9
9
0
)
T
h
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
t
h
e
N
L
R
A
o
n
S
t
o
c
k
-
h
o
l
d
e
r
W
e
a
l
t
h
i
n
t
h
e
1
9
3
0
s
F
i
r
m
s
a
t
r
i
s
k
o
f
b
e
-
i
n
g
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
1
9
3
0
s
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
a
v
e
r
-
a
g
e
e
x
c
e
s
s
r
e
t
u
r
n
N
L
R
A
a
n
d
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
e
v
e
n
t
s
W
h
e
r
e
a
s
m
o
s
t
r
e
c
e
n
t
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
e
x
a
m
i
n
i
n
g
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
t
h
e
N
L
R
A
o
n
l
a
b
o
r
-
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
a
s
f
o
c
u
s
e
d
o
n
t
h
e
i
m
-
p
a
c
t
o
f
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
s
o
f
t
h
e
l
a
w
,
t
h
i
s
s
t
u
d
y
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
a
n
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
o
f
t
h
e
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
t
h
e
p
a
s
s
a
g
e
o
f
t
h
e
N
L
R
A
o
n
7
5
ﬁ
r
m
s
t
h
a
t
w
e
r
e
a
t
g
r
e
a
t
r
i
s
k
o
f
b
e
i
n
g
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
1
9
3
0
s
.
T
a
k
i
n
g
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
w
e
a
l
t
h
a
s
a
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
t
h
e
s
h
i
f
t
i
n
t
h
e
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
o
f
p
o
w
e
r
c
a
u
s
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
N
L
R
A
,
t
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
ﬁ
n
d
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
p
a
s
s
a
g
e
o
f
t
h
e
N
L
R
A
c
a
u
s
e
d
a
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
a
n
d
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
-
c
a
l
l
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
i
n
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
w
e
a
l
t
h
f
o
r
t
h
e
s
a
m
p
l
e
d
ﬁ
r
m
s
.
S
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
a
l
l
y
,
b
y
A
p
r
i
l
1
9
3
7
,
s
t
o
c
k
h
o
l
d
e
r
w
e
a
l
t
h
i
n
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
m
s
w
a
s
1
5
.
9
%
l
o
w
e
r
t
h
a
n
w
o
u
l
d
h
a
v
e
b
e
e
n
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
h
a
d
t
h
e
N
L
R
A
n
o
t
b
e
e
n
e
n
a
c
t
e
d
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
B
e
c
k
e
r
a
n
d
O
l
s
o
n
(
1
9
9
2
)
U
n
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
F
i
r
m
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
U
.
S
.
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
s
,
1
9
7
7
E
x
c
e
s
s
v
a
l
u
e
,
p
r
i
c
e
-
c
o
s
t
m
a
r
g
i
n
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
T
h
i
s
s
t
u
d
y
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
-
t
u
r
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
,
e
x
t
e
n
d
i
n
g
e
a
r
l
i
e
r
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
b
y
c
o
m
b
i
n
i
n
g
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
-
l
e
v
e
l
a
n
d
ﬁ
r
m
-
l
e
v
e
l
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
.
U
s
i
n
g
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
,
w
e
ﬁ
n
d
t
h
a
t
q
u
a
s
i
-
r
e
n
t
s
f
r
o
m
ﬁ
r
m
i
n
-
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
i
n
i
n
t
a
n
g
i
b
l
e
a
s
s
e
t
s
a
r
e
a
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
s
o
u
r
c
e
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
t
h
a
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
m
a
r
k
e
t
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
c
c
u
r
l
a
r
g
e
l
y
i
n
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
s
t
1
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
ﬁ
r
m
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
,
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
i
n
g
s
p
i
l
l
o
v
e
r
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
n
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.
B
e
m
m
e
l
s
(
1
9
8
7
)
H
o
w
U
n
i
o
n
s
A
f
f
e
c
t
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
I
n
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
P
l
a
n
t
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
p
l
a
n
t
s
,
1
9
8
2
V
a
l
u
e
a
d
d
e
d
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
,
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
,
f
r
a
c
-
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
*
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
v
e
m
a
n
-
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
,
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
*
p
e
r
f
o
r
-
m
a
n
c
e
a
p
p
r
a
i
s
a
l
,
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
*
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
p
a
y
T
h
i
s
s
t
u
d
y
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
e
s
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
e
s
a
s
t
o
h
o
w
u
n
i
o
n
s
m
a
y
a
f
f
e
c
t
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
.
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
o
f
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
4
6
m
a
n
u
-
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
p
l
a
n
t
s
f
o
r
1
9
8
2
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
a
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
u
n
i
o
n
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
.
T
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
ﬁ
n
d
s
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
i
n
g
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
s
r
e
d
u
c
e
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
o
f
s
o
m
e
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
i
a
l
p
r
a
c
-
t
i
c
e
s
u
n
d
e
r
t
a
k
e
n
t
o
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
a
n
d
t
h
a
t
a
p
o
o
r
l
a
b
o
r
-
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
c
l
i
m
a
t
e
a
l
s
o
r
e
d
u
c
e
s
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
.
T
h
e
s
e
t
w
o
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
f
o
r
a
l
m
o
s
t
5
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
n
e
g
a
-
t
i
v
e
u
n
i
o
n
i
m
p
a
c
t
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
B
l
a
c
k
a
n
d
L
y
n
c
h
(
2
0
0
1
)
H
o
w
t
o
C
o
m
p
e
t
e
:
T
h
e
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
W
o
r
k
p
l
a
c
e
P
r
a
c
-
t
i
c
e
s
a
n
d
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
-
t
i
o
n
T
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
o
n
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
,
1
9
8
7
-
1
9
9
3
S
a
l
e
s
U
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
,
u
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
*
T
Q
M
(
t
o
t
a
l
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
m
a
n
a
g
e
-
m
e
n
t
s
y
s
t
e
m
)
,
u
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
*
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
h
a
r
i
n
g
f
o
r
n
o
n
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
i
a
l
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
U
s
i
n
g
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
a
u
n
i
q
u
e
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
l
y
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
v
e
,
s
a
m
p
l
e
o
f
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
s
,
t
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
t
h
e
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
w
o
r
k
p
l
a
c
e
p
r
a
c
-
t
i
c
e
s
,
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
,
a
n
d
h
u
m
a
n
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
.
T
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
a
n
a
u
g
m
e
n
t
e
d
C
o
b
b
-
D
o
u
g
l
a
s
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
w
i
t
h
b
o
t
h
c
r
o
s
s
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
p
a
n
e
l
d
a
t
a
c
o
v
e
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
p
e
r
i
o
d
o
f
1
9
8
7
-
1
9
9
3
,
u
s
i
n
g
b
o
t
h
w
i
t
h
i
n
a
n
d
G
M
M
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
o
r
s
.
I
t
i
s
f
o
u
n
d
t
h
a
t
i
t
i
s
n
o
t
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
a
n
e
m
-
p
l
o
y
e
r
a
d
o
p
t
s
a
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
w
o
r
k
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
b
u
t
r
a
t
h
e
r
h
o
w
t
h
a
t
w
o
r
k
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
i
s
a
c
t
u
a
l
l
y
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
i
n
t
h
e
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
-
m
e
n
t
t
h
a
t
i
s
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
h
i
g
h
e
r
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
.
U
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
t
h
a
t
h
a
v
e
a
d
o
p
t
e
d
h
u
m
a
n
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
t
h
a
t
p
r
o
m
o
t
e
j
o
i
n
t
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
m
a
k
i
n
g
c
o
u
p
l
e
d
w
i
t
h
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
-
b
a
s
e
d
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
t
i
o
n
h
a
v
e
h
i
g
h
e
r
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
t
h
a
n
o
t
h
e
r
s
i
m
i
-
l
a
r
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
p
l
a
n
t
s
,
w
h
e
r
e
a
s
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
s
t
h
a
t
m
a
i
n
-
t
a
i
n
m
o
r
e
t
r
a
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
l
a
b
o
r
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
a
v
e
l
o
w
e
r
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
.
F
i
n
a
l
l
y
,
p
l
a
n
t
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
i
s
h
i
g
h
e
r
i
n
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
s
w
i
t
h
m
o
r
e
-
e
d
u
c
a
t
e
d
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
o
r
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
u
s
a
g
e
b
y
n
o
n
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
i
a
l
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
s
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
B
r
o
n
a
r
s
a
n
d
D
e
e
r
e
(
1
9
9
0
)
U
n
i
o
n
R
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
-
t
i
o
n
E
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
F
i
r
m
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
U
.
S
.
u
n
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
-
t
i
o
n
s
,
1
9
6
2
-
1
9
8
0
P
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
d
a
t
e
e
x
c
e
s
s
r
e
t
u
r
n
;
c
e
r
t
i
ﬁ
c
a
t
i
o
n
d
a
t
e
e
x
c
e
s
s
r
e
t
u
r
n
F
i
r
m
a
n
d
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
U
n
i
o
n
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
s
i
n
ﬁ
r
m
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
I
n
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
t
o
t
h
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
m
e
a
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
o
n
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
n
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
ﬁ
r
m
s
,
t
h
e
r
e
e
x
i
s
t
s
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
t
i
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
h
e
m
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
o
f
e
q
u
i
t
y
l
o
s
s
e
s
a
c
r
o
s
s
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
e
v
e
n
t
s
.
C
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
v
a
r
i
a
-
t
i
o
n
i
n
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
e
q
u
i
t
y
l
o
s
s
e
s
c
a
n
b
e
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
l
a
b
o
r
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
t
y
o
f
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
m
,
t
h
e
s
i
z
e
o
f
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
w
a
g
e
p
r
e
m
i
u
m
a
n
d
f
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
m
’
s
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
,
t
h
e
p
r
e
s
-
e
n
c
e
o
r
a
b
s
e
n
c
e
o
f
r
i
g
h
t
-
t
o
-
w
o
r
k
l
a
w
s
i
n
t
h
e
s
t
a
t
e
w
h
e
r
e
t
h
e
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
i
s
h
e
l
d
,
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
w
o
r
k
e
r
s
c
o
v
e
r
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
r
e
p
r
e
-
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
,
a
n
d
t
h
e
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
u
n
i
o
n
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
-
t
a
t
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
i
n
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
m
.
T
h
e
e
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
t
h
a
t
e
q
u
i
t
y
l
o
s
s
e
s
a
r
e
t
h
e
g
r
e
a
t
e
s
t
i
n
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
w
h
e
r
e
u
n
i
o
n
w
a
g
e
g
a
i
n
s
a
r
e
t
h
e
h
i
g
h
e
s
t
a
n
d
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
r
a
t
e
s
a
r
e
t
h
e
l
a
r
g
e
s
t
,
a
n
d
i
n
t
h
e
m
o
s
t
l
a
b
o
r
-
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
v
e
ﬁ
r
m
s
,
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
s
i
z
e
o
f
t
h
e
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
u
n
i
t
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
.
T
h
e
l
a
t
t
e
r
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
t
h
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
c
e
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
s
p
i
l
l
o
v
e
r
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
B
r
o
n
a
r
s
a
n
d
D
e
e
r
e
(
1
9
9
4
)
U
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
-
E
v
i
-
d
e
n
c
e
o
f
S
p
i
l
l
o
v
e
r
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
U
.
S
.
u
n
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
-
t
i
o
n
s
,
1
9
6
2
-
1
9
8
0
E
x
c
e
s
s
r
e
t
u
r
n
P
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
d
a
t
e
R
u
b
a
c
k
a
n
d
Z
i
m
m
e
r
m
a
n
’
s
(
1
9
8
4
)
e
v
e
n
t
s
t
u
d
y
,
w
h
i
c
h
s
h
o
w
e
d
t
h
a
t
f
o
r
m
a
l
u
n
i
o
n
-
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
i
n
g
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
l
y
l
o
w
e
r
s
a
ﬁ
r
m
’
s
m
a
r
k
e
t
v
a
l
u
e
,
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
c
o
m
p
e
l
l
i
n
g
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
-
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
d
u
c
e
s
a
ﬁ
r
m
’
s
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
U
n
i
o
n
-
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
i
n
g
a
c
t
i
v
-
i
t
y
m
a
y
a
l
s
o
h
a
v
e
s
i
z
a
b
l
e
c
r
o
s
s
-
ﬁ
r
m
o
r
s
p
i
l
l
o
v
e
r
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
n
t
h
e
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
o
f
n
e
i
g
h
b
o
r
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
s
.
T
h
u
s
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
i
n
g
o
n
t
h
e
w
e
a
l
t
h
o
f
ﬁ
r
m
o
w
n
e
r
s
m
a
y
b
e
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
-
t
i
a
l
l
y
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
t
e
d
b
y
f
o
c
u
s
i
n
g
o
n
l
y
o
n
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
m
i
n
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
-
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
i
n
g
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
o
c
c
u
r
s
.
T
h
i
s
p
a
p
e
r
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
a
n
a
l
t
e
r
-
n
a
t
i
v
e
a
p
p
r
o
a
c
h
f
o
r
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
n
g
u
n
i
o
n
s
p
i
l
l
o
v
e
r
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
n
p
r
o
f
-
i
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
u
s
i
n
g
a
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
a
n
d
m
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
t
o
R
u
b
a
c
k
a
n
d
Z
i
m
m
e
r
m
a
n
’
s
.
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
o
f
t
h
e
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
N
L
R
B
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
t
o
n
e
ﬁ
r
m
o
n
t
h
e
s
h
a
r
e
p
r
i
c
e
s
o
f
o
t
h
e
r
ﬁ
r
m
s
i
n
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
n
a
r
r
o
w
l
y
d
e
ﬁ
n
e
d
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
s
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
,
a
f
t
e
r
c
r
o
s
s
-
ﬁ
r
m
o
r
s
p
i
l
l
o
v
e
r
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
a
r
e
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
,
a
r
e
n
e
a
r
l
y
t
h
r
e
e
t
i
m
e
s
a
s
l
a
r
g
e
a
s
t
h
e
o
w
n
-
ﬁ
r
m
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
b
y
R
u
b
a
c
k
a
n
d
Z
i
m
m
e
r
m
a
n
.
B
r
o
w
n
a
n
d
M
e
d
o
f
f
(
1
9
7
8
)
T
r
a
d
e
U
n
i
o
n
s
i
n
t
h
e
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
c
e
s
s
U
.
S
.
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
,
1
9
7
2
V
a
l
u
e
a
d
d
e
d
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
I
n
o
r
d
e
r
t
o
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
s
o
n
w
o
r
k
e
r
p
r
o
d
u
c
-
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
a
C
o
b
b
-
D
o
u
g
l
a
s
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
i
s
m
o
d
i
ﬁ
e
d
s
o
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
a
s
a
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
.
T
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
f
o
r
m
i
s
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
t
o
t
h
a
t
u
s
e
d
t
o
i
s
o
l
a
t
e
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
w
o
r
k
e
r
q
u
a
l
-
i
t
y
i
n
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
.
U
s
i
n
g
s
t
a
t
e
b
y
t
w
o
-
d
i
g
i
t
S
I
C
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
-
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
U
.
S
.
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
,
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
f
o
u
n
d
t
o
h
a
v
e
a
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
t
i
a
l
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
o
u
t
p
u
t
p
e
r
w
o
r
k
e
r
.
H
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
t
h
i
s
r
e
s
u
l
t
d
e
p
e
n
d
s
o
n
t
w
o
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
a
s
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
s
w
h
i
c
h
w
e
c
a
n
-
n
o
t
v
e
r
i
f
y
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
;
a
t
t
e
m
p
t
s
t
o
r
e
l
a
x
t
h
e
s
e
a
s
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
s
a
r
e
n
o
t
c
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
v
e
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
C
l
a
r
k
(
1
9
8
0
a
)
T
h
e
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
U
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
:
A
C
a
s
e
S
t
u
d
y
S
i
x
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
i
n
U
.
S
.
c
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
-
d
u
s
t
r
y
,
1
9
5
3
-
1
9
7
6
T
o
n
s
p
e
r
m
a
n
h
o
u
r
U
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
T
h
i
s
s
t
u
d
y
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
t
h
e
u
s
e
o
f
t
i
m
e
-
s
e
r
i
e
s
d
a
t
a
o
n
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
i
n
t
h
e
U
.
S
.
c
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
.
T
h
e
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
c
o
m
b
i
n
e
s
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
-
c
a
l
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
i
m
p
a
c
t
a
n
d
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
s
w
i
t
h
u
n
i
o
n
a
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
ﬁ
c
i
a
l
s
t
o
f
o
r
g
e
a
l
i
n
k
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
e
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
t
h
e
t
r
a
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
i
o
n
a
l
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
p
o
l
i
c
y
a
n
d
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
.
T
h
e
e
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
d
e
a
l
s
p
r
i
m
a
r
i
l
y
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
o
f
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
i
n
g
f
o
r
i
n
t
e
r
ﬁ
r
m
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
i
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
s
u
c
h
a
s
t
h
e
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
o
f
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
a
n
d
a
l
s
o
f
o
r
t
h
e
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
u
n
i
o
n
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
l
a
b
o
r
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
.
T
h
e
c
a
s
e
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
a
r
e
d
e
s
i
g
n
e
d
t
o
s
h
o
w
t
h
e
s
p
e
c
i
ﬁ
c
w
a
y
s
i
n
w
h
i
c
h
u
n
i
o
n
-
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
f
f
e
c
t
s
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
.
T
h
e
e
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
l
e
a
d
s
t
o
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
g
a
i
n
s
,
d
e
r
i
v
i
n
g
i
n
l
a
r
g
e
p
a
r
t
f
r
o
m
a
s
e
r
i
e
s
o
f
e
x
t
e
n
s
i
v
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l
a
n
d
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
.
C
l
a
r
k
(
1
9
8
0
b
)
U
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
P
r
o
d
u
c
-
t
i
v
i
t
y
:
M
i
c
r
o
-
E
c
o
n
o
m
e
t
r
i
c
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
U
.
S
.
c
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
d
u
s
-
t
r
y
,
1
9
7
3
-
1
9
7
6
T
o
n
s
p
e
r
m
a
n
h
o
u
r
U
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
I
t
i
s
w
i
d
e
l
y
a
g
r
e
e
d
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
f
f
e
c
t
s
t
h
e
r
u
l
e
s
a
n
d
p
r
o
-
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
i
n
g
t
h
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
e
d
e
s
-
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
.
T
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
t
h
e
s
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
o
n
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
h
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
i
s
u
n
c
l
e
a
r
.
T
h
i
s
i
s
s
u
e
i
s
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
d
u
s
i
n
g
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
U
.
S
.
c
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
.
A
p
o
s
-
i
t
i
v
e
u
n
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
t
h
e
o
r
d
e
r
o
f
6
-
8
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
i
s
f
o
u
n
d
i
n
b
o
t
h
c
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
t
i
m
e
s
e
r
i
e
s
d
a
t
a
.
A
l
t
h
o
u
g
h
s
o
m
e
c
a
u
t
i
o
n
i
s
i
n
o
r
d
e
r
i
n
i
n
t
e
r
p
r
e
t
i
n
g
t
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
,
t
h
e
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
s
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
c
a
n
l
e
a
d
t
o
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
C
l
a
r
k
(
1
9
8
4
)
U
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
F
i
r
m
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
:
T
h
e
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
,
G
r
o
w
t
h
,
a
n
d
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
-
l
i
n
e
b
u
s
i
-
n
e
s
s
e
s
,
1
9
7
0
-
1
9
8
0
S
a
l
e
s
,
v
a
l
u
e
a
d
d
e
d
,
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
n
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
,
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
n
s
a
l
e
s
,
r
a
t
e
o
f
g
r
o
w
t
h
o
f
d
e
-
ﬂ
a
t
e
d
s
a
l
e
s
U
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
T
h
e
h
i
s
t
o
r
y
o
f
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
i
n
t
h
e
U
.
S
.
h
a
s
b
e
e
n
m
a
r
k
e
d
b
y
d
r
a
m
a
t
i
c
e
p
i
s
o
d
e
s
o
f
c
o
n
f
r
o
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
t
h
a
t
u
n
d
e
r
s
c
o
r
e
t
h
e
c
h
a
n
g
e
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
b
r
i
n
g
s
t
o
t
h
e
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
a
n
e
n
t
e
r
-
p
r
i
s
e
.
I
n
s
p
i
t
e
o
f
t
h
e
d
i
f
f
u
s
i
o
n
o
f
m
a
n
y
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
r
e
c
e
n
t
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
h
a
s
r
e
v
e
a
l
e
d
t
h
e
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
i
n
g
e
x
i
s
t
e
n
c
e
o
f
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
u
n
i
o
n
a
n
d
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
i
n
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
g
o
v
e
r
n
i
n
g
c
o
m
p
e
n
s
a
-
t
i
o
n
,
e
x
i
t
a
n
d
e
n
t
r
y
,
d
i
s
p
u
t
e
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
p
r
o
m
o
t
i
o
n
.
U
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
w
o
r
k
s
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
m
o
r
e
t
h
a
n
o
n
e
m
e
d
i
a
t
i
n
g
f
a
c
t
o
r
a
n
d
t
h
e
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
o
n
a
g
i
v
e
n
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
o
f
ﬁ
r
m
p
e
r
f
o
r
-
m
a
n
c
e
d
e
p
e
n
d
s
o
n
t
h
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
u
l
a
r
c
o
n
t
e
x
t
i
n
w
h
i
c
h
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
a
n
d
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
t
a
k
e
p
l
a
c
e
.
T
h
i
s
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
u
s
e
s
m
i
c
r
o
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
d
a
t
a
o
n
o
v
e
r
9
0
0
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
-
l
i
n
e
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
s
t
o
g
a
u
g
e
t
h
e
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
o
n
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
.
A
c
l
e
a
r
i
m
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
o
f
t
h
e
t
h
e
o
r
e
t
i
c
a
l
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
i
s
t
h
e
n
e
e
d
t
o
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
i
n
d
i
-
c
a
t
o
r
s
o
f
ﬁ
r
m
b
e
h
a
v
i
o
r
i
n
o
r
d
e
r
t
o
d
r
a
w
i
n
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
a
b
o
u
t
t
h
e
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
c
o
n
s
e
q
u
e
n
c
e
s
o
f
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
.
C
o
o
k
e
(
1
9
9
4
)
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
P
a
r
t
i
c
-
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
,
G
r
o
u
p
-
B
a
s
e
d
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
,
a
n
d
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
P
e
r
-
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
:
A
U
n
i
o
n
-
N
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
C
o
m
p
a
r
i
s
o
n
M
i
c
h
i
g
a
n
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
-
t
u
r
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
s
,
1
9
8
9
V
a
l
u
e
a
d
d
e
d
U
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
w
o
r
k
t
e
a
m
s
a
n
d
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
/
g
a
i
n
s
h
a
r
i
n
g
p
l
a
n
T
h
i
s
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
u
n
i
o
n
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
p
o
s
i
-
t
i
v
e
l
y
o
r
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
i
n
ﬂ
u
e
n
c
e
s
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
o
f
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
a
n
d
g
r
o
u
p
-
b
a
s
e
d
i
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
i
n
i
m
p
r
o
v
-
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
.
E
x
a
m
i
n
e
d
a
t
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
m
l
e
v
e
l
,
a
m
o
d
e
l
o
f
t
h
e
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
a
n
d
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
f
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
,
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
n
d
g
a
i
n
s
h
a
r
i
n
g
,
a
n
d
u
n
i
o
n
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
d
a
t
a
o
n
8
4
1
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
s
i
n
M
i
c
h
i
g
a
n
i
n
1
9
8
9
.
T
h
e
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
t
h
a
t
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
d
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
t
i
a
l
l
y
m
o
r
e
t
o
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
i
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
ﬁ
r
m
s
t
h
a
n
i
n
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
ﬁ
r
m
s
,
w
h
e
r
e
a
s
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
n
d
g
a
i
n
s
h
a
r
-
i
n
g
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
c
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
d
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
t
i
a
l
l
y
m
o
r
e
t
o
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
i
n
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
ﬁ
r
m
s
t
h
a
n
i
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
ﬁ
r
m
s
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
D
i
N
a
r
d
o
a
n
d
L
e
e
(
2
0
0
4
)
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
I
m
p
a
c
t
s
o
f
N
e
w
U
n
i
o
n
-
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
S
e
c
t
o
r
E
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
s
:
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
1
U
.
S
.
u
n
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
-
t
i
o
n
s
,
1
9
8
4
-
1
9
9
9
T
o
t
a
l
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
s
h
i
p
-
m
e
n
t
s
V
o
t
e
s
h
a
r
e
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
s
a
r
e
d
i
f
ﬁ
c
u
l
t
t
o
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
i
n
t
h
e
a
b
s
e
n
c
e
o
f
l
a
r
g
e
,
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
v
e
d
a
t
a
o
n
e
s
-
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
w
i
t
h
u
n
i
o
n
s
t
a
t
u
s
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
.
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
r
e
a
l
s
o
c
o
n
f
o
u
n
d
e
d
b
y
s
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
b
i
a
s
,
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
u
n
i
o
n
s
c
o
u
l
d
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
e
a
t
h
i
g
h
l
y
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
l
e
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
t
h
a
t
a
r
e
m
o
r
e
l
i
k
e
l
y
t
o
g
r
o
w
a
n
d
p
a
y
h
i
g
h
e
r
w
a
g
e
s
.
U
s
i
n
g
m
u
l
t
i
p
l
e
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
-
l
e
v
e
l
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
s
t
h
a
t
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
m
e
n
t
s
t
h
a
t
f
a
c
e
d
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
i
n
g
d
r
i
v
e
s
i
n
t
h
e
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
1
9
8
4
-
1
9
9
9
,
t
h
i
s
p
a
p
e
r
u
s
e
s
a
r
e
-
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
d
i
s
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
i
t
y
d
e
s
i
g
n
t
o
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
t
h
e
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
-
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
s
u
r
v
i
v
a
l
,
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
o
u
t
p
u
t
,
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
-
i
t
y
,
a
n
d
w
a
g
e
s
.
E
s
s
e
n
t
i
a
l
l
y
,
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
f
o
r
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
s
w
h
e
r
e
u
n
i
o
n
s
b
a
r
e
l
y
w
o
n
t
h
e
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
(
e
.
g
.
,
b
y
o
n
e
v
o
t
e
)
a
r
e
c
o
m
-
p
a
r
e
d
w
i
t
h
t
h
o
s
e
w
h
e
r
e
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
s
b
a
r
e
l
y
l
o
s
t
.
T
h
e
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
ﬁ
n
d
s
s
m
a
l
l
i
m
p
a
c
t
s
o
n
a
l
l
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
s
t
h
a
t
w
e
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
;
e
s
t
i
-
m
a
t
e
s
f
o
r
w
a
g
e
s
a
r
e
c
l
o
s
e
t
o
z
e
r
o
.
T
h
e
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
s
t
h
a
t
–
a
t
l
e
a
s
t
i
n
r
e
c
e
n
t
d
e
c
a
d
e
s
–
t
h
e
l
e
g
a
l
m
a
n
d
a
t
e
t
h
a
t
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
s
t
h
e
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
t
o
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
w
i
t
h
a
c
e
r
t
i
ﬁ
e
d
u
n
i
o
n
h
a
s
h
a
d
l
i
t
t
l
e
e
c
o
-
n
o
m
i
c
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
r
s
,
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
u
n
i
o
n
s
h
a
v
e
b
e
e
n
s
o
m
e
-
w
h
a
t
u
n
s
u
c
c
e
s
s
f
u
l
a
t
s
e
c
u
r
i
n
g
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
w
a
g
e
g
a
i
n
s
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
E
b
e
r
t
s
a
n
d
S
t
o
n
e
(
1
9
8
7
)
T
e
a
c
h
e
r
U
n
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
P
r
o
d
u
c
-
t
i
v
i
t
y
o
f
P
u
b
l
i
c
S
c
h
o
o
l
s
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
p
r
o
-
g
r
a
m
s
,
l
a
t
e
1
9
7
0
s
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
i
z
e
d
t
e
s
t
s
c
o
r
e
s
U
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
D
o
t
e
a
c
h
e
r
u
n
i
o
n
s
a
f
f
e
c
t
t
h
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
o
f
p
u
b
l
i
c
s
c
h
o
o
l
s
?
T
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
t
h
i
s
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
u
s
i
n
g
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
S
u
s
t
a
i
n
i
n
g
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
S
u
r
v
e
y
s
p
o
n
s
o
r
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
U
.
S
.
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
o
f
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
.
H
o
l
d
i
n
g
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
c
o
n
s
t
a
n
t
a
n
d
u
s
i
n
g
a
c
h
i
e
v
e
m
e
n
t
g
a
i
n
s
o
n
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
i
z
e
d
t
e
s
t
s
a
s
t
h
e
m
e
a
-
s
u
r
e
o
f
o
u
t
p
u
t
,
t
h
e
y
ﬁ
n
d
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
a
r
e
s
e
v
e
n
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
m
o
r
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
e
f
o
r
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
.
F
o
r
t
h
e
m
i
n
o
r
i
t
y
o
f
s
t
u
-
d
e
n
t
s
w
h
o
a
r
e
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
l
y
a
b
o
v
e
o
r
b
e
l
o
w
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
,
h
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
d
i
s
t
r
i
c
t
s
a
r
e
m
o
r
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
e
b
y
a
b
o
u
t
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
m
a
r
-
g
i
n
,
a
p
p
a
r
e
n
t
l
y
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
t
e
a
c
h
e
r
u
n
i
o
n
s
r
e
d
u
c
e
t
h
e
u
s
e
o
f
s
p
e
-
c
i
a
l
i
z
e
d
i
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
t
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
s
.
T
h
i
s
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
s
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
e
n
t
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
v
i
e
w
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
s
t
e
n
d
t
o
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
i
z
e
t
h
e
w
o
r
k
p
l
a
c
e
.
A
c
r
o
s
s
a
l
l
s
t
u
d
e
n
t
s
,
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
u
n
i
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
a
d
v
a
n
t
a
g
e
i
s
t
h
r
e
e
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
.
E
h
r
e
n
b
e
r
g
e
t
a
l
.
(
1
9
8
3
)
U
n
i
o
n
s
a
n
d
P
r
o
-
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
i
n
t
h
e
P
u
b
l
i
c
S
e
c
t
o
r
:
A
S
t
u
d
y
o
f
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
L
i
b
r
a
r
i
e
s
M
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
l
i
-
b
r
a
r
i
e
s
,
1
9
7
7
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
i
n
f
o
r
-
m
a
t
i
o
n
r
e
q
u
e
s
t
s
,
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
b
o
r
-
r
o
w
e
r
s
,
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
i
n
t
e
r
l
i
b
r
a
r
y
l
o
a
n
s
,
t
o
t
a
l
c
i
r
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
,
b
o
o
k
a
n
d
p
e
r
i
o
d
i
-
c
a
l
c
i
r
c
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
U
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
T
h
i
s
p
a
p
e
r
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
s
a
n
d
i
l
l
u
s
t
r
a
t
e
s
t
h
e
u
s
e
o
f
t
w
o
m
e
t
h
o
d
-
o
l
o
g
i
e
s
t
o
a
n
a
l
y
z
e
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
s
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
i
n
t
h
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
s
e
c
t
o
r
.
A
l
t
h
o
u
g
h
t
h
e
m
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
i
e
s
a
r
e
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
b
l
e
t
o
a
w
i
d
e
v
a
r
i
e
t
y
o
f
p
u
b
l
i
c
s
e
c
t
o
r
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
t
h
e
f
o
c
u
s
o
f
t
h
e
p
a
p
e
r
i
s
o
n
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
l
i
b
r
a
r
i
e
s
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
o
f
t
h
e
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
d
a
t
a
.
T
h
e
e
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
,
w
h
i
c
h
u
s
e
s
1
9
7
7
c
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
d
a
t
a
o
n
2
6
0
l
i
b
r
a
r
i
e
s
,
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
s
t
h
a
t
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
c
o
v
-
e
r
a
g
e
h
a
s
n
o
t
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
l
y
a
f
f
e
c
t
e
d
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
i
n
m
u
n
i
c
i
p
a
l
l
i
b
r
a
r
i
e
s
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
H
i
r
s
c
h
(
1
9
9
1
)
U
n
i
o
n
C
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
a
n
d
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
A
m
o
n
g
U
n
i
t
e
d
S
t
a
t
e
s
F
i
r
m
s
U
.
S
.
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
s
,
1
9
7
2
-
1
9
8
0
T
o
b
i
n
’
s
q
,
r
a
t
e
o
f
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
n
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
T
h
i
s
p
a
p
e
r
u
t
i
l
i
z
e
s
u
n
i
q
u
e
s
u
r
v
e
y
d
a
t
a
o
n
l
a
b
o
r
u
n
i
o
n
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
a
t
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
m
l
e
v
e
l
t
o
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
u
n
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
n
t
h
e
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
7
0
5
U
.
S
.
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
d
u
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
1
9
7
0
s
.
M
a
r
k
e
t
v
a
l
u
e
a
n
d
e
a
r
n
-
i
n
g
s
a
r
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
t
o
b
e
a
b
o
u
t
1
0
%
-
1
5
%
l
o
w
e
r
i
n
a
n
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
t
h
a
n
i
n
a
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
c
o
m
p
a
n
y
,
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
e
x
t
e
n
s
i
v
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
f
o
r
ﬁ
r
m
a
n
d
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
.
D
e
l
e
t
e
-
r
i
o
u
s
u
n
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
n
ﬁ
r
m
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
a
r
e
s
i
z
a
b
l
e
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
o
u
t
t
h
e
1
9
7
2
-
8
0
p
e
r
i
o
d
,
b
u
t
v
a
r
y
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
b
l
y
a
c
r
o
s
s
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
.
T
h
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
l
y
p
o
o
r
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
c
o
m
p
a
-
n
i
e
s
m
a
y
h
e
l
p
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
t
h
e
r
e
c
e
n
t
d
e
c
l
i
n
e
i
n
U
.
S
.
u
n
i
o
n
m
e
m
-
b
e
r
s
h
i
p
.
H
i
r
s
c
h
a
n
d
C
o
n
n
o
l
l
y
(
1
9
8
7
)
D
o
U
n
i
o
n
s
C
a
p
t
u
r
e
M
o
n
o
p
o
l
y
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
?
U
.
S
.
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
s
,
1
9
7
7
T
o
b
i
n
’
s
q
,
r
a
t
e
o
f
r
e
t
u
r
n
o
n
s
a
l
e
s
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
T
h
i
s
p
a
p
e
r
c
h
a
l
l
e
n
g
e
s
t
h
e
c
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
r
e
a
c
h
e
d
i
n
r
e
c
e
n
t
s
t
u
d
-
i
e
s
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
s
r
e
d
u
c
e
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
e
x
c
l
u
s
i
v
e
l
y
i
n
h
i
g
h
l
y
c
o
n
c
e
n
-
t
r
a
t
e
d
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
.
F
r
o
m
t
h
e
i
r
r
e
v
i
e
w
o
f
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
i
r
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
o
f
1
9
7
7
d
a
t
a
o
n
3
6
7
F
o
r
t
u
n
e
5
0
0
ﬁ
r
m
s
,
t
h
e
a
u
-
t
h
o
r
s
c
o
n
c
l
u
d
e
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
n
o
c
o
n
v
i
n
c
i
n
g
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
t
h
a
t
c
o
n
-
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
s
m
o
n
o
p
o
l
y
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
f
o
r
u
n
i
o
n
s
t
o
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
.
M
o
r
e
o
v
e
r
,
t
h
e
y
ﬁ
n
d
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
w
a
g
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
i
s
n
o
t
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
i
n
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
d
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
e
s
,
a
s
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
h
y
p
o
t
h
e
s
i
s
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
s
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
.
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
i
s
f
o
u
n
d
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
i
n
g
t
h
a
t
a
ﬁ
r
m
’
s
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
h
a
r
e
,
i
t
s
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
o
n
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
a
n
d
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
,
a
n
d
i
t
s
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
f
r
o
m
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
m
o
r
e
l
i
k
e
l
y
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
f
o
r
u
n
i
o
n
r
e
n
t
s
t
h
a
n
d
o
e
s
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
L
e
e
a
n
d
M
a
s
(
2
0
0
9
)
L
o
n
g
-
R
u
n
I
m
-
p
a
c
t
s
o
f
U
n
i
o
n
s
o
n
F
i
r
m
s
:
N
e
w
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
,
1
9
6
1
-
1
9
9
9
U
.
S
.
u
n
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
-
t
i
o
n
s
,
1
9
6
1
-
1
9
9
9
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
r
e
t
u
r
n
E
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
T
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
n
e
w
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
ﬁ
r
m
s
’
e
q
u
i
t
y
v
a
l
u
e
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
1
9
6
1
-
1
9
9
9
p
e
r
i
o
d
u
s
i
n
g
a
n
e
w
l
y
a
s
s
e
m
-
b
l
e
d
s
a
m
p
l
e
o
f
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
L
a
b
o
r
R
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
B
o
a
r
d
(
N
L
R
B
)
r
e
p
-
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
s
m
a
t
c
h
e
d
t
o
s
t
o
c
k
m
a
r
k
e
t
d
a
t
a
.
E
v
e
n
t
-
s
t
u
d
y
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
s
h
o
w
a
n
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
u
n
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
n
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
m
e
q
u
i
v
a
l
e
n
t
t
o
a
c
o
s
t
o
f
a
t
l
e
a
s
t
$
4
0
,
5
0
0
p
e
r
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
w
o
r
k
e
r
.
A
t
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
t
i
m
e
,
p
o
i
n
t
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
f
r
o
m
a
r
e
g
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
-
d
i
s
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
i
t
y
d
e
s
i
g
n
–
c
o
m
p
a
r
i
n
g
t
h
e
s
t
o
c
k
m
a
r
k
e
t
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
f
c
l
o
s
e
u
n
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
w
i
n
s
t
o
c
l
o
s
e
l
o
s
s
e
s
–
a
r
e
c
o
n
-
s
i
d
e
r
a
b
l
y
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
a
n
d
c
l
o
s
e
t
o
z
e
r
o
.
T
h
e
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
e
s
a
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
c
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e
a
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
r
e
-
t
u
r
n
s
a
n
d
t
h
e
v
o
t
e
s
h
a
r
e
i
n
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
o
f
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
,
w
h
i
c
h
a
l
l
o
w
s
t
o
r
e
c
o
n
c
i
l
e
t
h
e
s
e
s
e
e
m
i
n
g
l
y
c
o
n
t
r
a
d
i
c
t
o
r
y
ﬁ
n
d
i
n
g
s
.
U
s
i
n
g
t
h
e
m
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
s
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
,
t
h
e
a
t
h
o
r
s
c
a
l
i
b
r
a
t
e
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
a
l
"
m
e
d
i
a
n
v
o
t
e
r
"
m
o
d
e
l
o
f
e
n
d
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
u
n
i
o
n
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
o
r
d
e
r
t
o
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
c
o
u
n
t
e
r
f
a
c
t
u
a
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
s
i
m
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
o
f
p
o
l
i
c
i
e
s
t
h
a
t
w
o
u
l
d
m
a
r
g
i
n
a
l
l
y
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
e
t
h
e
e
a
s
e
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
.
L
o
v
e
l
l
e
t
a
l
.
(
1
9
8
8
)
T
h
e
E
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
U
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
L
a
b
o
r
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
:
S
o
m
e
A
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
a
l
E
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
U
.
S
.
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
,
1
9
4
8
-
1
9
7
3
G
D
P
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
F
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
B
r
o
w
n
a
n
d
M
e
d
o
f
f
(
1
9
7
8
)
,
a
n
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
h
a
v
e
i
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
e
d
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
l
a
b
o
r
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
-
i
t
y
u
s
i
n
g
a
l
o
g
-
l
i
n
e
a
r
,
C
o
b
b
-
D
o
u
g
l
a
s
m
o
d
e
l
o
f
t
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
y
.
T
o
d
e
r
i
v
e
t
h
i
s
m
o
d
e
l
,
a
ﬁ
r
s
t
-
o
r
d
e
r
T
a
y
l
o
r
-
s
e
r
i
e
s
a
p
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
t
o
t
h
e
i
n
t
r
i
n
s
i
c
a
l
l
y
n
o
n
l
i
n
e
a
r
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
s
m
a
d
e
;
t
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
i
n
g
l
i
n
e
a
r
e
q
u
a
t
i
o
n
i
s
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
i
z
e
d
l
e
a
s
t
-
s
q
u
a
r
e
s
(
G
L
S
)
t
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
s
.
T
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
d
e
m
o
n
s
t
r
a
t
e
t
h
a
t
t
h
i
s
a
p
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
s
a
b
i
a
s
t
h
a
t
n
e
c
e
s
s
a
r
i
l
y
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
i
n
a
n
o
v
e
r
s
t
a
t
e
m
e
n
t
o
f
t
h
e
a
b
s
o
l
u
t
e
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
e
e
x
a
c
t
u
n
i
o
n
p
r
o
-
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
e
f
f
e
c
t
.
T
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
i
l
l
u
s
t
r
a
t
e
t
h
e
m
a
g
n
i
t
u
d
e
o
f
t
h
i
s
b
i
a
s
b
y
c
o
m
p
a
r
i
n
g
G
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
l
i
n
e
a
r
B
r
o
w
n
-
M
e
d
o
f
f
m
o
d
e
l
w
i
t
h
G
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
o
f
t
h
e
e
x
a
c
t
,
n
o
n
l
i
n
e
a
r
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
-
s
h
i
p
,
u
s
i
n
g
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
t
i
m
e
-
s
e
r
i
e
s
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
d
o
m
e
s
-
t
i
c
s
e
c
t
o
r
o
f
t
h
e
U
.
S
.
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
M
a
c
h
i
n
(
1
9
9
1
)
T
h
e
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
O
f
U
n
i
o
n
-
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
A
n
d
F
i
r
m
S
i
z
e
I
n
B
r
i
t
i
s
h
E
n
g
i
n
e
e
r
i
n
g
F
i
r
m
s
5
2
B
r
i
t
i
s
h
e
n
g
i
-
n
e
e
r
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
s
o
v
e
r
t
h
e
p
e
r
i
o
d
1
9
7
8
-
8
2
v
a
l
u
e
-
a
d
d
e
d
S
e
v
e
r
a
l
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
p
r
e
s
e
n
c
e
A
v
e
r
a
g
e
u
n
i
o
n
n
o
n
-
u
n
i
o
n
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
n
l
a
b
o
u
r
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
e
s
t
i
-
m
a
t
e
d
u
s
i
n
g
t
h
i
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
,
o
r
u
s
i
n
g
a
d
u
m
m
y
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
i
n
d
i
-
c
a
t
i
n
g
t
h
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
c
e
o
f
c
l
o
s
e
d
-
s
h
o
p
a
r
r
a
n
g
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
a
r
e
f
o
u
n
d
t
o
b
e
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
i
n
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
.
H
o
w
e
v
e
r
,
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
s
o
m
e
v
a
r
i
a
t
i
o
n
a
r
o
u
n
d
t
h
i
s
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
,
a
n
d
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
v
a
l
u
e
a
d
d
e
d
p
e
r
e
m
p
l
o
y
e
e
i
s
f
o
u
n
d
t
o
d
e
p
e
n
d
s
i
g
n
i
ﬁ
c
a
n
t
l
y
o
n
ﬁ
r
m
s
i
z
e
,
t
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
e
f
f
e
c
t
s
b
e
i
n
g
m
o
r
e
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
i
n
l
a
r
g
e
r
ﬁ
r
m
s
.
M
i
t
c
h
e
l
l
a
n
d
S
t
o
n
e
(
1
9
9
2
)
U
n
i
o
n
E
f
f
e
c
t
s
o
n
P
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
:
E
v
i
-
d
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
W
e
s
t
-
e
r
n
U
.
S
.
S
a
w
m
i
l
l
s
W
e
s
t
e
r
n
U
.
S
.
s
a
w
m
i
l
l
s
,
1
9
8
6
L
u
m
b
e
r
(
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
b
o
a
r
d
f
e
e
t
)
U
n
i
o
n
d
u
m
m
y
T
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
c
o
n
j
e
c
t
u
r
e
t
h
a
t
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
h
a
v
e
t
e
n
d
e
d
t
o
o
v
e
r
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
t
h
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
ﬁ
r
m
s
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
t
o
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
ﬁ
r
m
s
d
u
e
t
o
i
n
a
d
e
q
u
a
t
e
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
f
o
r
o
u
t
p
u
t
q
u
a
l
-
i
t
y
a
n
d
i
n
p
u
t
u
s
a
g
e
-
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
o
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
s
i
f
t
h
e
h
i
g
h
e
r
c
o
s
t
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
l
a
b
o
r
l
e
a
d
s
t
o
l
e
s
s
l
a
b
o
r
-
i
n
t
e
n
s
i
v
e
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
s
a
n
d
t
e
c
h
n
i
q
u
e
s
.
T
o
a
v
o
i
d
t
h
o
s
e
p
r
o
b
l
e
m
s
,
t
h
i
s
s
t
u
d
y
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
a
f
a
i
r
l
y
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
i
z
e
d
c
o
m
m
o
d
i
t
y
,
l
u
m
b
e
r
,
a
n
d
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
f
o
r
d
e
-
t
a
i
l
e
d
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
a
t
t
r
i
b
u
t
e
s
a
n
d
i
n
p
u
t
s
.
A
n
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
o
f
d
a
t
a
f
r
o
m
a
s
u
r
v
e
y
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
b
y
t
h
e
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
s
a
w
m
i
l
l
s
w
e
r
e
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
1
2
%
a
n
d
2
1
%
l
e
s
s
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
e
t
h
a
n
n
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
m
i
l
l
s
i
n
ﬁ
s
c
a
l
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
6
.
A
s
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
e
d
,
w
h
e
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
a
n
d
r
a
w
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
u
s
a
g
e
a
r
e
n
o
t
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
i
n
t
h
e
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
,
t
h
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
i
s
b
i
a
s
e
d
u
p
w
a
r
d
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
R
u
b
a
c
k
a
n
d
Z
i
m
m
e
r
m
a
n
(
1
9
8
4
)
U
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
:
E
v
-
i
d
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
t
h
e
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
M
a
r
k
e
t
U
.
S
.
u
n
i
o
n
e
l
e
c
-
t
i
o
n
s
,
1
9
6
2
-
1
9
8
0
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
r
e
t
u
r
n
P
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
c
e
r
t
i
ﬁ
-
c
a
t
i
o
n
d
a
t
e
s
T
h
i
s
p
a
p
e
r
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
t
h
e
e
f
f
e
c
t
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
o
n
t
h
e
p
r
o
f
-
i
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
f
ﬁ
r
m
s
.
A
b
n
o
r
m
a
l
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
c
o
m
m
o
n
s
t
o
c
k
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
f
o
r
a
s
a
m
p
l
e
o
f
2
5
3
N
Y
S
E
-
l
i
s
t
e
d
ﬁ
r
m
s
a
r
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
f
o
r
t
h
e
m
o
n
t
h
i
n
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
s
f
o
r
a
n
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
n
d
f
o
r
t
h
e
m
o
n
t
h
i
n
w
h
i
c
h
t
h
e
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
L
a
b
o
r
R
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
B
o
a
r
d
c
e
r
t
i
ﬁ
e
s
t
h
e
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
.
T
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
o
n
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
,
i
s
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
a
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
i
n
e
q
u
i
t
y
v
a
l
u
e
.
W
h
e
n
u
n
i
o
n
s
w
i
n
a
n
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
,
t
h
e
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
l
o
s
s
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
d
r
i
v
e
i
s
3
.
8
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
o
f
e
q
u
i
t
y
v
a
l
u
e
.
W
h
e
n
u
n
i
o
n
s
l
o
s
e
a
n
e
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
,
t
h
e
r
e
i
s
a
n
a
v
e
r
a
g
e
n
e
t
r
e
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
o
f
1
.
3
p
e
r
-
c
e
n
t
i
n
t
h
e
e
q
u
i
t
y
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
t
h
e
ﬁ
r
m
.
S
a
l
i
n
g
e
r
(
1
9
8
4
)
T
o
b
i
n
’
s
Q
,
U
n
i
o
n
-
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
,
a
n
d
t
h
e
C
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
-
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
R
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
-
s
h
i
p
M
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
s
,
1
9
7
9
T
o
b
i
n
’
s
q
,
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
r
a
t
e
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
T
h
i
s
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
u
s
e
s
T
o
b
i
n
’
s
q
,
t
h
e
r
a
t
i
o
o
f
t
h
e
m
a
r
k
e
t
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
a
ﬁ
r
m
t
o
t
h
e
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
m
e
n
t
v
a
l
u
e
o
f
i
t
s
p
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
a
s
s
e
t
s
,
t
o
m
e
a
-
s
u
r
e
m
o
n
o
p
o
l
y
p
o
w
e
r
a
n
d
t
o
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
t
h
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
a
n
d
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
.
T
o
b
i
n
’
s
q
i
s
a
b
e
t
t
e
r
m
e
a
-
s
u
r
e
o
f
m
o
n
p
o
l
y
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
t
h
a
n
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
o
f
s
i
n
g
l
e
-
p
e
r
i
o
d
p
r
o
f
-
i
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
b
e
c
a
u
s
e
i
t
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
l
o
n
g
-
r
u
n
m
o
n
o
p
o
l
y
p
o
w
e
r
.
I
n
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
,
i
t
i
s
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
t
o
l
e
s
s
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
e
r
r
o
r
a
n
d
i
t
c
o
n
-
t
a
i
n
s
a
n
a
d
j
u
s
t
m
e
n
t
f
o
r
r
i
s
k
.
T
h
e
r
e
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
q
a
n
d
l
o
n
g
-
r
u
n
m
o
n
o
p
o
l
y
p
o
w
e
r
i
s
e
s
t
a
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
.
P
r
o
v
i
d
e
d
t
h
a
t
a
l
l
i
n
-
p
u
t
s
a
r
e
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
d
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
l
y
,
q
s
h
o
u
l
d
b
e
h
i
g
h
l
y
s
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
e
t
o
e
v
e
n
s
m
a
l
l
a
m
o
u
n
t
s
o
f
m
o
n
o
p
o
l
y
p
o
w
e
r
.
S
i
n
c
e
t
h
e
l
e
v
e
l
o
f
q
i
s
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
l
y
n
o
t
h
i
g
h
i
n
t
h
e
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
,
t
h
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
s
e
i
t
h
e
r
t
h
a
t
m
o
n
o
p
o
l
y
p
o
w
e
r
i
s
a
b
s
e
n
t
o
r
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
s
m
a
n
a
g
e
t
o
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
m
o
n
o
p
o
l
y
r
e
n
t
s
.
E
m
p
i
r
i
c
a
l
t
e
s
t
s
o
f
t
h
e
r
e
l
a
-
t
i
o
n
s
h
i
p
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
T
o
b
i
n
’
s
q
a
n
d
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
o
f
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
a
n
d
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
e
v
i
d
e
n
c
e
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
s
d
o
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
m
o
s
t
m
o
n
o
p
o
l
y
r
e
n
t
s
.A
u
t
h
o
r
,
y
e
a
r
a
n
d
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
T
i
t
l
e
S
a
m
p
l
e
M
a
i
n
D
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
M
a
i
n
I
n
d
e
p
e
n
-
d
e
n
t
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
o
n
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
V
o
o
s
a
n
d
M
i
s
h
e
l
(
1
9
8
6
)
T
h
e
U
n
i
o
n
I
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
P
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
:
E
v
i
-
d
e
n
c
e
f
r
o
m
I
n
d
u
s
-
t
r
y
P
r
i
c
e
-
C
o
s
t
M
a
r
-
g
i
n
D
a
t
a
U
.
S
.
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
ﬁ
r
m
s
,
1
9
6
8
-
1
9
7
2
P
r
i
c
e
-
c
o
s
t
m
a
r
g
i
n
F
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
u
n
i
o
n
i
z
e
d
T
h
i
s
p
a
p
e
r
u
s
e
s
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
p
r
i
c
e
-
c
o
s
t
m
a
r
g
i
n
d
a
t
a
t
o
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
t
h
e
e
x
t
e
n
t
t
o
w
h
i
c
h
u
n
i
o
n
s
r
e
d
u
c
e
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
.
E
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
f
o
r
t
h
e
e
n
d
o
g
e
n
e
i
t
y
o
f
u
n
i
o
n
s
t
a
t
u
s
a
r
e
c
o
n
t
r
a
s
t
e
d
w
i
t
h
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
t
h
a
t
a
s
s
u
m
e
u
n
i
o
n
s
t
a
t
u
s
i
s
e
x
o
g
e
n
o
u
s
a
n
d
n
o
t
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
d
i
n
p
a
r
t
b
y
e
i
t
h
e
r
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
o
r
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
.
E
n
d
o
g
e
n
e
-
i
t
y
i
s
f
o
u
n
d
t
o
b
e
a
n
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
i
n
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
i
n
g
t
h
e
u
n
i
o
n
i
m
p
a
c
t
o
n
p
r
o
ﬁ
t
s
:
t
w
o
-
s
t
a
g
e
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
a
r
e
c
o
n
s
i
d
e
r
a
b
l
y
l
a
r
g
e
r
t
h
a
n
O
L
S
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
s
.
T
h
e
ﬁ
n
a
l
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
e
x
p
l
o
r
e
s
t
h
e
t
o
t
a
l
e
s
t
i
m
a
t
e
d
r
e
d
i
s
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
f
r
o
m
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
t
o
l
a
b
o
r
i
n
t
h
e
m
a
n
u
f
a
c
-
t
u
r
i
n
g
s
e
c
t
o
r
.
A
n
i
m
p
o
r
t
a
n
t
c
o
n
c
l
u
s
i
o
n
i
s
t
h
a
t
u
n
i
o
n
s
r
a
i
s
e
p
r
i
c
e
s
l
e
s
s
t
h
a
n
w
a
s
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
l
y
b
e
l
i
e
v
e
d
.